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Abstract
The introduction of market-based measures to combat CO2 emissions from international
transport will affect countries with a higher dependence on international trade and tourism
to a greater extent than those relying more on domestic markets. This thesis quantifies
the resulting changes in real income in the trade and tourism sector in 123 countries. It
consists of three main parts.
The first part explores the relative price changes of operational mitigation strategies in
ocean freight versus air freight, based upon a logit model that is embedded into a trade
model with homogeneous firms. Results indicate that the slow steaming of ships could
reduce CO2 emissions from international trade by a significant amount (50%) and with
only little impacts on welfare (-0.6%).
The second part derives—in the absence of dedicated theoretical frameworks—a gravity
model of international tourism. Estimating the demand model yields a price elasticity of
four, which is similar to estimates in international trade. Unlike in trade however, the
calculated welfare gains vary widely across countries and can be as high as 54% for small
island developing states (SIDS).
The third part combines the tourism model and a simplified version of the trade model into
a multi-sector, multi-country general equilibrium model to examine the economic impact
of a global bunker fuel levy in the international air and maritime transport industry. The
resulting economic cost of reducing one tonne of CO2 in both industries corresponds to
approximately $400 in global value added. A carbon price of $150/tCO2 could raise all of
the $100 billion of global climate finance needed, while 318 Mt of transport related CO2
could be abated cost-effectively each year. This scheme would result into a nonrecurring
drop in gross world product of 0.13% and, except for SIDS and landlocked countries, be
non-discriminatory against developing countries.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Economic activity is intertwined via international trade and tourism. This interdepend-
ence results from having access to goods and services at lower cost from foreign countries.
In economic terms, trade and tourism globalisation is therefore beneficial. At the same
time however, international trade and tourism impact the environment through transport
energy use and emissions. Studies related to environmental policy analysis in international
transport consist of environmental impact assessments at the local and global level, optim-
isation and operational research studies (fuel optimisation, route optimisation, integrated
assessment models), technology and innovation research studies (use and production of
biofuels, electrification), studies related to supply responses (technology uptakes, marginal
abatement cost curves, game theory), as well as studies related to the demand responses
(welfare impacts, mode choice behaviour).
This thesis focuses on the demand responses. It evaluates the demand implications of
environmental transport policies in international trade and tourism. It starts by laying
out a theoretical framework for international trade and tourism, continues by collecting
data and estimating key structural model parameters thereof, and ends by calculating
the changes in consumer prices and income within a general equilibrium condition in the
industry and tourism sectors in each country. It then uses these results to investigate
patterns of discrimination (if any) against countries with a high dependency on either
international trade or tourism and their level of development (developing vs. developed
countries) if international transport would be subject to an environmental tax. Results of
this thesis therefore provide insight into environmental policy regulation and development
at the intergovernmental level.
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1.1 Context
National economies are linked through trade and tourism. In 2015, the dollar value of
world merchandise exports reached 17 trillion, a quarter of world economic output (WTO,
2013). In the same year, the tourism sector comprised 1.2 billion travellers who spent US$
1.26 trillion in foreign countries, corresponding to a 7% share of the world’s exports in
goods and services or a tenth of world economic output (UNWTO, 2016).
Both the aviation and maritime transport industries are prime facilitators of global trade
and tourism. Air and sea transport are dependent on fossil fuels, which, when burned, form
CO2. Trade and tourism therefore impact the environment through transport emissions. In
2013, the international aviation and maritime industry released 1,100 million tonnes of CO2
(MtCO2), representing a 4.7% share of global energy related CO2 (IEA, 2015). Slightly
more than half of these emissions is related to the import and export of manufacturing
goods and natural resources. The remainder of the emissions is related to the inbound and
outbound travel of passengers. Table 1.1 gives an overview.
Despite significant technological progress—particularly in the aviation industry (see e.g.
Schäfer et al., 2009)—emissions from both industries have been growing rapidly over the
last couple of years and are thus of increasing concern. Given the increasing importance
of international trade and tourism in a globalised world, international transport emissions
are likely to further increase in the future, with projected growth rates of around 2.4% per
year1.
Table 1.1: International transport CO2 emissions by transport activity in 2013.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Activity Trade Tourism Total
[MtCO2] [MtCO2] [MtCO2]
International transport 645 455 1,099
International sea transport 581 28 609
Non-manufacturing trade 265 0 265
Bulk 131 0 131
Oil 98 0 98
Gas 36 0 36
Manufacturing trade 316 0 316
Containerized 161 0 161
Other 155 0 155
Passenger 0 28 28
International air transport 63 427 490
Passenger (incl. belly freight) 27 427 454
Manufacturing trade (dedicated freighter) 37 0 37
Notes: Numbers refer to million metric tons of CO2. Source: IEA (2015) with a year 2012 %-split by
ship type from IMO (2014) and a year 2013 %-split between dedicated air freight carriers and freight
transported in passenger aircraft (belly freight) from Boeing (2014). The split between air passenger
and air cargo transport emissions is approximated by comparing global RPK and converted RTK 2013
values.
1Calculated as the compound annual growth rate between 1990-2013 using numbers from the IEA
(2015).
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De-carbonising the international transport system however remains a challenge. In com-
parison to most other industrial sectors, both international transport industries have only a
relatively limited number of mitigation options available2, next to low fleet turnover rates,
which cause a comparatively long delay in implementing these options.
Given the anticipated emission growth rates on the one hand, and the limited number
of mitigation options available at a significant higher cost on the other, a substantial de-
carbonisation of both industries in the long term can thus only be achieved through regu-
latory or market-based measures (MBMs). MBMs provide alternatives to reduce emissions
through levies, trading of allowances, or offsets. Given this flexibility, MBMs are often pre-
ferred over regulatory measures and the international transport industry is no exception
(ICAO, 2016, IMO, 2016).
Once confronted with an MBM, transport firms in both the international aviation and
maritime industry will strive to absorb as little as possible of the associated cost increases
and therefore pass them down the supply chain to consumers in the form of price increases.
MBMs in international transport will therefore inevitably impact the industry and tour-
ism sector in each country through higher consumer prices, and thus affect the volume,
direction, and composition of international trade and tourism. At the same time, countries
with a higher dependency on international trade and tourism will be affected to a greater
extent than those relying more on domestic markets. The questions to what extent car-
bon emissions pricing schemes in international transport cause global economic impacts
and disproportionate economic welfare losses have been debated at intergovernmental or-
ganisations for years and have now become one of the most pressing barriers to practical
implementation (UNFCCC, 2012, ICAO, 2016, IMO, 2016).
1.2 Problem statement
MBMs are the preferred mechanism to ensure a significant de-carbonisation of the inter-
national transport industries over a relatively shorter period of time (see section above).
Concerns over these policy measures however exist with respect to causing disproportion-
ate economic impacts and discrimination against countries with a higher dependency on
international trade and tourism (ICS, 2017, ICAO, 2016).
To date, there is limited research that examines the role of international transport in the
industry and tourism sectors in each country and how these sectors are affected by exo-
genous price shocks through international transport. Although transport research focuses
2Technologies enhancements in international aviation and maritime transport must not significantly
compromise payload and range capabilities e.g. due to excess weight. Other sectors are able to utilise
carbon capture and storage technologies, heat recuperation with large heat exchangers, alternative energy
storage systems such as batteries in road transport or reduce emissions at the tailpipe with large-scale
filters.
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on many crucial aspects influencing demand (e.g. the analysis of travel behaviour), the
link to consumer theory and the underlying theoretical frameworks is often omitted (e.g.
Martinez, Kauppila and Gachassin, 2014; Gallagher and Taylor, 2003; Keen, Parry and
Strand, 2013; Ben-Akiva and De Jong, 2013; Keum, 2008; Balli, Balli and Louis, 2016).
Limitations therefore exist with respect to the combined treatment of consumer demand
and transport supply and the combined analysis of the trade and tourism sectors for four
main reasons.
First, the link between consumer demand and transport supply is rarely accomplished
in the literature. Transport is vital to make goods and services accessible to consumers.
The demand for transport is therefore a direct result of the consumers demand for goods
and services. Yet, it is common practice in the literature to treat consumer demand
and transport supply independently of one another. Models of consumer demand usually
account for some form of transport costs, but do not specify in detail what these costs
entail (Krugman, 1980; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Melitz, 2003). This makes the impacts
of exogenous fuel price shocks on consumer prices difficult to quantify. For example, the
costs of a transport firm include labour, material, capital, and fuel costs (to name but a
few). Without the link between consumer demand and transport supply, the level of cost
increases from individual cost elements (e.g. fuel costs) passed down the supply chain to
consumers in the form of price increases cannot be determined. The difficulties that arise
from an independent treatment of consumer demand and transport supply can also be
identified in models of international transport systems. Although they are often rich in
detail, changes to transport demand are usually treated as exogenous (OECD ITF, 2015;
Reynolds et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2011) by using e.g. off-line results of future projections
of trade between countries. In this case too, exogenous fuel price shocks cannot be linked
to changes in consumer prices and hence consumer demand.
Second, if the link between consumer demand and transport supply is accomplished, short-
comings in the model specification exist. One of the key economic tools to link consumer
demand with transport supply is the gravity model. Gravity equations in international
trade link bilateral trade demand (imports) to relative price differences across countries
and multilateral resistance terms (price indexes). Given the log-linear nature of the gravity
equation, the independent variables need to be specified in multiplicative form. The cost
component related to transport therefore needs to be transformed into the one plus the ad
valorem tax equivalent to the production costs, so as to be compliant with the theoretical
framework of consumer demand (gravity). In many research projects related to transport
demand, this transformation is rarely accomplished (e.g. The Economist Intelligence Unit,
2008; Vivid Economics, 2010; Cristea et al., 2013).
Third, no theoretical framework exists for international tourism flows. In contrast to
the well established literature on trade theory and theoretical models of trade (Krugman,
1980; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Melitz, 2003), no theoretical framework exists that links
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international tourism spending to a country’s economic output and thus welfare. Most of
the research related to tourism is concerned with economic and ecological impact analyses
on a country level and the sustainable development of tourism (e.g. Mathieson, Wall et al.,
1982; Archer, Cooper and Ruhanen, 2005; Sharpley, 2000; Ceballos-Lascuráin et al., 1996).
In the absence of dedicated theoretical frameworks, the gains from international tourism
across countries have therefore never been investigated before. Linked to this uncertainty
are the welfare impacts associated with exogenous price shocks on international transport
(aviation in particular), which can therefore not be quantified.
Fourth, the combined economic analysis of the industry, tourism, and transport sectors
has never been accomplished before. Table 1.1 illustrates that the international air and
maritime transport industries are intrinsically interlinked through trade. If all aircraft are
operated under an MBM, the tourism sector will be affected through passenger transport
and the industry sector through the transport of freight in international trade. Once an
MBM is enacted in either the aviation and maritime transport industry, it is likely that
the other sector will follow and introduce an MBM as a result of increased societal and
political pressure. A combined treatment thus becomes important to holistically under-
stand the economic impacts at the country level, as some countries are more dependent on
international tourism receipts or industrial export revenues than others.
Given the multitude of issues and challenges involved in establishing the link between
consumer demand and transport supply in the trade and tourism sectors and although
the policy debate on environmental regulation in international transport is perennial, the
question to what extent the industry and tourism sectors are subject to economic impacts
as a result of a carbon emissions pricing scheme in international transport has not been
investigated thoroughly in the literature.
1.3 Aim and Scope
The aim of this thesis is to quantify the country-level economic impacts that result from a
carbon price in international transport. To achieve this objective, this thesis (i) develops a
theoretical framework of consumer demand for international trade and tourism, (ii) collects
and estimates missing data on prices, transport costs, and gross output in each sector, (iii)
estimates macro-level predictors of global trade and tourism flows, (iv) builds a general-
equilibrium model using the theoretical frameworks of consumer demand and the estimated
parameters, and (v) quantifies changes in real income in each sector and country (for which
data can be obtained).
The models include both the demand and supply side. On the demand side, trade and
tourism are described using gravity equations. On the supply side, the costs associated
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with the international transport of goods and services are described using a cost function
of a representative transport firm. The two models are balanced via transport prices. With
knowledge of the price elasticity of demand, changes in transport costs can be linked to
changes in prices and hence changes in demand. On a country level, these results provide
insight into the magnitude of welfare impacts in each sector that are to be expected if in-
ternational transport is subject to a market-based CO2 reduction policy. On a global level,
the calculated economic impacts across countries provide insight into patterns of discrim-
ination against countries with a higher dependency on international trade and tourism.
Limits to this research mainly arise from the modelling framework. As general equilibrium
models are not capable of determining price levels uniquely, the obtained results are calcu-
lated relative to a chosen reference or constant (the numeraire). The general equilibrium
model iterates over the changes in income and consumption in each sector and country. In
this way, the calculated changes reflect general equilibrium changes on the demand side in
the trade and tourism sectors. The iteration over (reduced) consumer demand and (hence
reduced) transport supply (impacting transport prices) is not accomplished in this thesis
as a result of the significant increase in modelling complexity (see Section 7.2).
This study does also not account for any transition dynamics in moving the global economy
from an environmentally unconstrained to an environmentally constrained international
transport system. This includes the dynamics of technology uptakes and operational effi-
ciency improvements on the supply side as well as firm entry and exit and changes in labour
supply on the demand side. On the supply side, technology uptakes and improvements
in operational efficiency are assumed to scale approximately linearly with increases in fuel
costs. On the demand side, since carbon emissions pricing schemes mainly affect marginal
costs, the changes in fixed costs and firm entry and exit are assumed to be insignificant
and are therefore ignored.
Due to data limitations, this thesis does also not take into account spillover effects, indi-
vidual price adjustments by transport firms on strategically important trade and tourism
routes (network effects), the embodied carbon in goods imports (see e.g. Figure 3 in Grubb
et al., 2015) and any form or carbon leakage. Not incorporating these effects (including the
transition dynamics mentioned above) allows to investigate the welfare implications in isol-
ation, which is pedagogically useful, considering the complexity involved in the interaction
of global flows in terms of income and spending in each sector and country.
1.4 Significance of the study
This thesis makes contributions on a theoretical, empirical, and policy level. On a the-
oretical level, one intended outcome of the study is to develop a theoretical framework
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of international trade by mode of transport and a theoretical framework of international
tourism. Both theoretical frameworks could influence future research in the economics
discipline, and in particular in the macroeconomics discipline related to tourism. As no
theoretical framework exists to explain international tourism flows, the model developed
in this thesis could be useful for other researchers, as it can be extended in many possible
ways to account for additional micro and macro-level predictors of tourism.
A second intended outcome of the study is to develop and provide a general equilibrium
model of the industry, tourism and international transport sectors that could be used for
further research to e.g. study specific policy designs. The model could also be extended
by linking the trade model and tourism model with partial equilibrium models of the air
and marine transport system (see future work in Chapter 7) to arrive at an integrated
assessment model in which mode shifts and technology uptakes are treated endogenously.
On an empirical level, a third intended outcome of the study is to estimate the value of
time in international trade and to estimate the price elasticity of demand in international
tourism. Many transport related studies use parameter estimates of the value of time to
transfer transport costs into generalised costs. Estimates of the price elasticities of demand
are also frequently used either as an input to other studies (e.g. to calculate the welfare
impacts) or as a benchmark for comparison.
A fourth intended outcome of the study is to establish a dataset (including estimates in
case of missing data) of domestic income and expenditure and international income and
expenditure by sector (industry and tourism) and country. This dataset could be used
for further research in the macroeconomics and transport economics field as it links and
compares a country’s international contribution to and dependency on trade and tourism.
On a policy level, a final intended outcome of the study is to quantify the extent of
which carbon emission pricing schemes in international transport lead to discrimination
against countries with a relatively high dependency on income from international trade
and tourism. In particular, this study addresses the concerns of many countries to be
discriminated by environmental policy schemes in international air and maritime transport
(ICAO, 2016, ICS, 2017). It provides insight into the extent of which discrimination
may be expected (if any) and discusses ways of how these may be overcome in the form
of rebate mechanisms. It therefore reduces the uncertainty associated with the demand
implications of international policies governing trade and tourism. Results of this study
therefore provide insight to policy makers at the intergovernmental level.
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1.5 Overview of the study
This thesis consists of seven further chapters. The following Chapter 2 provides a review
of the literature in four main parts, including a review of the economics literature on (1)
trade and (2) tourism, (3) a review of the literature on international transport and the
environment, and (4) a review of the legal policy framework of international transport
policies.
Chapter 3 describes the methodology employed in this study. The point of departure for
the described analysis are theory-consistent, multi-country gravity models of international
trade and tourism. These models are then used in counterfactual exercises to investigate
the economic impacts of exogenous price shocks.
Chapter 4 focuses on column 2, Chapter 5 on column 3 of Table 1.1.
Chapter 4 develops a theoretical framework of consumer demand to explain international
trade flows by mode of transport. The model features on the supply side a component
of transport and time costs that firms minimise with respect to choosing an optimum
transport mode for exporting. The value of time in international trade is estimated using
trade data by mode of transport from Eurostat. The theoretical framework and parameter
estimates are used to explore relative price changes of operational mitigation strategies in
ocean freight versus air freight.
Chapter 5 develops—in the absence of dedicated theoretical frameworks—a model of com-
parative advantage in international tourism. The model describes consumers of having
discrete choices over worldwide locations to undertake activities. The resulting system of
equations is shown to be observationally equivalent to the standard gravity equation in
international trade, implicating a parsimonious way to learn about a country’s compet-
itiveness and economic dependency on international tourism. Data on airfares and the
number of tourist arrivals by country are used to estimate the price elasticity of demand
in international tourism, which, in combination with the theoretical framework, is used to
calculate the gains from international tourism across countries.
Chapter 6 then combines the tourism model and a simplified version of the trade model
(without air freight) into a multi-sector, multi-country general equilibrium model. This
model is then used to quantify changes in real income in more than 100 countries by
imposing a carbon tax in the form of a global bunker fuel levy in the international aviation
and maritime industry.
Chapters 7 contains the discussion and Chapter 8 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Literature review
This literature review consists of four sections, each of which addresses one of the main
topics of this thesis as follows. The first section provides a review of the economics literature
on trade theory, with a focus on models of trade by mode of transport. Section 2.2 provides
a review of the economics literature related to tourism. Section 2.3 provides a review of the
economics and transport literature related to international transport and the environment
and the policy cases investigated. The last section provides a review of the legal policy
framework of international transport policies.
2.1 Trade
The section on trade gives a brief overview of the macroeconomics literature related to
trade theory, the gravity equation, the gains from trade, and the role of transport in trade.
Trade Theory. Three substantial contributions shaped the evolution of trade theory.
In chronological order, these are: Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, Krugman’s
theory of economic geography, and the theoretical literature on firm heterogeneity and
trade.
One of the most celebrated insights in the theory of international trade is Ricardo’s concep-
tual framework of absolute and comparative advantage. Because countries have differential
access to technology, their productivity varies across goods and countries. As formalised
in Eaton and Kortum (2002), a country’s state of technology reflects its absolute advant-
age in producing some varieties of the goods at a lower cost, relative to other varieties of
goods, compared to another country1. Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage therefore
1A number of numerical examples can been associated with the concept of comparative advantage.
For example, if z denotes the labour required per unit of output of products A and B, country j has an
absolute advantage in product A if zAj < z
A
i , and a comparative advantage in product A if z
A
j /z
B
j < z
A
i /z
B
i
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predicts that countries should specialise in producing and exporting commodities in which
they are relatively more productive.
Comparative advantage among countries may however arise for several reasons. Heckscher
(1919) and Ohlin (1935) identified the role of differences in factor endowments as a de-
terminant of comparative advantage. In this case, countries are assumed to have identical
states of technology but different factor endowments. The Heckscher-Ohlin theorem states
that a country is led to specialise in the production of goods that use its relatively abund-
ant factor more intensively. Exporting such goods leads to a rise in the real and relative
return to its relatively abundant factor (Panagariya, 2009). A country is therefore led to
import products that demand its relatively scarce factor more intensively. Because of these
features, the Heckscher-Ohlin model is often applied in the form of a two-factor (labour
and capital), two-good, and two-country model, as e.g. formalised by Samuelson (1948).
It is therefore not ideally suited to the research aim and scope of this thesis.
Monopolistic competition among firms with economies of scale on the one hand, and the
presence of trade costs on the other (often referred to as economic geography), affects trade
through an additional channel, which Krugman (1980) identified as home-market effect.
In a frictionless world without trade costs, firms can sell to all countries at equal cost. In
the presence of trade costs however, firms in countries with larger domestic markets of a
particular good specialise in the production of these goods relative to countries with smaller
markets (Helpman, 2011). In this way, firms can cheaply supply the larger market and
its costs associated with supplying the smaller, more expensive market remain relatively
low, so as to realise economies of scale. Firms may therefore locate near a market with
higher production costs (higher labour costs) but better access to markets (less trade
costs) (Krugman, 1991, p. 96). As a result, a disproportionately higher number of firms
will locate in the larger market and locations of larger markets will be supplying goods to
other markets and therefore become net-exporting markets. The location of production in
space is referred to as ’economic geography’.
Krugman shows in his 1980 paper that international trade is related to patterns in which
one location emerges as the manufacturing core, while the other becomes an agricultural
periphery (referred to as core-periphery equilibrium) due to large economies of scale, low
transport costs and a large share of manufacturing in expenditure (Krugman, 1991, p.
113). A higher share of manufacturing in expenditure makes a core-periphery pattern
due to stronger forward and backward linkages more likely, while an increase in the price
elasticity of demand for any particular good lowers the importance of economies of scale
and makes a core-periphery pattern more difficult to sustain. These two economic forces
may outweigh comparative advantage in a frictionless world without trade costs. In other
words, “trade need not be a result of international differences in technology or factor
(Maneschi, 2009). The product with a relatively lower cost of production is exported in exchange for the
other.
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endownments" (Krugman, 1979). A number of studies followed to identify home market
effects (e.g. Helpman, 1987; Head and Ries, 2001; Hanson and Xiang, 2004).
Krugman’s alternative theory to explain trade is referred to as New Trade Theory. Trade
models where productivity does not vary across firms within a country are also referred to
as Homogeneous Firm Models to distinguish them from Heterogeneous Firm Models, which
are described next.
In the monopolistic competition model of trade with homogeneous firms, it is profit max-
imising for firms to (costlessly) leave one set and produce another, unique set of product
varieties. Countries are therefore completely specialised in different product varieties and
utilise intraindustry trade (Feenstra, 2003b). As shown by Melitz (2003) however, trade
liberalization leads to within-industry reallocations of resources across firms, as evidenced
by micro-level data on plants and firms (Bernard, Jensen and Lawrence, 1995; Bernard
and Jensen, 1999). This raises average industry productivity as low-productivity firms
exit and high-productivity firms expand to enter export markets (Melitz and Redding,
2015). Trade liberalisation therefore also raises firm productivity. And theories of firm
heterogeneity and trade (Melitz, 2003; Yeaple, 2003; Bernard et al., 2003) provide a better
understanding of mechanisms through which an economy responds to trade through entry
and exit of firms, and the expansion of and higher productivity of exporting firms. Trade
models where productivity varies across countries and across firms within a country are
referred to as Heterogeneous Firm Models. The collection of models which focus on firm
heterogeneity and trade, as formalised by Melitz (2003), are sometimes also referred to
as ’New’ New Trade Theory, to be able to distinguish them from the collection of models
related to New Trade Theory.
There has been a rapid uptake of the Melitz (2003) model of firm-level heterogeneity and
product differentiation with monopolistic competition in the literature. Among the many
applications of this model, three studies are mentioned with respect to their model ex-
tensions. Antràs and Helpman (2004) let heterogeneous firms choose different ownership
structures and supplier locations. Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) include realloca-
tions of resources both within and across industries and countries, and the resulting job
turnover in all sectors. Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011) develop a multiple-product,
multiple-destination model of firms, which allows for heterogeneity in ability across firms
and in product attributes within firms.
Gravity. The gravity equation in international trade evolved in three significant steps.
The initial empirical finding of relating trade with country size and distance, the step
in moving from naive gravity to structural gravity (including the usage of fixed effects for
estimation), and the link of trade theory with the gravity equation, which today, provides a
consistent framework of economic theory and empirical evidence to study the determinants
of trade.
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The gravity equation is a linear in logs equation and states, in its most simplistic form that
bilateral trade is directly proportional to the product of the countries’ GDPs and inversely
proportional to the distance between the two countries (hence the analogy to Newton’s
law of universal gravitation and the name gravity equation). The relationship between the
country GDP’s and distance was first shown in an empirical study by Tinbergen (1962).
Armington (1969) added to this finding an extremely simplified but useful theoretical
foundation: Each country produces a different good, and consumers in each country would
like to consume at least some of each country’s goods. A utility function that mimics such a
consumer behaviour is the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Under CES,
preferences are homothetic. The CES demand function is therefore commonly used in the
trade literature. Due to its simplified structure yet robust prediction, the Armington model
(as formulated by Anderson, 1979) is often used as starting point in international trade
theory before moving to more complex models such as the heterogeneous firms model.
The next significant step in the evolution of the gravity equation involved the move-
ment from naive to structural gravity. McCallum (1995) stimulated a large amount of
research to understand border effects in his comparison of Canadian intra-national and
U.S.-Canadian international trade. Trefler (1995) pointed to trade that is ‘missing’ relative
to the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theorem that he invoked ‘home bias’ consumption. Leamer
and Levinsohn (1995) suggested to include the effect of distance into economic thinking.
And Krugman (1995) intuitively pointed to the effect of a country’s remoteness, which
cannot be explained by using bilateral distance alone. These remoteness indexes have now
become multilateral resistance terms that Anderson (1979) originated and Anderson and
Wincoop (2003) popularized.
The presence and consideration of multilateral resistance terms in the gravity equation
distinguishes structural gravity from naive gravity. The multilateral resistance terms—
which are now an essential part of every theoretical trade model—represent price indexes
across goods consumed from different countries. The prices paid by consumers are inclusive
of trade costs. Anderson and Wincoop (2003) showed that the multilateral resistance terms
change if trade costs change. Estimating the role of trade barriers in international trade
without accounting for the multilateral resistance terms therefore causes biased estimates.
Papers that appeared before Anderson and Wincoop (2003) can therefore be universally
characterised into papers that omitted the multilateral resistance terms (Baldwin and
Taglioni, 2007).
The last step in the evolution of the gravity equation was its joint consideration with
theoretical models of trade. Although gravity always played an influential role in trade
theory as in Armington (1969), it was Anderson and Wincoop (2003) and Eaton and
Kortum (2002) who laid down the theoretical foundation for the gravity equation. As
Head and Mayer (2014) note, both models build on micro-theoretical foundations and point
toward estimation methods that take into account the underlying structure of these models.
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While the implicit solution of the gravity equation to take into account the multilateral
resistance terms as suggested by Anderson and Wincoop (2003) was difficult to implement,
Eaton and Kortum (2002) already pointed towards a much more convenient solution in
using dummy variables by origin country to take them into account. The estimation of
gravity equations using importer and exporter fixed effects for each country to capture
the multilateral resistance terms—as is standard today—was then finally demonstrated by
Feenstra (2003b) and Redding and Venables (2004). Estimating gravity equations has thus
become a relatively easy task and led to a rapid uptake in usage in empirical work.
The Ricardian trade model as formalised by Eaton and Kortum (2002) deserves particular
mention. Not only did it point to estimating the gravity equation using fixed effects, but
it also demonstrated that a gravity equation can be obtained from a multinomial logit
model of discrete choice. This was surprising as Eaton and Kortum (2002) depart from the
standard CES approach that somewhat manifested in the way how trade models were built
from theory. Their theoretical approach towards developing this model therefore turned
out to be extremely elegant and has been receiving increasing attention. Chapter 5 makes
use of this conceptual framework and develops a theoretical model of international tourism
flows.
The last missing link of the gravity equation with trade theory was then only in terms of
the heterogeneous firm model. As demonstrated by Chaney (2008) and Helpman, Melitz
and Rubinstein (2008), the determination of bilateral trade flows in the heterogeneous firm
model requires the distinction between intensive and extensive margins of adjustment to
trade shocks. Chaney (2008) showed that the price elasticity of demand becomes depend-
ent on the degree of firm heterogeneity in the presence of fixed trade costs, which can then
be subdivided into an intensive and extensive margin elasticity. Helpman, Melitz and Ru-
binstein (2008) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) demonstrated how to estimate this model.
Their formulation differs from a homogeneous firm model by additionally controlling for
the fraction of firms participating in trade, which can also take the value of zero in the
presence of high fixed costs and therefore account for zero trade flows in the estimation of
the gravity equation.
In sum, the evolution of the gravity model was driven by the development of trade theory,
empirical evidence, and estimation methods and is likely to continue to do so. Given that
gravity is underlying in a wide range of trade models, the gravity equation has become the
workhorse model of international trade. Head and Mayer (2014) show how the main vari-
ants of trade models can be grouped into supply-side and demand-side models. Ultimately,
they show that whether heterogeneity of goods (homogeneous firm model), heterogeneity
of productivity of firms (heterogeneous firm model), or heterogeneity of countries (Ricar-
dian trade model) is used to in theoretical models to explain bilateral trade flows – they
all yield into gravity.
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Gains from trade. Important contributions have also been made to quantify the welfare
gains from trade. Eaton and Kortum (2002) first computed changes in real income as
a function of the domestic consumption share and the price elasticity of demand in the
Ricardian trade model. Arkolakis et al. (2008) calculated the gains from trade from the
Melitz (2003) model of heterogeneous firms with fixed exporting costs. Arkolakis, Costinot
and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) then generalised these results. They show that the welfare
predictions from trade remain identical for the Armington trade model, the Ricardian trade
model, and the homogeneous and heterogeneous firms models as they can be computed
using only two statistics: the domestic trade share and the price elasticity of demand (the
trade elasticity). Within that class of models, they argue that new margins of adjustment
to foreign trade shocks (in terms of consumption or labour reallocation) cannot change the
total size of the gains from trade. In a more recent study however, Melitz and Redding
(2015) show that, relative to homogeneous firm models, endogenous firm selection provides
a new welfare margin for heterogeneous firm models of trade. Their result builds on the
observation that the domestic trade share and the endogenous trade elasticity are no longer
sufficient statistics of welfare in a more general setting with less parameter restrictions. This
is because the assumption of a single constant trade elasticity is highly sensitive to small
departures from the additional restrictions on the parameter space in Arkolakis, Costinot
and Rodríguez-Clare (2012). Relative to the homogeneous firm model, Melitz and Redding
(2015) find that there are larger welfare gains from reductions in trade costs and smaller
welfare losses from increases in trade costs in the heterogeneous firm model.
Using the framework as in Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012), Costinot and
Rodríguez-Clare (2014) calculate the gains from trade to be 4% on average in a one-sector
Armington model. However, accounting for additional economic channels such as multiple
sectors and tradable intermediate goods increase the gains from trade significantly as a
result of scale effects. More recent research suggests that the gains from trade could be
even higher if the dynamic gains from trade are accounted for. Sampson (2016) shows
that knowledge spillovers from incumbent firms to entrants is a new source of the gains
from trade in the Melitz (2003) model of heterogeneous firms with dynamic selection. In
contrast, the study of Pierce and Schott (2016) indicates that there are potentially missing
links in the welfare formula developed by Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012).
They find that 21 percent of the decline of manufacturing employment by 5 million jobs
since 2000 in the US is attributable to the rising import competition from China (Pierce
and Schott, 2016). The loss of local jobs due to trade liberalisation is not taken into account
in the quantification of the gains from trade. It therefore remains debatable whether or
not such losses outweigh the gains from trade.
In this thesis, the gains from trade and tourism are calculated by taking into account the
welfare gains of consuming goods and services at lower prices from foreign countries (this
is the standard welfare formula as in Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2012) as
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well as the welfare gains (or losses) of an increase (or reduction) in domestic income (see
Sections 5.6 and 6.2). Changes in real income are then calculated from the changes in
the price index and the changes in wages, using labour as the numeraire. This approach
ensures that the changes in income are taken into account next to the changes in consumer
prices. In tourism, the changes in income are quantitatively important as many countries
are primarily dependent on international tourism receipts.
Trade and transport. Transport always played an important role in theoretical and
empirical research related to trade for two reasons. First, transport costs are one type of
trade costs that inhibit trade. Second, data on transport costs can be used to measure the
price elasticity of demand.
The comparison of observed trade with predicted frictionless trade provides a measure of
trade frictions and their influences such as transport costs and tariffs. Sources of bilateral
resistance to trade therefore play an unambiguous role in all international trade theories as
a result of the no-arbitrage condition that equates differences in domestic and foreign prices
with transport costs and tariffs2. Anderson and Wincoop (2003) argue that the ad valorem
tax equivalent of trade costs can be as large as 170%, consisting of 21% transport costs
(including a 9% tax equivalent of the time value of goods in transit), 44% trade barriers
(other than transport costs) and 55% retail and wholesale distribution costs. Given their
size, there has been a sustained interest in quantifying the magnitude of barriers to trade.
Data on transport costs (and tariffs) is however difficult to obtain as this type of data is
usually not collected by customs authorities. Transport costs are also difficult to quantify as
they are comprised of a wide range of cost elements such as shipping, distribution, logistic,
and insurance costs. As transport costs are never completely observed, their influence on
international trade is often inferred using bilateral distance. After the influential work of
Tinbergen (1962), the gravity equation has been used in many studies to show empirically
that, after controlling for size (GDP), trade undeniably falls unitarily elastic with distance.
Yet, although transport costs are strongly correlated with distance, Head and Mayer (2013)
show they only explain between 4 % and 28 % of the distance effect in international trade.
This is because of the co-existence of many other trade barriers that can be associated and
thus correlated with distance. For example, Allen (2014) estimates information barriers
(or search costs) to explain 90 % of the distance effect. In sum, distance will always play a
distinct role in international trade as it represents one key variable of the gravity equation.
The distance variable is however not informative towards determining the influence of
transport costs on trade.
Given the log-linear nature of the gravity equation, transport costs can only be taken into
2Given the no-arbitrage condition, researchers and economic institutions (including the World Bank)
also attempted, to measure transport costs from matched partner CIF/FOB ratios, until Hummels and
Lugovskyy (2006) however showed that these are error ridden in levels as a result of statistical reporting
issues.
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account in multiplicative form. First shown by Samuelson (1954), this can be achieved by
transferring transport costs into the one plus the tax-equivalent of trade barriers associated
with transport costs, also referred to as iceberg transport costs3 (see Section 4.5). Since
transport costs are now expressed in terms of their ad valorem tax equivalent to prices,
the price elasticity of demand can also be measured using data on iceberg transport costs
(or tariffs respectively), provided that relevant data can be obtained. The price elasticity
of demand in international trade (referred to as the trade elasticity) is a structural model
parameter of high significance at the macro-level. It measures the proportionate change
of imports relative to purchases at home associated with a change in prices (also known
as the "Armington elasticity"). In the homogeneous firm model, the trade elasticity is
a measure of the degree of homogeneity of products, in the heterogeneous firm model, a
measure of homogeneity of the productivity of firms, and in the Ricardian trade model, a
measure of homogeneity of countries. Secondly, as shown by Arkolakis et al. (2008), the
trade elasticity is—in combination with the domestic trade share—one of the key statistics
to quantify the gains from trade.
Feenstra (1994), and applied more broadly by Broda, Greenfield and Weinstein (2006),
uses an exact price index for a CES unit-cost function to estimate the trade elasticity using
generalized method of moments (GMM) identification via heteroskedasticity. His results
indicated a value of 42.9 for silver bullion, 27.2 for gold bullion, 3.59 for steel bars, 8.38
for TV receivers and 6.23 for athletic shoes. Using 1992 trade and tariff data from the US,
New Zealand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay, Hummels (1999) estimates the price
elasticity of demand to range from 3 to 8, depending on the type of good (57 considered in
total). Limão and Venables (2001) use quotes from shipping firms for a standard container
shipped from Baltimore and Maryland in the US to selected destinations and find a value of
3. Eaton and Kortum (2002) and refined by Simonovska and Waugh (2014) use maximum
price differences across goods between countries as a measure of transport costs and find
a value of 4. Head and Mayer (2014) collect 435 trade elasticity estimates based on either
tariffs or transport costs data from 32 papers and obtain a median value of 5, with a
standard deviation of 9.3. The high standard deviation is a result of the large range of
estimates obtained, as indicated by the aforementioned results. Disaggregating by product
group inevitably results into deviations from the central estimate of 5, as some goods may
represent nearly perfect substitutes, while others may represent weak substitutes. The
price elasticity therefore varies by commodity group as evidenced e.g. in Bas, Mayer and
Thoenig (2015) and Shapiro (2016).
The price elasticity of demand not only varies by product group but also by country pair,
3For example, if transport costs represent 10% of the actual price of the good at the factory gate, the
iceberg transport costs would take the value 1.1 (1 + 0.1). The iceberg measure indicates that 1.1 units
of the product must be shipped to the destination country in order for one unit to arrive. According to
Samuelson’s "iceberg" form specification, the amount 1.1 - 1 is assumed to "melt" along the way. This is
the transport amount paid in units of the exported good.
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given that some countries are more dependent on certain types of goods than others4. Yet,
the gravity equation imposes the structure of treating the trade elasticity as a parameter
common to all countries.
Given the large number of empirical studies undertaken, this thesis does not estimate the
price elasticity of demand in international trade. Rather, for the results in Chapter 6, it
uses the central estimate of 5 from Head and Mayer (2014) to quantify the welfare impacts
associated with changes in transport prices at an aggregated product level.
In international tourism however, no study exists that estimates the price elasticity of
demand using ad valorem transport costs. Chapter 5 therefore not only develops a model
for international tourism, but also collects data to estimate the price elasticity of demand
in tourism.
Trade by mode of transport. Existing studies that explain bilateral trade flows by
mode of transport differ with respect to assuming who or what exhibits mode-specific
idiosyncratic behaviour (countries, traders, firms, goods), with respect to measuring de-
terministic behaviour (transport costs, transit time or a combination of both), and with
respect to modelling mode-specific preferences in a general equilibrium trade setting or
as an independent model. Harrigan (1995) looks at the volume of trade in manufactured
goods by mapping trade in differentiated intermediate goods to the structure of the im-
porting country’s industrial sector. His model, featuring CES monopolistic competition,
increasing returns, and homothetic preferences, is however rejected by the data. Harrigan
(2010) and Lux (2011) model a continuum of goods, where each good is assumed to have an
idiosyncratic mode-specific transport cost. Their model is based on Ricardian comparative
advantage and builds on the influential work of Eaton and Kortum (2002). Ben-Akiva and
De Jong (2013) model logistics decisions at a disaggregated firm level using various logistic
cost components before they aggregate over origin-destination flows, which they use for a
network assignment model. Given the data requirements, it is unlikely that such a model
could be taken to a general equilibrium model of international trade. Hummels and Schaur
(2013) let firms choose their preferred mode of transport in comparing the profitability of
air versus sea shipping. Allen and Arkolakis (2014) model a continuum of traders using
intra-US trade, where each trader is assumed to have idiosyncratic mode-specific transport
cost.
The theoretical framework in Chapter 4 builds on the Krugman (1980) model with mono-
polistic competition and many firms and takes into account marginal costs of production
inclusive of transport and time costs. It therefore adds to the specifications listed above a
component of time cost which reflects the capital cost of goods locked up in transit.
4Feenstra (2003a) and Novy (2013) use instead of the CES-based gravity equation a homothetic translog
preference gravity equation to endogenise the trade elasticity. This functional form specification allows
the trade elasticity to vary with trade costs. Novy, 2013 concludes that trade cost elasticities appear
heterogeneous across import shares.
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2.2 Tourism
International tourism did not deserve much attention in the theoretical economics lit-
erature, particularly with respect to micro-theoretical foundations that are necessary to
determine macro-level predictors of global tourism flows. Most of the literature in inter-
national tourism is concerned with economic and ecological impact analyses on a country
level and the sustainable development of tourism (e.g. Mathieson, Wall et al., 1982, Archer,
Cooper and Ruhanen, 2005, Sharpley, 2000, Ceballos-Lascuráin et al., 1996). Economics
research related to tourism often focuses on the determinants of cross-border travel, by
examining the benefits derived from buying products at lower prices from foreign countries
(Timothy and Butler, 1995; Matteo and Matteo, 1996; Chandra, Head and Tappata, 2014).
By large, no attempts have been made to e.g. explain the economic or social phenomenon
of global tourism, or the influence of international tourism on the local economy.
Most of the related literature focuses on urban economics. Urban spatial models try to ex-
plain key interactions between locations, whether caused due to trade in goods, migration,
or commuting. Economic geography models therefore often take into account commuting
costs, as they represent a significant share in the consumers’ expenditure. For example,
Tabuchi and Thisse (2006) consider an economic geography model with mobile firms and
workers whose agglomeration within a city generates costs through competition on the
housing market. They find that the economy moves from dispersion to agglomeration if
commuting costs decrease. Intuitively, economic geography models with commuting costs
could therefore also nest agglomeration forces related to tourism.
Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) take this approach further and develop a gravity equation for com-
muting flows, drawing on the discrete choice framework of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and
featuring agglomeration and dispersion forces and an arbitrary number of heterogeneous
city blocks. As Head and Mayer (2014) note, with a few minor changes, the model de-
veloped by Eaton and Kortum (2002) could also be specified in a way to obtain a gravity
equation for tourism.
More recent research by Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) generalises the agglomeration
forces as external economies and the dispersion forces as an inelastic supply of land and
commuting costs into a quantitative urban model. The model builds on the work of
Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) and Lucas and Rossi–Hansberg (2002) and features homogeneous
goods in a single traded sector, endogenous amenities, residential and commercial land use,
constant returns to scale, endogenous productivity, migration and commuting costs, and
idiosyncratic preferences. They show that the model can be used to determine internal city
structures and transport infrastructure improvements. Both productivity and amenities
are found to strengthen agglomeration externalities by a significant amount.
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A few studies also exist with a direct reference to tourism economics. These include,
for example, the study by Copeland (1991), who investigates the spillover effect of an
expansion of tourism on welfare, output, and factor prices using a general equilibrium trade
model. For another example, Faber and Gaubert (2016) study the long-term economic
consequences of the services sector due to tourism in Mexico, including spillover effects on
manufacturing production. Both these studies link theoretical elements of trade economics
with tourism economics and pose interesting scopes of applications.
Chapter 5 takes the approach of linking quantitative urban models with tourism activities
further and develops a dedicated theoretical model for international tourism, by applying
theoretical elements and concepts of international trade to the economics of international
tourism. In contrast to the studies which treat tourism as one additional economic feature
of their model (as e.g. in Faber and Gaubert, 2016), the research in Chapter 5 provides a
fundamental theoretical explanation for the agglomeration of economic activity in tourism,
next to an empirically relevant quantitative model to perform general equilibrium counter-
factual policy exercises. The description of a model which includes these economic features
with respect to tourism as a global phenomenon has not been accomplished before in the
economics literature.
2.3 International transport and the environment
Studies related to international transport and the environment are grouped into studies
with a policy focus and studies with a focus on the environment.
The policy studies related to this work include a study undertaken by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF; Keen, Parry and Strand, 2013) and a study undertaken by Shapiro
(2016). The IMF study considers the international aviation and maritime industry jointly;
the study by Shapiro takes into account all transport (via air, sea, and surface) related to
the domestic and international trade of goods.
The IMF study considers a carbon tax on both the international aviation and maritime
industry. The carbon tax is at Pigovian levels using a social cost of carbon (SCC) of
$25/tCO2. Welfare calculations are based on the Harberger approximation and any cost
increase which arise from the carbon tax to a transport firm are fully passed on to the
consumers in the form of price increases. The study does neither consider endogenous
technology uptakes in the aviation and maritime transport sector, nor general equilibrium
prices and welfare effects. Under these simplifications, the study finds that the price effects
from a global carbon tax on international transport would result into a 2-4% increase in
aviation ticket prices and a 1% price increase of goods imports. The carbon tax could raise
a revenue of approximately 22$ billion per year in 2020, by taking into account developing
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country compensation to be 40% of revenues. The study concludes by stating that a carbon
price (charged per tonne of fuel purchased for consumption) not only leads to significant
reductions in emissions but also exhibits potential to serve as an imperfect device to correct
for other tax distortions in both industries.
The study by Shapiro (2016) uses a computable general equilibrium trade model to quantify
the changes in real income in each country associated with a carbon tax of domestic and
international transport. The study builds on the standard gravity in international trade,
compiles a unique dataset from national commerce offices on international and intranational
shipping costs, transport mode choice, pollution emissions, and trade flows for 13 sectors of
production, five modes of transport and 128 countries. The policy case investigated builds
on the assumption that each importing country receives the tax revenue generated by the
importing country’s imports in the form of a rebated lump-sum to consumers. This rebate
mechanism therefore lowers the welfare implications of countries with high import levels
(e.g. the US) and increases the welfare impacts of countries with relatively low levels of
imports (e.g. developing countries). Using a social cost of carbon of $29/tCO2, the study
finds that a carbon tax applied to the international maritime transport industry would
increase global welfare, increase the implementing region’s GDP, and decrease welfare in
poor countries. Bearing in mind the limitations that arise from autarky counterfactual
exercises and estimates of the social cost of carbon, the study finds that the gains from
trade exceed the environmental cost of trade by two orders of magnitude.
The results in Shapiro (2016) are not informative towards determining the demand implic-
ations associated with candidate policy designs at the IMO for two reasons. First, using
the tax revenues as rebated lump-sum to consumers by importing country provides a dis-
torted view on the actual demand implications by participating country. One would need
to first quantify these implications and then, based on the results obtained, design a re-
bate mechanism to compensate economically disadvantaged countries participating in the
scheme. The rebate mechanism could take the form of rebated lump-sum to consumers,
but should not necessarily be restricted to it. Second, the study takes into account all
modes of transport, including air cargo transport, of all domestic as well as international
transport activities. Under the UNFCCC umbrella, the IMO has a mandate for addressing
CO2 from international shipping only. Domestic emissions from shipping are therefore ad-
dressed at the national level and therefore form part of the Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (INDCs) of each Party under the Paris Agreement (see Section 2.4 below).
As will become clear in Chapter 6, the analysis undertaken in this thesis differs from the
study by Shapiro (2016) in multiple ways. First, it takes into account the cost structure
of transport firms on the supply side, leading to smaller price increases overall5. Second,
5A 1% price increase in fuel costs due to a carbon tax does not lead to a 1% increase in the operating
costs of a transport firm due to other cost items the transport firm faces including labour, capital and
material costs. By Shephard’s lemma, assuming a fuel cost share of e.g. 30%, a 1% increase in fuel costs
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it takes endogenous price changes into account6. Third, it takes technology uptakes into
account. Fourth, it analyses international transport policies that are in accordance with
candidate policy designs at the international organizational level, an in particular, the IMO
and the ICAO. Fifth, it addresses the bulk of emissions from both international transport
industries, including air passenger travel (see Table 1.1), and the demand implications in
terms of tourism. And lastly, it investigates potential patterns of discrimination against
economically disadvantaged countries before advising (or deciding) on an appropriate re-
bate mechanism to compensate these countries.
Other studies with a policy focus on international transport but without the inter-linkages
of international transport with the economy have been undertaken. For example, The
Economist Intelligence Unit (2008) briefing paper, commissioned by DHL Asia-Pacific, in-
vestigated the effect of oil price volatility on the value of trade using the gravity equation
and 1970-2007 GDP and oil panel data. They find that a 1% increase in the price of oil leads
to a 0.24% reduction in the value of trade. Another example is the study of Vivid Econom-
ics (2010), commissioned by the IMO, to quantify the economic impact of market-based
measures in international ocean freight. Their method relies on estimating the elasticity of
freight rates with respect to bunker prices on certain shipping routes. These estimates are
then combined with elasticities of freight rates with respect to bunker prices to infer values
of cost-pass through rates in international shipping markets. Their results indicate that
a significant amount of the costs of market based measures in international sea transport
would be borne by shipowners, as a result of low cost-pass through rates, especially in sea
transport of iron ore (55%) and grains (5% to 100%). The report subsequently stimulated
discussion at the IMO that market-based measures in international ocean freight would
be ineffective and be discriminating against shipowners. While cost-pass through rates
(as well as varying markups) certainly require thorough investigation, they do not play
a distinct role in quantifying the welfare impacts associated with MBMs in shipping on
a country level. This is because countries import goods from many other countries. If
certain trade routes are subject to considerable higher price increases due to a full cost-
pass through, the net change of the price index in the respective country would only be
marginally different (if not insignificant) as it reflects the aggregate of price increases of all
trade routes across countries.
There are many studies related to international transport and the environment. These
include studies related to a quantification of transport emissions, and studies related to
predicting future emissions using integrated assessment models (IAMs). An example of
would lead to an overall increase in transport costs of about 0.3%. Assuming competitive pricing, this
increase would than also translate into a 0.3% overall price increase rather than a 1% overall price increase.
To the best of my understanding, these dynamics are not taken into account in Shapiro (2016). This in
turn implies that Shapiro (2016) obtains disproportionately high welfare impacts.
6Transport costs enter the CGE trade and tourism model as an ad valorem to supply prices. The CGE
model solves for the changes in the supply prices. If supply prices change, so do transport costs. For this
reason, the level of transport costs needs to be determined co-jointly with the vector of supply prices in
an iterative CGE modelling framework.
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the former is a study by Cristea et al. (2013), who quantify the greenhouse gas emissions
from international freight transport and production. Trade data by mode of transport for
the year 2004 is taken from the US Imports and Exports of Merchandise database, the
Eurostats Trade database, and the Latin America (ALADI) trade database. Production
emissions are taken from the GTAP model (Walmsley, Aguiar and Narayanan, 2012). The
study finds that transport accounts for 33% of world-wide trade-related emissions and that
tariff liberalization and GDP growth concentrated in China and India in combination with
trade shifting toward more distant trading partners resulted into a growth in transport
emissions which was larger than the growth in the value of merchandise trade. It should
be noted that studies are regularly undertaken to quantify the emissions from international
air and maritime transport at the intergovernmental level (e.g. IMO, 2014; IEA, 2015).
IAMs of the global aviation and maritime transport industry include models developed in
OECD ITF (2015), Reynolds et al. (2007), and Smith et al. (2011). IAMs have a supply
side focus (i.e. transport). The link to changes in consumer prices to changes in a country’s
overall output (in the industry and tourism sectors) and income are usually omitted. For
the research undertaken in this study, these models would need to be extended to also
account for price changes on the demand side and to link them with economic activity and
thus welfare. A possible extension of these models is discussed in Section 7. The added
value of modelling transport supply more rigorously using IAM’s in a trade and tourism
demand setting to the result presented in this thesis remains however questionable. The
model developed in this thesis uses a simplified representation of trade and tourism demand
as well as transport supply. Improving the modelling capacity of transport supply would
leave the modelling capacity on the demand side unchanged and therefore result into similar
aggregate welfare predictions.
Many other studies investigated the regulatory framework of environmental policies in the
international aviation and maritime industries, and in particular in the aviation industry as
result of its inclusion in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (e.g. Scheelhaase and Grimme,
2007, Anger, 2010; see Section 2.4 below for the details of this scheme). None of these
studies however provide a link to the tourism sector in each country and the demand im-
plications of the economy as a result of environmental policies in the international aviation
industry can therefore not be quantified.
2.4 Legal dimension of international transport policy
International shipping and aviation are excluded from Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (INDCs) which constitute the post-2020 climate targets of the landmark
Paris Agreement, adopted by the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties
(COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
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in 2015. The Paris Agreement will be implemented to "reflect equity and the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities [CBDR] and respective capabilities [RC], in the
light of different national circumstances" (UNFCCC, 2015). As international transport
involves the movement of goods and passengers from, across, and to many different coun-
tries around the world, the allocation of emissions from international bunker fuels cannot
be allocated proportionally to the countries involved in these transport activities without
complex and comprehensive regulatory frameworks. Emissions from international bunker
fuels need therefore be addressed comprehensively at the global level. An intended determ-
ined contribution of the international shipping and aviation sectors would however create
a conflict with the UNFCCC CBDR/RC principle, as the contributions by each country
participating in the global scheme would be determined by the global scheme’s mechanism
to reduce the emissions, rather than by the participating nations themselves. This clash of
principles was already recognised under the UNFCCC since the first meeting of the Con-
ference of the Parties and subsequently also led to the exclusion of international aviation
and shipping from the predecessor of the Paris Agreement, the Kyoto Protocol. Article 2.2
of the Kyoto Protocol stated that Annex I Parties "shall pursue limitation or reduction of
emissions of greenhouse gases [...] from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through
the International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO] and the International Maritime Or-
ganization [IMO], respectively" (UNFCCC, 1998). IMO and ICAO therefore obtained the
mandate for addressing CO2 emissions from international transport, and remained to do
so in post-Paris world.
The ICAO was founded in 1947 on the premises to avoid discrimination between contract-
ing States set forth in the Chicago convention (ICAO, 2006). The IMO was founded in
1948 on the premises to "promote the availability of shipping services to the commerce of
the world without discrimination" set forth in the 1948 Geneva convention (IMO, 2017).
Both the ICAO and the IMO are therefore founded on principles of non-discrimination
and equal treatment. Once the ICAO and the IMO were mandated to reduce emissions
from international bunker fuels, it became clear that ICAO’s and IMO’s principle of equal
treatment and non-discrimination conflicts with the UNFCCC CBDR/RC principle. Since
their nomination in 1998 to tackle these issues, both international bodies have been study-
ing options for reducing CO2 from international bunker fuels. Only recently however has
an agreement been reached among the Member States at the ICAO to implement a car-
bon offsetting scheme in international aviation named "CORSIA" (Carbon Offsetting and
Reduction Scheme for International Aviation; ICAO, 2016; see Section 6.4 for the details
of this scheme). To this date, not commitments have been made towards reducing CO2
from international shipping at the IMO.
At the ICAO—to comply to the extent possible with the UNFCCC’s CBDR/RC principle,
thereby acknowledging that the proposed scheme does not represent the position of the
Parties to the UNFCCC (ICAO, 2016)—initial participation in CORSIA is voluntary. Fur-
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thermore, once the offsetting scheme at ICAO becomes mandatory for its member States,
least developed countries, SIDS, and landlocked developing countries will remain exempted
from participation. The leading international organization in tourism is the World Tourism
Organization (UNWTO). In it’s current framing, CORSIA does not contradict UNWTO’s
objectives and mission, including promoting tourism as a driver of economic growth, and
implementing a global code of ethics for tourism. In a statement released in 2010 (i.e.
before CORSIA was announced), the UNWTO however argues that an MBM in aviation
should take into account the economic importance of tourism when it comes to impact
assessments, comply with the CBDR principle, and be non-discriminatory against other
modes of transport, especially on short-haul routes (UNWTO, 2016). The UNWTO also
notes that although countries are exempted from the scheme, they could still be affected
by it through international airlines serving both, destination markets within the scheme
and destination markets of countries exempt from the scheme.
At the IMO too, concerns over discrimination against developing countries exist. Today,
developing countries account for 60% of total maritime trade (ICS, 2017). Market-based
measures (MBM) in international shipping could therefore affect developing countries more
than developed countries and the opposition from poor countries that anticipate receiving
less than their cost incurred is therefore likely to remain strong. One way to work around
this issue is to implement a rebate mechanism as part of the MBM. A rebate mechanism
would entitle developing countries to obtain unconditional payments (rebates) equal to
the attributed burden of its participation in the scheme as e.g. proposed by Stochniol
(2012). An MBM with a rebate mechanism would in theory therefore also comply with the
principles of CBDR and RC under the UNFCCC umbrella. The entitlement of countries
to receive a rebate and the level of the rebate could however trigger lengthy negotiations
among Member States. Once an agreement has been found, it would be subject to a review
after a few years as the economic condition of all Member States changes over time. An
MBM with a rebate mechanism therefore creates substantial additional complexity.
Due to the shipping’s inherent inter-linkages with international trade, MBMs in interna-
tional shipping need to also comply with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) principles under the WTO framework. For example, Article 1 of GATT (general
most favoured nation treatment) states that "customs duties and charges of any kind im-
posed on [...] importation or exportation [...], and with respect to the method of levying
such duties and charges, [...] any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted [...] to
any product [...] shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties" (WTO, 1947).
In other words, any (trade) advantage for one WTO Member should also apply (imme-
diately and unconditionally) to all other WTO Member States. As long as the MBM is
non-discriminatory therefore, it would in theory also comply with the WTO and GATT
principles. Article III of GATT (national treatment) has attracted much more atten-
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tion in recent years by academics and policy-makers as it is held applicable to de jure
(discrimination against foreign products by origin) and de facto discriminatory measures
(discrimination against foreign products in a domestic market) (Vranes, 2009). An MBM
in international shipping may therefore be de facto discriminatory, as foreign goods would
be priced higher than domestic goods, unless environmental policies for domestic transport
are in place vis-à-vis the international scheme with equal levels of carbon prices. De jure
discrimination of an MBM in international shipping can be avoided if all member countries
participate in the scheme. Exempting countries from an MBM in international shipping
complicates the interpretation of both principles significantly. Excluding (economically
disadvantaged) countries from the scheme would in theory contradict the de jure principle
and also be de facto discriminatory against those countries who participate in the scheme
and serve the same market as the countries who are exempt. A representative of the WTO
Secretariat at the IMO however concluded that a MBM in international shipping should in
theory be compatible with WTO rules (IMO, 2011b) as the WTO primarily regulates and
solves trade disputes among its Member States. Once the details of the policy design of a
MBM in international shipping along with its exempting rules are formulated however, its
compatibility with WTO rules would need to be examined in detail.
Emissions from international transport have also been tackled by other organisations. Most
prominent is the inclusion of aviation CO2 in the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS)
since 2012. Under the EU ETS, all airlines operating to or from European airports are
required to surrender allowances against their emissions. After agreement has been reached
at the ICAO however to implement CORSIA from 2012 onwards, the European Commission
(EC) decided to limit the scope of the EU ETS to flights within the European Economic
Area (EEA) until 2016 and issued a proposal in 2017 to continue to do so beyond 2016
(EC, 2017a). The EU ETS is fully compatible with the UNFCCC CBDR/RC principle as
it’s scope is limited to EEA flights only.
To this date, no environmental policy schemes have been put into place by other organ-
isations to tackle the emissions from international transport. The EC is calling for a
global approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping, work-
ing through the IMO (EC, 2017b), but also gives consideration to include emissions from
international shipping into the EU ETS (ICS, 2017). The EC’s push forward to redu-
cing emissions from aviation stimulated much of the political debate needed to achieve
an agreement at the international level. The EU ETS is therefore most likely the primary
reason why an agreement to tackle emissions from international transport has already been
reached at the ICAO, while the debate at the IMO is still ongoing. If no progress is made
at the IMO, unilateral action to tackle the emissions from international shipping could not
only come from the EC but also from Canada, California, or China, as they already intro-
duced carbon pricing at the national level (ICS, 2017). Enacting environmental policies at
the national level would however greatly undermine the authority of the IMO.
40
MBMs for international aviation and maritime bunker fuels have also been proposed as an
innovative source of global climate finance. Article 9 of the Paris Agreement defines climate
finance as the financial resource from developed country Parties that is needed to assist
developing country Parties with respect to mitigation and adaptation to climate change,
in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention (UNFCCC, 2015). The
agreed collective quantified goal is to raise 100$ billion per year. A report from the World
Bank, in close partnership with the IMF, the OECD and the Regional Development Banks,
states that a carbon tax of 25$ per tonne of CO2 in both the aviation and maritime trans-
port industries would raise 40$ billion per year by 2020 (World Bank, 2011), subject to
the agreed level of compensation needed for developing countries who participate in the
scheme. MBM’s in international transport could therefore provide meaningful contribu-
tions to mobilising funds to mitigate and adapt to climate change.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
This thesis builds on gravity models of international trade and tourism and uses compar-
ative static exercises to show the welfare implications associated with a carbon emissions
pricing scheme in international transport.
Gravity equations are consistent with economic theory, relatively easy to implement eco-
nometrically and have been used for quantifying welfare impacts of trade policy changes
for many years (see Section 2.1). Today, they are considered in combination with the many
possible underlying micro-theoretical foundations but identical macro-level predictors, as
one of the most empirically robust and theoretically sound findings in all of economics
(Head and Mayer, 2014, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2014).
First demonstrated by Dekle, Eaton and Kortum (2008) and similar to older computational
general equilibrium (CGE) models (Baldwin and Venables, 1995), quantitative models
based on structural gravity can be used to evaluate policy changes by introducing a shock
to any of the gravity variables and then solving a system of non-linear equations to obtain
the state of a new equilibrium.
In equilibrium, supply equals demand. Drawing from economic theory, gravity equations
can be used to explain consumer demand using equilibrium prices and multilateral resist-
ance terms. In international trade, the demand side is represented by import expenditures
of goods produced in foreign countries. In international tourism, the demand side is rep-
resented by tourism expenditures in foreign countries. As both these variables take into
account transport costs, gravity models naturally take into account an equilibrium price
inclusive of transport costs to explain changes in demand.
The point of departure for this analysis are therefore theory-consistent, multi-country
gravity models of international trade and tourism.
Current practice in modelling exercises using gravity equations generally involves four
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steps: (1) the measurement of variables of interest, (2) the establishment of data-informed
theory and models, (3) the estimation of key structural parameters of those models, and
(4) the evaluation of policy questions using counterfactual exercises.
Chapter 4 develops a theoretical framework for international trade, Chapter 5 a theoretical
framework for international tourism. Chapter 6 combines both theoretical frameworks and
specifies the cost component on the supply side in more detail to be able to account
for exogenous price shocks induced by environmental policies. This chapter provides a
general overview of the modelling exercises in Chapters 4-6 by explaining each of the
aforementioned steps 1 to 4.
1 Measurement. The variables of interest are bilateral demand variables (country by
country trade and tourism flows), bilateral variables explaining demand (transport costs)
and country specific variables measuring a country’s economic activity (gross output, in-
come, and expenditure).
There exist many sources of data measuring global flows, with limitations however with
respect to worldwide coverage and aggregation levels. The dataset in this study therefore
draws from information and variables collected from different data sources.
Commonly reported by statistical authorities are the demand variables "import values"
and "international tourism receipts". In international trade, the import value corresponds
to the statistical value, inclusive of transport costs (CIF1), that is declared on the customs
declaration form. In international tourism, the statistical value corresponds to balance
of payments (BOP) expenditures of goods and services by international inbound visitors
(international arrivals). A detailed description of these variables can be found in the
relevant Chapters 4 and 5, and Appendices A and B.
More difficult to measure are supply prices in the partner country and bilateral transport
costs between the reporting and partner country as these are usually not reported by
statistical authorities. In international trade, the supply price corresponds to the cost of
production a the factory gate in the origin country (assuming no markup). In international
tourism, the supply price corresponds to the costs paid for all tourism activities (lodging,
food, services) in the destination country (exclusive of travel costs). Bilateral transport
costs2 refer to the costs to ship manufacturing produces from the origin (the exporting) to
the destination country (the importing country), or, to the costs to travel from the origin
(the outbound) to the destination country (the inbound tourism country) respectively. In
1The statistical value is ‘the amount that would be invoiced in the event of sale or purchase at the
national border of the reporting country’(Eurostat, 2014). For exports, this value is said to be a FOB (free
on board) valuation, for imports a CIF (cost, insurance, freight) valuation.
2Transport costs in international trade include shipping costs, distribution and logistic costs (handling,
loading and unloading, storing, packaging, and warehousing costs), probability of loss or damage, and the
time the traded goods are locked in transit. Transport costs in international tourism are the costs paid for
a ticket for a return trip inclusive of taxes, surcharges and other fees.
43
either case, both variables - supply prices and transport costs - are needed to calculate
bilateral transport costs relative to supply prices in the partner country. Transport costs
are usually not reported in bilateral trade and tourism data and need therefore be collected
from other data sources.
Lastly, country specific variables measuring a country’s economic output in manufactur-
ing (trade) and service provision (tourism) are needed to link changes in bilateral flows
to changes in welfare. Gross manufacturing output data can be obtained from UNIDO
statistics, gross industry output data from the OECD input-output tables. Missing values
can be approximated by the ratio of value added to manufacturing value added in GDP
as in Mayer and Thoenig (2016) or by estimating the ratio of GDP to gross output using
GDP and population as independent variables as in Simonovska and Waugh (2014). Gross
tourism output can be measured by adding aggregated international tourism expenditures
to domestic tourism receipts as reported by the WTTC. These variables are described in
detail in each chapter.
The data requirements of this study are substantial. The collected data however ensures
that the computed results are based on actual measurements (or approximations therefore
in case of missing data) of the key variables of interest. Conditional on the data3 and the
model restrictions imposed by economic theory, the CGE model developed in this thesis
should therefore be capable to predict approximate changes in economic activity as a result
of carbon emission pricing schemes in international transport.
2 Theory: Theoretical frameworks in the economics discipline often build on functional
forms to specify a relationship between the explained and explanatory variables. These
include linear and logarithmic functions, but also Cobb-Douglas, Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES), and Leontief functions. Building on consumer theory, one of these
functions is then selected and specified in way to describe aggregate consumer preferences.
In doing so, they are then referred to as utility functions and build on the underlying
assumption of consumers to act rationally. The next step involves the maximisation of
consumer utility by setting the first derivative equal to zero and solving for the variable
of interest (e.g. quantity) to obtain a consumer demand equation. The aggregate de-
mand equation is then immediately obtained by (1) solving for equilibrium prices that are
representative of all consumers and (2) integrating over all bundles of goods or activities
consumed. Finally, assuming that supply equals demand, the model can be closed using a
market clearing condition.
Theoretical frameworks in economics often impose that in a general equilibrium, consumers
3Data limitations are unavoidable and so is the models worldwide coverage and predictability. Bilateral
global flows reveal the matching of supply and demand. However, not all countries engage with each
other in terms of trade and tourism activities which thus results into zero flows. These flows are often
not reported. Missing observations in the data could either be a result of actual zero flows or missing
observations, both of which are not taken into account in this modelling exercise. Irrespective of their
ultimate cause and price increases therefore, zero flows remain zero in the counterfactual equilibrium.
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maximise utility (demand), firms maximise profits (supply), and markets clear (equilibrium
prices). The theoretical frameworks developed in Chapters 4 and 5 have in common this
market clearing condition.
3 Estimation: In theoretical frameworks designed to explain global flows, the explained
variables are the bilateral demand variables and the explanatory variables are the price
variables and price indexes (also referred to as multilateral resistance terms). The log-
arithmic transformation of the gravity equation allows to measure changes in demand in
response to changes in prices or changes in transport costs respectively. The structural
model parameters of the gravity equations are therefore price elasticities of demand. These
parameters can be estimated using bilateral expenditure and price data. Once estimated,
they can be used to predict changes in trade and tourism expenditures associated with e.g.
price changes due to carbon emission pricing schemes in international transport and are
therefore key parameters of this thesis.
Since the influential paper of Anderson and Wincoop (2003), specifications of theory-
consistent gravity equations include multilateral resistance terms (referred to as structural
gravity equations, see Head and Mayer, 2014). In the most simplistic form, the multi-
lateral resistance terms take the form of price indexes. Price indexes consist of prices
and expenditure shares in each country, including both domestic and foreign expenditures.
The multilateral resistance terms are therefore endogenous and take the form of country
fixed effects in regressions. This has two important implications. First, demand elasticities
cannot be measured from prices which are purely country specific, as they are absorbed
by the fixed effects in the regression. One popular way to estimate the price elasticity of
demand in gravity equations has therefore been using bilateral costs data such as tariffs or
transport costs. If these variables are specified as the one plus the ad valorem price equi-
valent (iceberg costs), the coefficient estimate represents the price elasticity of demand.
The transformation of the bilateral cost elements into ad valorem price equivalents ensures
that the price elasticity of demand with respect to bilateral tariff or transport costs is equi-
valent to the price elasticity of demand with respect to prices. Second, estimating gravity
equations does not require to collect data on country specific prices (which are usually dif-
ficult to obtain), as these are absorbed by the country fixed effects in the regression. The
former complicates the measurement of structural model parameters, whereas the latter
eases the use of gravity equations in a policy context and significantly contributed to its
rapid uptake in the literature.
The gravity structure imposes the restriction to specific the price elasticity of demand to
be common to all country pairs in the dataset. In theory, the price elasticity of demand
varies by country pair, with some country pairs having a higher demand elasticity than
others. Estimating all these elasticities in the gravity setting would however result into as
many variables as observations. Constructing theoretical frameworks on the one hand and
empirical estimation of key structural parameters thereof on the other therefore involves a
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balancing act: quantitative models must be rich enough to speak to primary features of the
data, yet parsimonious enough to allow for estimating its structural parameters (Costinot
and Rodríguez-Clare, 2014) and can never be exact.
4 Counterfactual analysis: Quantitative models based on structural gravity are similar
to older CGEmodels (Baldwin and Venables, 1995) in their primary focus to evaluate policy
changes using economic data (Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2014). Common starting
point are theoretical models that respond to data in a way that can be described by its
estimated parameters. Given that the observed data essentially reflects an equilibrium state
of supply matching demand, the model and original dataset describe an initial equilibrium
state. Counterfactual exercises then involve introducing a shock to any of the variables of
the model and solving for a state of a new equilibrium.
If gravity equations meet the separability requirement in terms of labour endowments in the
home country (see Chapters 4 and 5), counterfactual changes in income can be derived by
solving a system of non-linear equations which require information of only three statistics:
the expenditure shares on goods from different countries, initial income (output) levels,
and structural parameters of the model including the demand elasticity. The first two are
observed in the data, the latter can be obtained from empirical exercises as described above.
The changes in income levels then reveal changes in expenditure, which, in combination
with changes in prices, can be linked to changes in real income and thus welfare. This
approach was first demonstrated by Dekle, Eaton and Kortum (2008) and has been termed
“exact hat algebra” by Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014). Chapters 4-6, make use of
this approach to calculate changes in real income associated with foreign price shocks in
trade and tourism. In Chapter 6, these price shocks take the form of a global bunker fuel
levy charged per tonne of fuel purchased for consumption in the international aviation and
maritime industry.
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Chapter 4
Model of international trade
This chapter develops a theoretical framework of consumer demand to explain international
trade flows by mode of transport. It describes a world economy consisting of multiple firms
in each country, where each firm produces a unique variety and chooses a cost optimum
transport mode for exporting it. Consumers consume at least a little of each variety in
bundles, where each bundle represents the group of varieties transported using a common
transport mode. Because consumers maximise utility and firms minimise costs, the theor-
etical framework consists of a consumer demand equation as well as a production supply
equation that exhibits a multinomial logit structure.
This chapter focuses on international seaborne and airborne trade and describes column 2
of Table 1.1. Chapter 6, which follows after this chapter, focuses on international tourism,
representing column 3 of Table 1.1.
4.1 Background
International trade has been shaped by rapid growth in vertically differentiated products
as a result of vertical specialisation (Yi, 2003; Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman, 2011;
Zhu, Yamano and Cimper, 2011). Because firms increasingly specialise in only one particu-
lar innovation or production process, their manufacturing output is often not a final but an
intermediate good, which may be used in an entire range of differentiated products. The
today’s global supply chain is therefore a conglomerate of a complex interwoven network of
many stakeholders, including high-tech firms, OEM’s, and retailers, and spans over several
countries.
Transport is central to the functioning of these global supply chains. Globalisation and its
drive for increased competition on the one hand, as well as differences in unit labour costs
and cost optimisations of firms on the other, makes it necessary for firms to collaborate
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even if they are far distant from each other1. Given the vast range of vertically differen-
tiated products and their special product characteristics, the transport of these globally
exchanged goods needs to be accomplished by different transport modes that are capable
of bridging long-distances in a cost-effective manner.
Time is money. The non-accessibility of goods in transit is costly for a firm. Even more
so, the higher the unit value2 of the good. Hummels and Schaur (2013) find that each day
in transit is worth 0.6 to 2.1 percent of this value and that long transit delays significantly
reduce the probability of firms to successfully participate in the export market. Yet,
time costs associated with the export of goods do not always play a distinctive role in
international trade. Cheap stuff needs to remain cheap in order to be able to get sold in
foreign markets competitively. It’s price is in part also determined by the costs associated
with exporting it and rules out the possibility to use expensive shipping methods. The
availability of fast but expensive and slow but inexpensive transport modes in international
trade therefore comes as a direct result of highly specialised manufacturing process and
the collaboration of firms in a globalised world.
The most prominent but also most cost diverse transport modes in international trade
are sea and air transport. While freight rates by air are seven times higher than by
sea3, the transport of goods by air is accomplished in only a fraction of the time. The
link between differentiated transport modes and differentiated products is in most cases
therefore straightforwardly determined. Given that transport costs must remain relatively
small in comparison to the goods’ value, products with relatively higher unit values4 tend
to be transported by faster means of transport (air transport), whereas products with
relatively lower unit values tend to be transport by cost-effective means of transport to
utilise economies of scale (sea transport).
Vertical specialisation entails differentiation by products and transport modes. Splitting a
product into intermediates inevitably results into some parts that are more valuable than
others. The range of the per unit values of intermediates therefore increases the higher
the level of product differentiation. One of the fundamental consequences of growth in
vertically differentiated products is the changing landscape of a higher diversity of products
1First shown by Helpman (1981), intra-industry trade is related to differences in income per capita,
which, on the other hand, determine the volume of trade. More recent research shows that for a given
product category with many trading partners, higher-income countries tend to export goods with higher
unit values (Schott, 2004) as well as to import goods of higher quality (Bils and Klenow, 2001).
2For a given product category, the per unit value of a traded good can be obtained by dividing the
import value in US dollars by the import quantity in tonnes. Table A.1 shows that these value-to-weight
ratios differ by two orders of magnitude by subdividing extra-EU manufacturing imports into only 16
product categories.
3Hummels and Schaur (2013) indicate that, on average, ocean and air freight rates vary by a factor of
6.5. This study suggests a factor of 8 (see Section 4.3).
4For a given product category, the per unit value of a traded good can be obtained by dividing the
import value in US dollars by the imported quantity in tonnes. See Table A.1 for average value-to-weight
ratios by industry.
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exchanged globally. An increasing share of goods with relatively higher unit values will
therefore materialise into the global manufacturing and transport industries. If this pattern
continues, time will play in increasingly important role in international trade, as evidenced
by changes in the past: In combination with low fuel prices, container ships have been
designed to go faster (Wright, 2010), and the growth in total airborne trade5 has outpaced
the growth in total seaborne trade since records began in 1975 (Figure A.5).
The availability and use of different transport modes generates another source of product
differentiation6 in international trade. A firm participating in export markets differen-
tiates the products "air" and "sea transport" by cost and time. A firm’s selection over
these differentiated transport modes is a therefore a discrete choice. To learn about the
export preferences of such firms and the relative importance of time and transport costs in
international trade, I formulate in this chapter a discrete choice model that is embedded
into a general equilibrium trade model. In a second step, I show how to the translate this
model into a form that can be used for empirical work using international trade data by
mode of transport. The results indicate a strong influence of the time sensitivity of goods
on the general preference of air over sea transport.
The theoretical framework set out in this study builds on the Krugman (1980) model with
monopolistic competition and many firms and takes into account the marginal costs of
production inclusive of transport and time costs. It therefore adds to existing specifica-
tions7 a component of time cost that reflects the capital cost of goods locked up in transit.
The firm’s cost function is then specified to be cost-minimising in the aggregate, including
both transport and time costs. Conditional on these cost elements, a firm might therefore
select a transport mode with higher per unit transport costs but lower per unit time costs
to export to foreign markets. In doing so, firms choose from a set of distinctive transport
modes that have idiosyncratic appeal. Drawing on the theory of McFadden (1973) and
Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (1992), the assumed form of the transport utility func-
tion and the distribution of firms’ tastes are such that the system of aggregate transport
demand exhibits a multinomial logit structure.
The only study to additionally account for transit time in international trade is Hummels
and Schaur (2013). Yet, their specification relies on measuring time cost in units of days
(i.e. an indirect measure of time costs). In this study, time costs are measured using the
concept of the value of time (VOT), which is defined as the marginal rate of substitution
between transit time and transport cost. Time costs are therefore expressed in monetary
5The growth in Figure A.5 implies that air transport has had a significant influence in enabling the
fast and secure means of transport of goods with higher unit values as a result of vertical specialisation.
Annual global revenue tonne-kilometres (RTK) of air transport remain however much smaller than annual
global RTK of sea transport. In 2013, airborne trade represented 0.17% of seaborne trade by annual global
RTK.
6First formulated by McFadden (1973).
7These include Harrigan, 1995, Harrigan, 2010, Lux, 2011, Hummels and Schaur, 2013, and Allen and
Arkolakis, 2014
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units and can therefore be simply added to the marginal cost function of a firm to model
differences in trade costs of airborne and seaborne trade. In this way, the model and
estimated parameters can also be used to investigate the relative contribution of fast moving
goods on the welfare gains from trade.
The results in this chapter indicate that the VOT varies between industries and differs
between airborne and seaborne trade by factors of hundreds. The estimated VOT for the
total of manufacturing airborne trade is 50, whereas, for seaborne trade, the estimated
VOT is only about 0.3 Euros per tonne per hour. Given these inherent differences, I use
counterfactual exercises to investigate two related policy cases in international trade and
transport. The first policy case considers slow steaming. The contribution of ships to
the CO2 emissions from international trade is significant (Table 4.3). Given its anytime
availability, applicability, and significance, regulated slow steaming is considered to be one
of the key mitigation options to reduce CO2 from international maritime transport
8. I show
in this chapter that slow steaming could reduce the CO2 emissions from international trade
by a significant amount and with only little impacts on welfare. The second policy case
is hypothetical and considers a change from all air to sea cargo transport. In this case,
the results are indicative of the relative contribution of aviation to the welfare gains from
trade, which I estimate to be, on average, as large as 30%.
The limitations of the presented study originate from model simplifications and data con-
straints. I describe a theoretical framework in which time costs are assumed to predomin-
ately influence the marginal costs of production. The model does therefore not explicitly
account for fixed exporting costs, extensive margins (Chaney, 2008) and any potential
influence thereof in terms of time costs. Furthermore, this study does not look into the
determinants of global manufacturing patterns and the implications in terms of manufac-
turing production in general and per capita income in particular. Instead, the counter-
factual exercises in this study assume that the global manufacturing patterns in vertically
differentiated products remain unchanged. The results in this study are therefore partial
equilibrium results with respect to changes in transport and time costs and should there-
fore only be used as an informative benchmark. In addition, and as a direct result of data
constraints, this study does not incorporate any components of the logistic supply chain
beyond transport and time costs into a firms cost function. The logistic supply chain in
international transport is a complex construct involving a significant number of economic
agents and decision makers. The multinomial logit model presented in this chapter can
therefore only be a simplification of these processes. By referring to the firm as a decision
marker in the text, I equally address shippers and other economic agents involved in the
decision process.
8After the financial crises in 2008, slow steaming has been widely used in the maritime transport
industry as a measure to balance excess supply in ship capacity with the downturn in trade demand, which
resulted into significant reductions in CO2 (IMO, 2014)
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents the
theoretical framework. Before taking the model to data, I describe the dataset in Section
4.3, which I use to estimate the value of time in Section 4.4 and to quantify the relative
importance if time costs in international trade in Section 4.5. In the section after that I
use counterfactual exercises to show the welfare impacts associated with the policy cases
described above before I summarise my results.
4.2 Theoretical framework
In this section, I develop a general equilibrium framework of international trade, which in-
corporates firm-level preferences of choosing cost-effective transport modes for exporting.
The model consists of two components. The demand side is represented by the tradi-
tional gravity equation of international trade, whereas the supply side is represented by
a multinomial logit model of discrete choice. Both models are linked using equilibrium
prices.
I build on the Krugman (1980) model with monopolistic competition and many firms in one
country and where each firm produces a unique variety indexed by ω ∈ Ω. I deviate from
the Krugman model by additionally assuming that each variety exhibits product attributes
that are unique. Conditional on these attributes, a firm chooses a transport modem that is
minimising in trade and time costs. By ω I therefore refer to an individual firm producing
a unique variety, which is transported using a characteristic transport mode. The number
of varieties exhibiting the same transport mode can therefore be indexed using ω ∈ Ωm.
In what follows, I consider an infinite number of varieties but a finite number of available
transport modes.
Setup. I consider a world economy comprising i = 1, ..., I countries and labour L as the
only factor of production with factor income (wage) denoted as w . The number of firms
in each country is denoted Ni and determined in equilibrium. Their fixed cost of entry in
order to produce is fei . Firms in each country are confronted with increasing returns to
scale (IRS) in production but constant returns to scale (CRS) in international transport.
The transport of goods between countries is accomplished by different modes of transport.
The transport modes considered by a firm in country i to export to country j is a subset of
the universal set M of transport alternatives in the economy and given by m ∈ Cij , where
Cij ⊂M denotes the choice set, which is ij-specific.
Demand. Consumers have CES preferences over varieties ω. As each variety is trans-
ported using a characteristic transport mode m, consumers consuming different quantities
of varieties q(ω) therefore indirectly select different transport modes for those varieties to
be imported. I group the varieties exhibiting the same transport mode m into bundles
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ω ∈ Ωm and assume that a representative consumer in country j has a predetermined
budget share αm available for consuming that bundle. Consumers therefore maximise
their utility according to a two-tier utility function. The upper-level is Cobb-Douglas
Uj =
M∏
m=1
(
Umj
)αmj , where M∑
m=1
αmj = 1. (4.1)
The lower-level utility function is CES
Umj =
(
I∑
i=1
∫
ω∈Ωmi
qij(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
) σ
σ−1
, (4.2)
where Ωm ⊂ Ω and qij(ω ∈ Ωm) is the quantity demanded of varieties produced in
country i and consumed in country j. Common to all consumer bundles and countries is
the elasticity of substitution between goods σ > 1.
Putting a constant share by transport mode into the utility function is unconventional.
This specification is however necessary to establish an equilibrium condition between con-
sumer demand and transport supply by mode of transport. The equilibrium condition
implies that the cost-optimum selection of transport modes by firms is such that it exactly
matches the consumer demands for the bundles of goods imported by these different trans-
port modes. If supply and demand are not equilibrium, this condition may be problematic
as the bundle ω ∈ Ωm demanded may be different from the actual quantities imported
using transport mode m.
Assuming equilibrium conditions, the CES demand function for each individual bundle is
given by
qij(ω ∈ Ωmi ) = p−σij (ω ∈ Ωmi )Xjαmj (Pmj )σ−1, (4.3)
where Xjα
m
j is country j’s total expenditure on bundle m goods and P
m
j is the bundle or
mode-specific Dixit-Stiglitz price index
Pmj ≡
(
I∑
i=1
∫
ω∈Ωmi
p1−σij (ω)dω
) 1
1−σ
. (4.4)
Mode-specific bilateral trade flows can then be determined by multiplying the CES demand
function by the price pij and subsequently integrating over all varieties
Xmij ≡ Xjαmj (Pmj )σ−1
∫
ω∈Ωmi
p1−σij (ω)dω, (4.5)
where Xmij ≡
∫
ω∈Ωmi qij(ω ∈ Ω
m
i )p
1−σ
ij (ω)dω. If the bundles by transport mode were to
reflect a common set of varieties associated with an economic sector (say h), i.e. Ωmi ≡ Ωhi ,
Equation 4.5 would represent a sector level version of multi-sector gravity models commonly
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used in the literature (see e.g. Donaldson, 2010, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2014,
Caliendo and Parro, 2015). In this case however, the bundles ω ∈ Ωmi represent goods
imported from all partner countries using a common transport mode m, irrespective of
their final use in the importing country. A bundle ω ∈ Ωmi therefore spans over the entire
range of representative economic sectors in country j. Yet, because the consumer bundles
only differ in prices, it is possible to aggregate over all consumer bundles to obtain the
aggregated value of total bilateral trade flows between country i and j. Under Cobb-
Douglas preferences, the aggregate consumer price index in country j is given by
Pj ≡
M∏
m=1
(Pmj )
α
m
j . (4.6)
Replacing Pmj with the demand equation for each bundle in 4.5 yields into the total demand
equation
P 1−σj =
M∏
m=1
(Pmj )
(1−σ)αmj
= Xj
M∏
m=1
(
αmj
Xmij
∫
ω∈Ωmi
p1−σij (ω)dω
)αmj
⇐⇒
Xij = XjP
σ−1
j
M∏
m=1
(
αmj
λmij
∫
ω∈Ωmi
p1−σij (ω)dω
)αmj
, (4.7)
where
λmij =
Xmij
Xij
=
Xmij∑M
m=1X
m
ij
(4.8)
is the expenditure share of country j on the bundle of goods imported using transport mode
m from country i or, in short, the bilateral mode-specific expenditure share9. For Equation
4.7 to hold in a general equilibrium therefore, λmij must be determined independent of j’s
labour endowment wjLj . At this point however, it is not known what constitutes prices
pij(ω) and trade flows X
m
ij , which thus leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Bilateral mode-specific expenditure shares are entirely determined by rel-
ative differences in j’s pre-determined budget share, mode-specific bilateral transport costs,
and the number of firms exporting to j using transport mode m. Proof: see Equation 4.27.
Proposition 1 is similar to the proposition in Lux (2011) and ensures that mode-specific
bilateral trade shares λmij remain multiplicatively separable. Because λ
m
ij varies by country
pair however, there is a need to keep track of it in the model.
The next step involves solving for optimal prices pij(ω) before integrating over all varieties
ω ∈ Ωmi to obtain a gravity-like equation of international trade by mode of transport.
9Lux (2011) uses a similar specification for this expenditure share.
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Supply. Each manufactured good can be produced everywhere. However, exporting coun-
tries differ in terms of their production costs due to differences in labour and productivity
z. Under monopolistic competition with homogeneous firms, productivity varies by coun-
try, but not within a country. All firms in country i therefore share the same productivity
level zi to produce one unit of the good using 1/zi units of labour. The marginal cost of
producing the quantities Q ≡ {qj} by a representative firm in country i using wage wi is
therefore wiqj(ω)/zi.
For manufactured goods to be sold in foreign markets, the costs borne by a firm include
the costs for exporting. Exporting costs contain transport costs as well as the capital
costs of goods tied up in transit, both of which are dependent on the variety ω ∈ Ωm,
as each variety is transported using a characteristic transport mode m. However, for
the transport of goods to foreign markets, international transport carriers are assumed to
charge a per-unit transport price, which is independent of the product type and therefore
variety shipped10.
Faced with marginal production and exporting costs, the cost function of a firm located in
i with exports to j is
Cmij (ω) = qij(ω)
(
wi
zi
τmij
)
+ wif
e
i , (4.9)
with marginal costs given by
MCmij =
wi
zi
τmij . (4.10)
The following equations specify how time costs enter the cost function before turning to
the interpretation and discussion of the role of fixed costs fei in Equation 4.9.
τij are mode-specific iceberg transport costs a firm faces in shipping one unit of the variety
ω ∈ Ωm from i to j, which enter the gravity equation as an ad valorem tax equivalent to
the production costs at the factory gate wi/zi
τmij ≡ 1 +
tmij + s
m
ij
wi/zi
, (4.11)
where τmii = 1 and τ
m
ij ≥ 1.
Iceberg transport costs consist of mode-specific per-unit transport costs tmij and mode-
specific per-unit time costs smij—similar to a shadow price—reflecting the capital costs of
goods tied up in transit. In particular, the time costs are given by
smij = V OT
m · TTmij , (4.12)
10Certain types of varieties of goods transported might require special packaging, handling, insurance,
etc. and the transport and time costs are therefore dependent on the variety shipped. Due to limited
information on these costs however, I do not explicitly account for such cost differences by product type.
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where TTmij is the mode-specific transit time and VOT is the value of transit time common
to all firms on the bundle of m goods and defined as the marginal rate of substitution
between transit time and transport cost
V OTm =
∂MCmij /∂TT
m
ij
∂MCmij /∂t
m
ij
(4.13)
in units of [AC/units/hour]. Due the addition of the shadow price in the cost function, it
might be cost-effective for a firm to choose a transport mode with higher per unit transport
costs but lower per unit time costs (e.g. choosing air over sea transport).
Transit time TT is the duration the good remains on the transport vehicle. During this
time, the good is non-accessible and can therefore not be sold to the customer. The cost
associated with transit time is therefore the opportunity cost of having goods tied up in
transit11.
The VOT is used to express time as an economic value, the interpretation of which depends
on the specification of the VOT. If the VOT is specified among all transport alternatives,
time is considered as a homogeneous resource (a shadow price), which is uniform across all
alternatives (DeSerpa, 1971; Truong and Hensher, 1985). If the VOT is specified for each
transport alternative as in the case above, time is interpreted as a resource comparable
with a factor input into a production function for the transit activity (DeSerpa, 1971). The
VOT therefore accounts for the opportunity cost of making goods accessible at an earlier
or later point in time that arises from perishability, insurance costs (and thus transport
risks) and capital carrying costs12.
The interpretation of the role of fixed costs fei in the cost function in Equation 4.9 is crucial.
With fixed costs, there are increasing returns to transport mode. That is, the cost of
quantity shipped by a given transport mode also depends on the quantity shipped by other
modes. A key question to resolve is therefore the role of interdependencies between choices
of transport mode. From a theoretical point of view, the interdependency is important
to consider because of increasing returns. From an empirical point of view however, this
interdependency is overruled because of data limitations. Section 4.4 estimates the VOT
using trade data by mode of transport. Because this data only reveals transport choices
in aggregated form by country, the estimation procedure imposes the IIA property on the
model. As a result, the disturbances between transport modes are assumed to be mutually
independent. The consideration of increasing returns to transport mode would contradict
the IIA property needed for estimation. To make the estimated results compliant with the
theory outlined in this section, fixed costs are assumed to appear in production but not in
11The opportunity cost of goods tied up in transit is the difference between the present value and the
discounted present value of the commodities at the time of arrival, subject to a discount rate.
12If the VOT per day is expressed in percent of the goods value tied up in transit, it can also be
interpreted as a daily discount rate.
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transport. This is why fixed costs fei obtain the index i instead of ij in Equation 4.9. As
a result, the model considers IRS in production but CRS in transport.
Faced with the cost function in Equation 4.9, firms utilise an optimisation sequence13 in
which they initially
1. minimise their per-unit production costs by selecting the transport mode m with
lower marginal costs (MCmij ) under CRS, and then
2. maximise their production output (qij(ω)) by charging an optimal price under IRS.
In other words, firms maximise profits once the transport decision has be made. The
transport decision (Step 1) is purely based on differences in marginal costs MCmij between
transport modes, including marginal transport and time costs. Fixed costs and increasing
returns to transport mode are not considered in these choices. Fixed costs and increasing
returns to production (as is standard in the Krugman model) do however matter once the
firm maximises its production output and are therefore taken into account in addition to
the marginal costs in the profit maximising function in Step 2.
Step 1: minimise per-unit production costs. Firms minimise marginal costs by choosing a
transport mode m, which yields the optimal cost combination of transport and time costs,
tmij and s
m
ij . The probability of a firm located in i to choose m to ship to j (denoted Pij(m))
is therefore equal to the probability that the marginal costs using transport alternative m
are lower than or equal to the marginal costs from all available transport alternatives k in
the choice set C. Mathematically
Pij(m|Cij) = P
[
MCmij ≤MCkij , ∀k ∈ Cij , k 6= m
]
Pij(m|Cij) = P
[
tmij + s
m
ij ≤ tkij + skij , ∀k ∈ Cij , k 6= m
]
Pij(m|Cij) = P
[
tmij + V OT
m · TTmij ≤ tkij + V OTm · TT kij , ∀k ∈ Cij , k 6= m
]
.
(4.14)
Because the marginal cost of production wiqj(ω)/zi for a given variety ω are independent
of the transport mode, they become irrelevant in the respective choice situation. The
choice probabilities of the different transport alternatives are therefore only described by
the differences in transport and time costs.
The systematic cost component of the marginal cost function of a firm (denoted V mij )
therefore only needs to include the generic variables tmij and s
m
ij
V mij = β
m
0 + β
m
3
(
tmij + V OT
m · TTmij
)
, (4.15)
where βm0 is an alternative-specific constant and β
m
3 is the coefficient of transport cost and
defined as β3 ≡ ∂V mij /∂tmij . To be compliant with the definition of the VOT in 4.13, the
13The definition of optimisation sequences is not uncommon in the international trade literature. For a
recent study see e.g. Antràs, Fort and Tintelnot (2017).
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ratio of the coefficient of transit time to transport cost must be equivalent to the value
of time, in this case V OTm ≡ βm2 /βm3 , where βm2 is the coefficient of transit time and
therefore given by βm2 ≡ ∂V mij /∂TTmij .
Assuming that systematic differences in marginal costs V mij − V kij can be described by the
random differences εk ij − εmij , such that Vmij − Vk ij ≤ εk − εm, which are i.i.d. and
Gumbel-distributed with location parameter η and a scale parameter14 µ > 0, mathemat-
ically exp[−e−µ(ε−η)], yields into the multinomial logit (MNL) model (McFadden, 1973)
Pij
(
m ∈ Cij |tij , TTij
)
=
eµV
m
ij∑M
m∈Cij e
µV
m
ij
, (4.16)
where Pij
(
m ∈ Cij |tij , TTij
)
is the conditional probability of a firm located in i to select
transport mode m in the choice set Cij to export to j given transport costs and transit
time values tij and TTij respectively.
Because the systematic cost component V mij does not take into account any variables that
are related to the production of variety ω of a given firm in country i, the MNL model in
Equation 4.16 holds for every firm located in i with exports to j. A firm’s idiosyncratic
preference over a specific transport mode to export to j is captured by the random cost
component εk ij .
Step 2: maximise production output. Having determined their optimum marginal cost
level, firms choose a price, which—given demand—maximises the number of units sold in
the destination market j. The optimisation problem of a firm is given by
max
{qij(ω)}j∈I
I∑
j=1
qij(ω)
[
pij(ω)−
wi
zi
τmij
]
− wifei s.t. qij(ω) = p−σij (ω)Xjαmj (Pmj )σ−1,
where ω ∈ Ωmij . First order conditions imply that optimal pricing for a firm selling to
destination j is a constant markup over marginal cost
pmij (zi) =
σ
σ − 1
wi
zi
τmij . (4.17)
The optimal pricing condition in this model is therefore identical to the optimal pricing
condition in the standard Krugman model with the exception of the trade costs component,
which is in this case specified to additionally take time costs into account.
Gravity. Conditional on the selected transport mode m, every firm is charging the same
14Following Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), the intuition of the value of µ is as follows: as µ → 0,
the variance of the distributions approaches infinity and the alternatives are equally likely; as µ → ∞,
the variance of the utility disturbances approaches zero and the alternatives become deterministic i.e. all
information about individual preferences is contained in the systematic utilities.
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price, and substituting the price equation 4.17 for pij in the demand equation 4.7 yields
Xij = XjP
σ−1
j
M∏
m∈Cij
[
αmj
λmij
∫
ω∈Ωmi
(
σ
σ − 1
wi
zi
τmij
)1−σ
dω
]αmj
=
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ (wi
zi
)1−σ
XjP
σ−1
j
M∏
m∈Cij
[
αmj
λmij
(
τmij
)1−σ
Nmi (f
e
i )
]αmj
,
where Nmi (f
e
i ) ≡
∫
ω∈Ωmi dω is the mass of firms producing in country i, which choose to
export to country j using transport mode m. The equilibrium number of firms15 involved
in the production of manufactured goods in country i is dependent on the level of fixed
costs of entry, fei , and given by Ni(f
e
i ) ≡
∑M
m=1N
m
i (f
e
i ).
Multiplying the above equation byNi(f
e
i )/Ni(f
e
i ) and denoting the share of firms in i which
select transport mode m to export to foreign markets as λmi = N
m
i (f
e
i )/Ni(f
e
i ) yields
Xij =
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ (wi
zi
)1−σ
Ni(f
e
i )XjP
σ−1
j
M∏
m∈Cij
[
αmj λ
m
i
λmij
(
τmij
)1−σ]αmj
.
The resulting expression αmj λ
m
i in the product term measures country j’s expenditure on
bundle m goods and country i’s production in bundle m goods, which is inversely related
to the denominator of this term, given by country j’s expenditure on bundle m goods from
i. To see this, I rewrite this expression using the definition of the share of firms specialised
in producing ω ∈ Ωm from above, the definition of bilateral mode-specific expenditure
shares in 4.8, and the definition of the Cobb-Douglas shares αmj = X
m
j /Xj (see the market
clearing condition below)
αmj λ
m
i
λmij
=
Xmj
Xj
Nmi (f
e
i )
Ni(f
e
i )
Xij
Xmij
.
Because country j’s spending on goods imported from i, Xij , is determined by country
j’s total expenditure Xj and the number of products produced in country i, Ni(f
e
i ), no
explicit solution to the term αmj λ
m
i /λ
m
ij exists. I therefore chose to evaluate the gravity
equation at a point of symmetry where α
m
j λ
m
i
λ
m
ij
≡ constant.
The final model for estimation can then be written as (using 4.11)
Xij =
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ (wi
zi
)1−σ
Ni(f
e
i )XjP
σ−1
j
M∏
m∈Cij
(
1 +
tmij + s
m
ij
wi/zi
)(1−σ)αmj
, (4.18)
15Fixed exporting costs fei are specified independent of transport and time costs. For this reason, it is
not necessary to determine the equilibrium number of firms in this model.
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with mode choices given by (using 4.16)
Pij
(
m ∈ Cij
)
=
exp
[
µβm0 + µβ
m
3
(
tmij + V OT
m · TTmij
)]∑M
m∈Cij exp
[
µβk0 + µβ
k
3
(
tkij + V OT
k · TT kij
)] .
Equation 4.18 is what I will refer to as gravity equation in this model, consisting of an
exporter term (i), an importer term (j) and a bilateral transport costs term (ij). With
σ > 1 and conditional on the selected transport mode, Equation 4.18 implies that bilateral
trade flows Xij are
• decreasing with wage wi in country i as higher wage results into higher production
costs and thus prices pmij (zi) (see Equation 4.17),
• increasing with productivity zi as higher productivity lowers the cost of production,
• increasing with the equilibrium number of firms Ni exporting to country j as each
firm produces a unique variety and consumers would like to consume at least a little
of each variety (more firms therefore results into more goods imported by j),
• increasing with country j’s expenditure Xj ,
• increasing with j’s price index Pj as goods imported from country i are becoming
relatively cheaper if Pj increases, and
• decreasing with increasing transport costs tmij or time costs smij respectively.
Because 4.18 predicts aggregate bilateral flows Xij of all varieties produced in i and ex-
ported to j using all available transport modes m ∈ Cij , it is possible to also specify an
aggregate measure of τij . To do so, I first transform Equation 4.18 into its logarithmic
form
lnXij = δi + δj + (1− σ)
ln τij︷ ︸︸ ︷
M∑
m∈Cij
αmj ln
(
1 +
tmij + s
m
ij
wi/zi︸ ︷︷ ︸
τ
m
ij
)
(4.19)
where I used δi = (1−σ) ln
(
wi
zi
)
+lnNi(f
e
i ) for the exporter fixed effect and δj = lnXj−
(1−σ) lnPj for the importer fixed effect. This transformation is possible as all the variables
entering 4.18 can be grouped into i, j or ij terms, thereby remaining multiplicatively
separable16. From Equation 4.19 it can be seen that the log of τij essentially represents an
aggregated measure of the log of mode specific ad valorem transport costs τmij where each
individual mode-specific term is weighted by the Cobb-Douglas share αmj , mathematically:
ln τij ≡
∑M
m∈Cij α
m
j ln τ
m
ij .
Given these observations, the partial elasticity of relative imports with respect to overall
16Equation 4.18 therefore satisfies the separability condition of gravity equations (Head and Mayer, 2014,
Fally, 2015).
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transport costs can be defined as17
1− σ = ∂ ln
(
Xij/Xjj
)
∂
∑M
m∈Cij α
m
j ln
[
1 +
(
tmij + s
m
ij
)
/ (wi/zi)
] = ∂ ln (Xij/Xjj)
∂
∑M
m∈Cij α
m
j ln τ
m
ij
(4.20)
where Xjj is the value of goods produced and also consumed in country j.
Market clearing. To the close the model, I impose the following market clearing condition
wiLi ≡
I∑
j=1
Xij . (4.21)
That is, i’s production value wiLi inclusive of transport costs is equivalent to the sum of
i’s exports to all destinations j, including i’s export to its own home market Xii.
On the demand side, country j’s expenditure must be equivalent to the sum of j’s imports
from all supply countries i, including j’s imports from its own home market Xjj
Xj ≡
I∑
i=1
Xij =
M∑
m=1
Xmj =
M∑
m=1
I∑
i=1
Xmij . (4.22)
It follows that country j’s overall expenditure share on the bundle of m goods αmj and
overall, bilateral budget shares λij are given by
αmj ≡
Xmj
Xj
, (4.23)
λij ≡
Xij
Xj
=
Xij∑I
i=1Xij
. (4.24)
To comply with structural gravity, bilateral budget shares must remain multiplicatively
separable (Head and Mayer, 2014). In other words, λij must remain independent of country
j’s income wjLj . This can be shown by substituting trade flows for the gravity equation
in 4.18 to obtain
λij =
(
wi
zi
)1−σ
Ni(f
e
i )
∏M
m∈Cij
(
τmij
)(1−σ)αmj
∑I
i=1
(
wi
zi
)1−σ
Ni(f
e
i )
∏M
m∈Cij
(
τmij
)(1−σ)αmj . (4.25)
Similarly, using Equation 4.5, substituting pij(ω ∈ Ωm) for the optimal price equation 4.17,
and integrating over all varieties ω ∈ Ωm yields into a gravity equation for mode-specific
17If the elasticity of substitution between the goods ω ∈ Ωm is assumed to also vary by transport mode
m, the partial elasticity of relative imports with respect to mode-specific transport would be given by
1− σm = ∂ ln
(
Xij/Xjj
)
∂ ln
[
1 +
(
t
m
ij + s
m
ij
)
/ (wi/zi)
] = ∂ ln (Xij/Xjj)
∂ ln τ
m
ij
∀m ∈M.
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bilateral trade flows
Xmij =
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ (wi
zi
)1−σ
Nmi (f
e
i )Xjα
m
j
(
Pmj
)σ−1 (
τmij
)(1−σ) (4.26)
Using this expression in the definition for λmij , I immediately obtain
λmij =
Xmij∑M
m∈Cij X
m
ij
=
Nmi (f
e
i )α
m
j
(
τmij
)1−σ∑M
m∈Cij N
m
i (f
e
i )α
m
j
(
τmij
)1−σ , (4.27)
which is the proof of Proposition 1.
Country j’s budget shares, λij and λ
m
ij , are therefore both independent of country j’s labour
endowment and therefore ensure multiplicative separability, while αmj is a predetermined
structural model parameter of the Cobb-Douglas demand function.
Jointly, Equations 4.24 and 4.25 as well as Equations 4.8 and 4.27 ensure that budget
shares sum to one
I∑
i=1
λij =
I∑
i=1
Xij∑I
i=1Xij
= 1,
M∑
m=1
λmij =
M∑
m=1
Xmij∑M
m=1X
m
ij
= 1, (4.28)
which completes my description of the trade equilibrium in this economy.
Model isomorphism. It is easily verified that the theoretical model outlined in this
section is isomorphic to the Krugman (1980) model with monopolistic competition and
increasing returns to scale. Assume that all transport modes exhibit the same transport
costs and transit time values. The need to distinguish between transport modes is therefore
superfluous and the budget share for a consumer to consume the only available bundle
ω ∈ Ω is equal to one (αj = 1). On the production side, country i now also focuses only
on producing goods that are commonly exported using m as the only available transport
mode (λmi = 1). As a result, country j’s bilateral expenditure share on the bundle of goods
imported from country i is also equal to one (λmij = 1). Combining these observations in
Equation 4.18 gives
Xij =
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ (wi
zi
)1−σ
Ni(f
e
i )XjP
σ−1
j , τ
1−σ
ij (4.29)
which is the standard gravity equation in theoretical models with many firms in one country,
each of which produces a unique variety and operates in a monopolistic market.
The model could also be taken to the Chaney-Melitz model of monopolistic competition
with CES (Chaney, 2008, Melitz, 2003) to account for exporting decisions of firms with
respect to fixed exporting costs fij (see e.g. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008). The
homogeneous good as specified in Chaney (2008), which is freely traded and thus implies
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t0ij ≡ 0 as well as TT 0ij ≡ 0 and therefore V 0ij ≡ 0 and exp(µV 0ij) = 1, adds the outside
alternative of not choosing any transport mode to the MNL model in Equation 4.16. The
use of an homogeneous good can also be found in empirical studies of differentiated product
markets, where an outside alternative is added to represent the option of not purchasing
any of the products available to the consumer (e.g. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995).
On the demand side, fixed exporting costs fij , which now vary bilaterally, determine a
firm’s selection into exporting to j. Average prices charged by all firms therefore become
dependent on the average productivity of the equilibrium number of firms who chose to
export to j, which changes Equation 4.17. Together, changes in Equations 4.16 and 4.17
provide the theoretical basis to develop a Chaney-Melitz version of the model presented in
this section.
Limitations. Because transport prices and transit time vary by country pair, a firm
in country i exporting to destination j using mode m might consider a different mode
of transport, k 6= m, in shipping the same produced variety to another destination, say
l. This is because transport costs, tmij 6= tmil , and transit times, TTmij 6= TTmil vary by
trade routes and thus country pairs. While Equation 4.16 does in principal account for
this firm behaviour on the supply side, the theoretical framework on the demand side
remains restrictive to one variety and one characteristic transport mode only. From the
very beginning, I assumed that varieties can be grouped into bundles ω ∈ Ωmi , where
Ωmi ⊂ Ωi. For a model to reflect bilateral variations in transport modes for each variety,
the varieties must be bundled using ω ∈ Ωmij , where Ωmij ⊂ Ωmi ⊂ Ωi. The number of
varieties produced in country i would therefore also become dependent on the destination
market:
∫
ω∈Ωmij dω = N
m
ij (f
e
i ). Keeping track of the number of varieties produced, which
reflect certain characteristics to be shipped to j using multiple transport modes, remains
however difficult in an international trade setting, as not only multiple countries must be
dealt with but also multiple types of bundles, both of which vary by country pairs.
The way to think about multiple transport modes by destination country in the model
described above is as follows. If the firm is using multiple transport modes, then it is
intuitively appealing to think of those goods as two distinct varieties. As multiproduct
firms are however not accounted for in the model, a firm producing two varieties is thought
of as representing two separate firms, each producing a unique variety and using one
characteristic transport mode.
4.3 Data
To estimate the key parameters of the model, I use bilateral trade data from Eurostat
(2014). The dataset contains bilateral trade flows by mode of transport with a reporting
threshold of 1.000 AC in value over a 2001-13 time period between any EU country and any
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non-EU country (see Appendix A.1 for a description of the data).
Extra-EU trade data by mode of transport has not been used extensively in the literature,
predominantly due to its limited coverage18 and missing flows19. Given the focus of this
study on bilateral trade by mode of transport however, these limitations are unavoidable
and the results of this study are therefore limited to EU member countries only.
In Appendix A.1, I investigate the extra-EU trade dataset with respect to mode-specific
differences in value-to-weight ratios and product groups. For some observations I find that
the reported means of transport does not reflect the primary means of transport that is
used to bridge the greatest distance (e.g. EU imports from the US using road transport).
In such cases, I adjust the transport mode manually and assume sea transport as the
default mode. In the corrected dataset, trade by surface transport (rail, road, etc.) only
occurs between countries which are on the same landmass.
Because the transport between countries which are not on the same landmass is restricted
to air and sea transport only, the choice set Cij ⊂ M varies by country pair (ij). As the
log odds ratio (see below) prohibits the inclusion of zero flows in the estimation, the choice
set needs to be constrained to the alternatives that are common to each country pair. If all
available transport modes are considered, the sample size reduces considerably and only
includes trade between nearby or neighbouring countries20 (see Figure A.1). I therefore
restrict M to the frequently considered transport modes sea and air. The final dataset
does therefore not contain any bilateral flows other than trade by air and sea.
Because transport costs and transit time values are not reported, I rely on external data
sources to complement the extra-EU dataset with transport cost and transit time vari-
ables. In both cases, I estimate a functional form that allows to approximate transport
costs and transit time values using prices, quantities and distances. Within certain limits,
these approximations are acceptable for estimating a MNL model as only differences in
systematic utility (or costs) matter in a choice situation (see Equation 4.14). Given the
large differences in time and cost of air versus sea transport, neither the transport cost nor
the transit time variable need to be exact in absolute levels to obtain an approximation of
the value of time.
In Appendix A.2, I describe the method I use to estimate bilateral transit time dependent
18Lux (2011) therefore combines extra-EU trade data with extra-US trade data (North American Trans-
border Freight Data); Martinez, Kauppila and Gachassin (2014) combine extra-EU trade with Latin
America-extra trade (Base de datos de Transporte Internacional, BTI).
19Reported are imports into the EU and exports from the EU. The pendant to either flow is not included
in the data.
20Considering all available transport modes inM would require to exclude all country pairs, which utilise
less then the available transport alternatives defined in M , from the dataset for estimation. In this case,
the sample would only include trade, which occurs over short distances as the surface transport modes
(foremost rail and road) are included as alternatives. In addition, the data does not include intra-EU
trade, imposing further constraints on the sample.
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on bilateral distance and average transport speed. To be compliant with the annual re-
porting of trade data, I approximate transit time values using average trip speeds, which
I assume to be representative for the reporting period of an entire year. The method uses
a power function to describe the relationship between average trip speed and average trip
distance21. Because no further information on operational transport patterns is available,
the calculated transit time values for a given country pair remain identical over each time
period.
In the text below, I explain the method I use to model transport costs.
I adopt the empirical specification of Hummels and Skiba (2004) and write freight rates f
as a log-linear function of observable, nonprice portions of freight charges
ln fij = β0 + β1 ln
(
Xij
qij
− tij︸ ︷︷ ︸
wi/zi
)
+ β2 ln qij + β3 lnDij + εij , (4.30)
where t are per unit freight charges (in $/kg), wi/zi is the goods’ price (exclusive of freight
costs) at the factory gate, q is the total shipment quantity (in kg), and D is country pair
distance (in km). The error term captures any unobserved cost shifters and measurement
errors.
I estimate this equation for air and ocean freight rates using data from the OECD Maritime
Transport Cost database (OECD, 2007) for containerized seaborne trade and data from
Hummels (2007) for airborne trade. Table 4.1 contains the results.
Table 4.1: Approximation of transport costs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables (in logs) Ocean freight rate Ocean freight rate Air freight rate Air freight rate
Price [$/kg] 0.543 (0.004) 0.541 (0.005) 0.386 (0.001) 0.320 (0.001)
Quantity [kg] -0.042 (0.001) -0.059 (0.002) -0.089 (0.000) -0.121 (0.000)
Distance [km] 0.178 (0.007) 0.125 (0.008) — —
Constant [-] -3.480 (0.069) -2.180 (0.118) 0.050 (0.004) -0.420 (0.146)
Fixed effects [-] no yes no yes
Observations 17,941 17,941 893,772 893,085
R2 0.62 0.70 0.44 0.57
Notes: Estimated is Equation 4.30 using ordinary least squares (OLS) and the log of air or ocean freight
rates in [$/kg] as dependent variable. For the total of containerized manufacturing seaborne trade, the
fixed effects are specified for each origin country, destination country and year; for airborne trade by
commodity group, the fixed effects are specified for each destination country, commodity group, and year.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
The elasticities of freight rates with respect to prices at the factory gate obtain a significant
positive value of 0.54 for seaborne trade and 0.32 for airborne trade and implicate the
following two conclusions. First conjectured by Alchian and Allen (1967) and documented
by Hummels and Skiba (2004), because freight costs are increasing with the price of the
21Because of operational inefficiencies, the average trip speed is declining with decreasing average trip
distance. See Appendix A.2.
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good, firms tend to sell goods with higher unit values in foreign markets (exports), while
selling goods with lower unit values in the domestic or home market. In other words,
because transport costs associated with exporting would take up a significant share of
the overall price of goods with lower unit values, they are rarely sold in foreign markets.
The significantly smaller elasticity for airborne trade indicates that transport costs are
lower relative to the goods’ prices as a result of a significantly large share of goods with
higher unit values imported by air. Second, because the price elasticity is in all cases not
equal to one, transport costs are not purely ad valorem to the price at the factory gate and
the iceberg assumption in Equation 4.11 should therefore be rejected (Hummels and Skiba,
2004). Measuring the price elasticity of demand 1−σ from iceberg transport costs therefore
inevitably involves some levels of inaccuracy, which are amplifying with increasing per unit
costs of the exported goods.
The elasticities of freight rates with respect to quantity are all negative, indicating that
the per unit costs are falling in shipment size due to transport economies of scale. Because
the data for airborne trade is by importing country only, a country pair distance variable
cannot be included in the regression.
To control for any location and time specific variation in those results (e.g. local port and
bunker fuel prices and their variation over time), I include importer, exporter and year
fixed effects (columns 3 and 5 in Table 4.1), which changes the coefficient estimates only
marginally. Because prices at the factory gate may be determined simultaneously with
freight rates, they are endogenous. The results in Hummels and Skiba (2004) however
indicate that this endogeneity issue is less of a problem.
I use the coefficient estimates in columns 3 and 422 in Table 4.1 to calculate the transport
costs of seaborne and airborne manufacturing trade in the extra-EU trade dataset by mode
of transport for all commodity groups23. I assume that any price variations not captured
by the variables in Equation 4.30 are absorbed by a constant marginal cost term (AP ),
which I add to the side of manufacturing exports by air
tsij ≡fsij = eβ̂
s
0 (w si /z
s
i )
β̂
s
1
(
qsij
)β̂s2 (Dsij)β̂s3 (4.31)
taij ≡faij +AP = eβ̂
a
0 (wai /z
a
i )
β̂
a
1
(
qaij
)β̂a2 +AP. (4.32)
Because AP is representative of a marginal transport markup that is added to the marginal
freight costs part faij , I refer to it as being the air premium that firms face when choosing
22
β
a
0 is not significant in column 5. Using the coefficient estimates in column 4, I obtain a medium value
of air freight rates that is closer to the reported air freight rates.
23The price variable controls for any variation in the per unit value of the traded good. I therefore apply
the coefficients in Table 4.1 to all disaggregated product levels (see Appendix A.1 for a description of the
commodity groups). I calculate wi/zi for exports using the reported FOB values. As extra-EU trade data
does not include FOB values for imports, I approximate wi/zi for imports using the reported CIF values
and include a binary variable for imports in the MNL estimation. I do not report the coefficient estimates
of this variable in the results section.
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air over sea transport. The value of the air premium (in units of [$/kg]) will be recovered
from the alternative specific constant in the MNL estimation below.
In Appendix A.1 I investigate freight rates of seaborne trade using data from the OECD and
find that, on average, the transport of manufactured goods accounts for 6% of the traded
value, corresponding to a freight rate of about tsea = 0.26 $/kg. Using the coefficient
estimates in Table 4.1 and extra-EU trade data by mode of transport, I obtain a median
ocean freight rate of tsea = 0.27 $/kg and a median air freight rate of tair = 2.04 $/kg
(assuming 1$ ≈ 1AC ), both of which are well in line with actual reported values (Table A.2
and UPS, 2016). Ultimately, the predicted values of transport costs by mode of transport
are however a first order approximation under limited information, as the functional form
does not account for any local (or country specific) variation in transport costs.
In the next section, I use the differences in transport costs and transit time values by mode
of transport to estimate the MNL model of transport mode choice in international trade.
4.4 Trade and mode-specific preferences
Motivated by the theoretical model outlined above, this section deals with the estimation
of cost and time parameters of firms choosing different transport modes for exporting.
Of particular interest is in this respect the estimation of the VOT, which—in combination
with transit time values—provide insight into the significance of time costs in international
trade.
Recalling from Equation 4.16, a firm’s decision to export to j using transport mode m can
be described as
Pij
(
m ∈ Cij |tij , TTij
)
=
eµV
m
ij∑M
m∈Cij e
µV
m
ij
,
where Pij
(
m ∈ Cij
)
is the probability of a firm located in i to choose m to export to j.
Estimating this equation would in practice be straightforward if revealed preference data
of firms were available. In the case of international trade data however, the information of
firms choosing transport mode m to export to j is only available in aggregated form24. It
is therefore necessary to first transform the MNL model into a nonlinear probability model
before I can proceed with the estimation of the VOT. First shown by Berkson (1953) and
extended by Theil (1969), this transformation requires the systematic cost function V to
be linear in its parameters and the choice probabilities to be independent from irrelevant
alternatives.
As described earlier in the theoretical framework, the systematic component of the marginal
24several firms choosing m to export to j to ship quantities qmij
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cost function of a firm is given by V mij = β
m
0 + β
m
3
(
tmij + V OT
m · TTmij
)
, which is a linear
in the parameters utility function. Denoting β = [βm0 , β
m
2 , . . . , β
k
0 , β
k
2 , . . . , β
k
A] as the vector
of A unknown parameters of all alternatives k that are common to all firms and xmij =
[TTmij , t
m
ij ] as the vector of attributes characterising the firm as a decision maker, the
restricted (linear-in-parameters) version of the MNL model can be written as
Pij (m) =
eµβ
′
x
m
ij∑M
m∈Cij e
µβ
′
x
m
ij
.
The IIA property states that the disturbances are mutually independent (Ben-Akiva and
Lerman, 1985), such that
Pij (m)
Pij (l)
=
eµV
m
ij /
∑M
m∈Cij e
µV
m
ij
eµV
l
ij/
∑M
m∈Cij e
µV
m
ij
= e
µ
(
V
m
ij −V lij
) (∀m 6= l, {m, l} ∈ Cij) .
In terms of the prevailing model, the IIA property essentially means that the ratio of the
choice probabilities (the odds ratio) of any two transport alternatives of a representative
firm in country i is entirely unaffected by the systematic cost of any other transport
alternative. Given the differences in the systematic cost components, firms therefore choose
e.g. sea transport over air transport in a specific choice situation, irrespective of the fact
that e.g. road transport is also available or not available to them25.
Jointly, the linear-in-parameters and IIA property yield
Pij (m)
Pij (l)
= exp
[
µβ′
(
xmij − xlij
)] (∀m 6= l, {m, l} ∈ Cij) .
To arrive at the nonlinear probability model, I consider Nmi (f
e
i ) firms, located in country
i, where each individual firm is responsible for shipping quantity qmij goods from i to j
using transport mode m. I assume that this group of firms can be divided into G < N
homogeneous subgroups of size Nmi1 , N
m
i2 , N
m
i3 , ..., N
m
iG, where
∑G
g=1N
m
ig = N
m
i (f
e
i ). If
each of those subgroups is homogeneous in terms of xij = x
m
ij − xlij (Ben-Akiva and
Lerman, 1985), then, by Berkson’s method, the ratio of the choice probabilities of any two
alternatives can be estimated using the share of each subgroup in shipping quantities qmigj
and qligj to j
ln
(
qmigj/qigj
qligj/qigj
)
= µβ′
(
xmij − xlij
)
g
+ ςigj
(∀m 6= l, {m, l} ∈ Cij) , (4.33)
with qigj ≡
∑M
m∈Cij q
m
igj and where ς is a heteroskedastic error term (Cox and Snell, 1989)
as a result of the logarithmic transformation.
25The IIA property fails if the disturbances between alternatives are correlated, that is, if the alternatives
are close substitutes. In such cases, a nested logit model is preferred over the simple logit model.
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As trade data by mode of transport is however only available in aggregated form by country
pairs, only G = ij × m = N subgroups can be formed, which thus implies having as
many subgroups as observations and G < N cannot be satisfied. This leaves two options:
decrease G or increase N . The first option would imply to treat multiple ijm observations
as one group (g) which would however contradict the gravity setting in treating each
country’s supply capacity and market demand individually. The second option, which
is my preferred option, is to increase N by observations at different points in time t,
so as to obtain multiple observations per mode of transport for the same country pair
G < N · (te − ts), where ts is the start year and te the end year. This approach solves the
issue of forming subgroups under limited information while ensuring that these subgroups
are also homogeneous in terms of xij = x
m
ij − xlij . This is because a firm’s decision to
export to j using m is influenced by economic or geographical aspects related to country
i or country j respectively. A subgroup specified for each time period therefore still refers
to the same country pair, thus preserving any long-run i or j specific conditions (e.g. local
port charges), while any short-run variations (e.g. a year-over-year change in local prices)
are captured by the time series component.
In treating the subgroups as individual country pair observations over time, the group
index g can be substituted with a time index t
ln
(
qmij
qlij
)
t
= µβ′
(
xmij − xlij
)
t
+ ςijt
(∀m 6= l, {m, l} ∈ Cij) , (4.34)
where the choice set Cij must remain identical over all time periods.
Equation 4.34 can be used to estimate the unknown parameters β, including the VOT,
using bilateral trade data by mode of transport, which has been collected over several time
periods.
Because the subgroups of the nonlinear probability model are formed as repeated observa-
tions over time, I account for autocorrelation in variables by adding a lagged mode share(
qmij /qij
)
t−1 to the systematic cost component V
m
ij to obtain(
β
′xmij
)
t
= βm0 + β1 ln
(
qmij /qij
)
t−1 + β
m
3
(
tmij + V OT
m · TTmij
)
t
. (4.35)
For any given country pair, the nonlinear probability model therefore takes the form of an
autoregressive model.
As Schäfer (2015) notes, in the context of a respondent’s systematic utility, the lagged mode
share represents the constraint of a respondent (e.g. a firm) in choosing mode m under
limited information and with respect to the potential influence of habits on these decisions.
The mode choice at time t is thus partially also determined by its preceding mode choice at
time t− 1. The lagged mode share therefore measures the inertia associated with choosing
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the same mode m within two consecutive time-steps. In the prevailing case above however,
β1 is specified as a parameter common to all country pairs in the cross-section and therefore
represents the average predetermined preference within two consecutive time-steps across
all country pairs in the sample. Its informative value is therefore limited.
Substituting β′
(
xmij
)
t
in Equation 4.34 with the systematic component of the marginal
cost function given by 4.35, 4.31 and 4.32, and choosing sea transport as the reference
transport mode26 l yields into the following system of equations
ln
(
qaij
qsij
)
t
=µβa0 + µβ1 ln
(
qaij
qsij
)
t−1
+ µβa2TT
a
ijt − µβs2TT sijt+
µβa3
(
faijt +AP
)− µβs3fsijt + ςijt
ln
(
qrij
qsij
)
t
=µβr0 + µβ1 ln
(
qrij
qsij
)
t−1
+ µβr2TT
r
ijt − µβs2TT sijt+
µβr3f
r
ijt − µβs3fsijt + ςijt
...
ln
(
qmij
qsij
)
t
=µβm0 + . . . ,
(4.36)
where the transport modes m ∈ Cij for a firm located in i to export to j are indicated using
s for sea, a for air, and r for road transport (to name a few). Assuming that each good
produced in i and exported to j weighs one tonne, qij can be measured by the total tonnes
imported from i using transport mode m. TT refers to the transit time in [h], f to the
freight rate in [AC/kg], and AP to the air premium in [AC/kg] (see Equation 4.32). Note that
the alternative-specific constants β0, the time coefficients β2, as well as the cost coefficients
β3, are specified separately for each transport alternative, while β1 is a parameter assumed
to be common to all alternatives.
The optimisation conditions of a representative firm and the parameters β imply that the
disturbances among the odds ratios in Equation 4.36 should be correlated and therefore be
estimated jointly, using a seemingly unrelated regression (Greene, 2002). In an ideal case
therefore, Equation 4.36 is estimated using an exhaustive choice set Cij ⊂M that consists
of all mutually exclusive alternatives m ∈ Cij . For reasons of sufficient sample size however
(see Section 4.3 above), the choice is constraint to the alternatives M ≡ {sea, air} for all
country pairs. This is a reasonable simplification as the choice parameters can also be
estimated consistently on a subset of alternatives if the IIA property holds (Train, 2009).
I estimate the air to sea odds ratio of 4.36 (top line) using non-linear least squares. I
calculate the variables of the systematic cost component of a firm using (i) reported extra-
EU trade quantities by mode of transport for qmijt, (ii) reported extra-EU trade values and
26The choice of the reference mode is arbitrary.
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quantities and the coefficient estimates in Table 4.1 for tmijt, and (iii) bilateral distances
and the coefficient estimates in Figures A.3 and A.4 for TTmijt. To recover the value of
the air premium AP , I first estimate 4.36 using the restriction µβa0 = µASC + µβ
a
3AP ≡
µβa3AP , where ASC is the alternative specific constant. In this case, µASC remains as
the only estimated constant in the model. I then estimate the same equation without
restrictions to obtain a value of µβa0 . The value of the AP can then be calculated using
AP = (µβa0 − µASC)/µβa3 . Table 4.2 contains the results.
In all regressions, the ASC (column 3) obtains a negative value, indicating a relative pref-
erence for sea transport, holding transport and time costs fixed. Except for coke and
petroleum products27, the absolute value of the ASC indicates that the various elements
in x form a systematic cost function V that captures the relevant differences in attributes
between alternatives. V therefore responds well to the established theory about transport
choice in an international trade context. A relatively high absolute value of the ASC would
indicate omitted-variable bias (OVB). Restricting a firm’s decision of choosing a transport
mode exclusively to the attributes of cost and time evidently omits other potential in-
fluences on these choice situations including insurance, loss and damage, delivery time,
and reliability. If these attributes were measurable and included in the systematic cost
component28, an even lower value of the ASC could potentially be obtained.
The air premium (column 4) is positive and significant for all commodity groups and ranges
from 0.6 AC/kg for textiles to 20 AC/kg for minerals, with a central estimate of 2.7 AC/kg
for the total of manufacturing goods. A high value of the AP reflects the additional costs
(special packaging and handling, insurance) associated with transporting hazardous goods
(e.g. chemicals), time and temperature sensitive goods (pharmaceuticals), fragile goods
(e.g. pottery in non-metallic mineral products) or valuable goods (e.g. minerals in non-
metallic mineral products). For all other commodity groups, the AP remains relatively
low in value, as the systematic cost differences are mainly captured by the differences in
variables of transport cost and transit time.
The preference of firms to choose either sea or air transport to export to foreign countries
is largely pre-determined. On average, almost 70 % of relative mode preference is pre-
determined between two consecutive years (column 5), leaving 30 % of relative preference
to be chosen freely at any time step. The estimated coefficients are however averaged across
the time series and cross-sectional component of the dataset and therefore representative
for all country pairs in the dataset. A relatively lower value of this estimate therefore in-
dicates volatility of the quantities commonly shipped via air against sea transport between
countries i and j. Significant changes in the quantities shipped in the data are a result of
27Also includes other non-fuel petroleum derivatives.
28Ideally, the various elements in x form a systematic cost function V that responds to any theory about
transport choice, thereby capturing relevant differences in attributes between alternatives. In practice
however, x can only take into account attributes that are observable and measurable, while V must be
specified in way to remain computational.
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changes in logistic patterns (j importing from k instead of i) or non-recurring air or sea
shipments on particular trade routes over time.
The sign of the estimated time and cost coefficients (columns 6, 7, 9 and 10) are consistent
with theory. The higher the transport or time costs, the higher the costs of a firm. Higher
production costs reduce the profits of a firm, which thus reduces a firm’s systematic cost
component Vij , indicated by the negative sign of the coefficients.
The absolute values of the time coefficients are in general smaller than the absolute values of
the cost coefficients as a result of the chosen units of these variables. If time were measured
in days—which is an unusual unit for air transport however—the absolute values of the
cost coefficients would be higher.
Dividing the time coefficient by the cost coefficient yields the VOT (note the unit trans-
formation from [AC/kg] and [h] to [AC/t/h] and that µ cancels). For sea transport, the VOT
ranges from 0.04 for food products to 1.08 AC/t/h for machinery and vehicles. For air trans-
port, the VOT ranges from 19 for rubber and plastic to 190 AC/t/h for non-metallic mineral
products. The central estimate for the total of manufacturing goods is 0.27 for seaborne
and 49.9 AC/t/h for airborne trade. These values compare well to estimates commonly
found in the freight logistics literature29.
Because the VOT is formed from the ratio of the time to the cost coefficient, changes in
either coefficient have a direct influence on the sign, value and significance of the VOT.
For some industries, time seems to be less of an importance (e.g. in the textiles, wearing
apparel, paper and furniture industries) as indicated by a positive sign and a relatively low
z-statistic of the coefficient estimates of the time variable.
The high statistical significance of the estimated coefficients can be attributed at least in
part to the underlying time series data as a result of forming subgroups of observations
over time. Yet, in using Berkson’s method, the subgroups need to be homogeneous in
terms of xij and consistency is only obtained if N → inf. Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)
therefore note that Berkson’s method may only be applied in the case of highly aggregated
data with a large number of repeated observations. The formation of subgroups over
time (as imposed by the data structure of this study) therefore inevitably results into
autocorrelation in variables.
Robustness check. To investigate the influence of heteroskedasticity resulting from the
transformation of the MNL model into a nonlinear probability model (see Equation 4.33),
I follow Guerrero and Johnson, 1982 and Kay and Little (1987) and apply the Box-Cox
transformation (Box and Cox, 1964) to the odds ratio to reduce anomalies such as non-
29De Jong (2008) conducts a literature review on the value of time in goods transported by different
transport modes. Using the average of the reported values in De Jong (2008) and correcting them for
inflation (2013AC) yields 0.019 for sea transport, 0.13 for inland waterways, 0.64 for rail, 2.67 for road, and
154 AC/t/h for air transport.
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normality and heteroskedasticity and to generalise the logistic model. That is,(
qmijt
qlijt
)λm
= µβ′
(
xmij − xlij
)
t
(∀m = 1, ..., k ∈ Cij ;m 6= l), (4.37)
where β and xmij are as in 4.33 and
(
qmijt
qlijt
)λm
=

ln
(
q
m
ijt
q
l
ijt
)
; λm = 0
λ−1m
[(
q
m
ijt
q
l
ijt
)λm
− 1
]
; λm 6= 0.
Assuming that there is some value of λm such that 4.37 holds, the generalised nonlinear
probability model can be estimated using
(
qmijt
qlijt
)
(Λ) =

exp
[
µβ′
(
xmij − xlij
)
t
]
; λm = 0[
1 + λmµβ
′ (xmij − xlij)
t
]1/λm
; λm 6= 0,
(4.38)
for some parameter values Λ = (β′;λm, ..., λk). I estimate equation 4.38 using MLE for
the total of manufactured goods and obtain a value of λm = 0.070(z = 46.96), a VOT
for sea transport of 0.239 AC/t/h (p < 0.01), and a VOT for air transport of 69.840 AC/t/h
(p < 0.01). The functional form parameter λm > 0 indicates some non-linearity of the odds
ratio of air against sea transport. The time and cost coefficient and hence the VOTs remain
however similar to the estimates in Table 4.2 and I therefore conclude that the presence of
heteroskedasticity in the nonlinear probability model influences the results only marginally.
4.5 Trade, transport and prices
Are time costs quantitatively important in international trade? The VOT estimates in the
previous section shed light on the importance of time costs on a per unit per hour basis for
airborne and seaborne trade. To see if they are quantitatively important in the aggregate
however relies on the relative influence of time costs on overall prices.
In the first part of this section I investigate if any useful information about prices can
be extracted from the data using matched-partner CIF/FOB ratios and the differences in
prices by transport mode. In both cases, the established theory is rejected by the data
due to measurement errors and model simplifications. In the second part of this section, I
use the estimates from the previous sections to quantitatively show the importance of time
costs in international trade.
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Matched-partner CIF/FOB30 ratios - rejected by the data. Starting from bilateral
trade values, the quantities imported times the per unit price of the traded good must
be equivalent to the reported import value from i, mathematically: Xmij ≡ pmij (zi)qij(ω),
where ω ∈ Ωmi . Recalling that the one plus the tax equivalent of bilateral transport costs
on shipments from i to j is given by τmij ≡ 1 +
tmij + s
m
ij
wi/zi
(Equation 4.11) and using the
optimal price equation (Equation 4.17) for pmij , I immediately obtain
Xmij
qmij
=
σ
σ − 1
[
wi
zi
+ tmij + s
m
ij
]
⇐⇒
τmij = 1 +
tmij + s
m
ij
wi/zi
=
(
σ − 1
σ
)
Xmij /q
m
ij
wi/zi
.
Trade values31 Xmij and trade quantities q
m
ij are commonly reported in trade data. Inform-
ation about country i’s production value32,
∑I
j=1 qijwi/zi, or the per unit production cost
at the factory gate, wi/zi, is more difficult to obtain.
One way to approximate the production costs in country i is by dividing the reported FOB
value by the quantity exported: wi/zi = X
FOB,m
ij /q
m
ij . This transformation is possible since
the FOB valuation refers to the trade value that would be invoiced in the event of sale
or purchase of the exported good at the national border of the exporting country. The
FOB value is therefore the trade value exclusive of any transport costs. Combining these
observations with the expression from above results into the so-called "matched-partner
CIF/FOB ratio"
τmij =
(
σ − 1
σ
)
Xmij
XFOB,mij
=
(
σ − 1
σ
)
pmij
pi
(4.39)
"Matched-partner" in this case refers to the two statistics that are collected for the two
countries trading with each other at the national border of the exporting and the importing
country.
Because XFOB,mij ≡ piqmij , the expression above can also be derived from the standard no-
arbitrage condition
pmij
pi
≡ τmij . As a result, the differences in prices pi and pmij are entirely
determined by bilateral transport costs.
Although the no-arbitrage condition holds in theory, any practical implementation thereof
to measure the demand elasticity with respect to transport costs remain limited. Hummels
30"CIF" refers to the trade value inclusive of any trade costs (such as transport costs and tariffs), whereas
"FOB" refers to trade values exclusive of any trade costs. See Appendix A.1.
31Note that because it is assumed that the transport costs are borne by the firm as specified by the firm’s
cost function in 4.9, trade flows, denoted with Xij , essentially refer to a CIF valuation (cost, insurance,
freight). This is the standard specification in the international trade literature. FOB values only become
relevant when calculating the one plus the tariff equivalent of bilateral transport costs measure τ . τ in
combination with CIF values provide the baseline to estimate the trade elasticity 1− σ.
32Note that summing over all export flows Yi =
∑I
j=1Xij yields into the production value inclusive of
transport costs, which is different from the production value at the factory gate
∑I
j=1 qijwi/zi.
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and Lugovskyy (2006) show that matched-partner CIF/FOB ratios are error ridden in levels
and therefore not appropriate to evaluate price elasticities of demand. This is because
statistical offices in the exporting and importing country often value goods differently (e.g.
due to exchange rates), track shipments more or less accurately (importers being more
accurate in order to levy tariffs), and place goods under different product sub-categories
(e.g. due to different product nomenclatures). In other words, is it difficult to get hold
of trade values reported at the exporting and the importing country, which refer to the
same bundle of goods exchanged. The matched-partner CIF/FOB ratio as a method to
infer about the relative importance of transport costs on prices is rejected by the data as
a result of measurement errors, rather than by the theory that is imposed on the data.
Mode specific price differences - rejected by the data. First noted by McFad-
den (1973), transport choice can be viewed as another source of product differentiation.
Differences in trade values by transport mode should therefore contain useful information
about differences in absolute levels of transport costs (see e.g. Hummels and Schaur, 2013).
Consider the two subgroups ω ∈ Ωm and ω ∈ Ωl, where m 6= l. Both these bundles are
produced in county i but exported to country j using different transport modes m and l.
Writing
Xmij
qmij
=
σ
σ − 1
[
wi
zi
+ tmij + s
m
ij
]
for each bundle separately and taking the difference
between the two expressions yields
Xmij
qmij
− X
l
ij
qlij
≈ σ
σ − 1
[
tmij − tlij
]
, (4.40)
where I assumed smij  tmij . By further assuming that each unit qij weighs one tonne,
Xmij /q
m
ij − X lij/qlij can be readily calculated from mode-specific bilateral trade data33 to
infer about the level of differences in transport costs between goods exported to j using
transport modes m and l. This is because the production costs at the factory gate only
depend on wage and productivity according to the laid out theory above, both of which are
assumed to be invariant of the variety produced in i and therefore cancel out in Equation
4.40.
Using extra-EU trade data and Equation 4.40 I find that for manufacturing imports into
the EU, goods transported via air are on average 87 Euros more expensive than goods
transported via sea on a per kilogramme basis. This value is surprisingly high and far
higher than the average difference of median air and ocean freight rates. In fact, using
the values from Section 4.3 above, the median difference in air and sea transport costs
is 2.04 − 0.27 = 1.77 $/kg. For the other industries defined in Appendix A, I obtain
values, which range from 16 AC/kg to 157 AC/kg (excluding negative values). Equation 4.3
is therefore unambiguously rejected by the data.
33
X
m
ij /q
m
ij can be calculated by dividing the CIF trade value of goods imported using transport m, by
the quantity of goods imported using transport m in units of e.g. AC/tonne.
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The main reason for these discrepancies is the simplified representation of the marginal
production cost function using only labour costs and productivity. Any other production
costs such as material or capital costs are not considered, which may however be of sig-
nificance. For example, the cost of materials used in the manufacturing process may be
significantly higher than the cost of labour. In such cases, the value added in manufac-
turing these goods might be significantly lower than the actual reported trade value (the
trade value measures gross manufacturing output). This is why Equation 4.40 does not
hold for product groups, which differ in factor input prices other than wage w . If data of
trade in value added per mode of transport would be available however34, Equation 4.40
should remain sufficiently accurate to approximate differences in mode-specific transport
costs, which, in theory, can be used to estimate or infer the values of the price elasticities
of demand (see e.g. Eaton and Kortum, 2002 and Simonovska and Waugh, 2014). The
materials price can then also be added to the systematic cost function of a firm in 4.9
to additional account for e.g. insurance costs. The presence of cost categories other than
labour would however not result into dramatic changes of the gravity equation. To see this,
assume that a materials price would be added to the optimal price equation in 4.17. Just
like wi/zi, this price would relate uniquely to each variety produced by a firm in country
i and subsequently be absorbed by a fixed effect in the regression.
In sum, no valuable information can be extracted from trade data by mode of transport
to learn about the influence of transport costs (and hence prices) on trade demand.
The relative importance of time costs in international trade. To quantify the
relative importance of time costs, I calculate the per unit time costs using smij = V OT ·TTmij
in units of [AC/kg], where the VOT is taken from Table 4.2. For tmij , I use air and sea freight
values from Section 4.3 and the estimates of the AP from Table 4.2 to calculate per unit
transport costs in units of [AC/kg]. Because transport and time cost are calculated on a per
unit basis, they are representative of the prices faced by firms to export to foreign markets.
I first evaluate relative price differences of airborne and seaborne trade using the one
plus the ad valorem cost equivalent associated with the transport of goods from i to j,
τmij ≡ 1 +
tmij + s
m
ij
wi/zi
(Equation 4.11). I aggregate these values into an overall price measure
using the Cobb-Douglas expenditure shares τ =
∏
m∈M
(
τmij
)αmj (Equation 4.19), where
M ≡ {sea, air} for all country pairs. I approximate αmj using imports and exports35.
34In an joint initiative, the OECD and WTO collect data on trade in value added (OECD, 2016). This
trade data is however not available by mode of transport.
35Domestic expenditures by mode of transport are not reported. I therefore use
α
m
j ≈
∑
i6=j
i∈I
X
m
ij +X
m
ji∑
i 6=j
i∈I
Xij +Xji
, (4.41)
to approximate the value of αmj , where Xij refers j’s imports and Xji to j’s exports. The former reveals
j’s consumption preferences, the latter j’s production output and hence domestic consumption preferences
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Because the production value at the factory gate wi/zi (or FOB respectively) is only
reported for extra-EU exports, I restrict the sample to exports only.
Figure 4.1 displays the Kernel estimates of density of the seaborne, airborne and total
iceberg transport cost measures. The distributions indicate that values of τ higher or lower
than the average are less likely to occur the greater the discrepancy between those two. All
curves have a positive skew, indicating that the mass of the distribution is concentrated
at values lower than the average. For air transport, the curve is offset to the left because
of relatively higher prices of the traded goods by air, which thus lowers the significance
of overall transport costs tmij + s
m
ij relative to the traded value wi/zi (indicated by a lower
elasticity of freight rates with respect to prices in Table 4.1). The deformation of the curve
for air transport on the right hand side results from the inclusion of the per-unit constant
AP. The Kernel density estimates I obtain for air transport are akin to the air premium
values in Hummels and Schaur (2013). Because the expenditure on goods imported by
air is much smaller than the expenditure on goods imported by sea transport (indicated
by a small value of 1− αs in Table 4.3), the aggregated iceberg transport cost measure is
distributed similarly to the iceberg transport cost measure of seaborne trade. Using iceberg
transport costs of goods imported by air to measure the price elasticity of demand 1 − σ
would result into relatively higher values in comparison to using iceberg transport costs of
goods imported by sea. This is because of the smaller variance of τ as indicated by the offset
of the curve to the left. Because small differences in prices are statistically important to
measure the price elasticity of demand however, I do not use the calculated price variables
of this study (which in turn rely on estimated freight costs) to obtain estimates of σ.
The relatively smaller values of iceberg transport costs by air may come at a surprise,
given the higher values of VOT in airborne trade in Table 4.2. To shed light on this, I
move from iceberg to per unit transport and time costs. Figure 4.2 shows the relative
importance of per unit time costs s in total per unit transport costs s + t in percent. I
approximate the aggregated measures of airborne and seaborne trade using
∏
m∈M
(
smij
)αmj
and
∏
m∈M
(
tmij
)αmj respectively. For the majority of bilateral trade flows by sea, per unit
time costs account for approximately 35% in overall per unit transport costs. In contrast,
for airborne trade, per unit time costs account for only approximately 10% in overall per
unit transport costs as a result of relatively higher freight rates by air ta. Relative to
per unit transport costs therefore, per unit time costs are quantitatively more important
in overall prices in seaborne trade as a result of relatively lower costs associated with
the actual transport of the good by sea. Similar to Figure 4.1 above, the distribution of
the aggregated values looks similar to the distribution of seaborne trade as a result of a
higher expenditure share of goods imported by sea. Relatively higher values of t and s
in combination with relatively lower prices wi/zi explain why iceberg transport costs are
larger for seaborne than for airborne trade (as indicated by Figure 4.1). In the aggregated
of bundle m goods.
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total of manufacturing exports, per unit time costs account for approximately 25% in
overall transport costs. Yet, dependent on the mix between airborne and seaborne trade
and their relative differences in per unit transport and time costs between country pairs,
their relative importance in overall transport costs can vary between 1% and 75%.
Figure 4.2 may be misleading in the interpretation of the differences in per unit time costs
between airborne and seaborne trade. In Figure 4.3 I therefore show the relative size of per
unit time costs by sea ss in overall per unit air and sea time costs ss + sa in percent over
great circle country pair distances. For large distances, the per unit time costs associated
with the transport of goods via air are significantly higher than the per unit time costs
associated with the transport of goods via sea. For short distances however, the per unit
time costs of seaborne trade are often larger than the per unit time cost of airborne trade
due to relatively larger sea distances by country pair and hence larger transit times TT .
Considered jointly, Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 illustrate that per unit time costs are of signific-
ance in international trade36. Their quantitative weight in overall prices however depends
on a number of related variables and their relative quantitative importance, including per
unit transport costs t, prices wi/zi, transit times TT , and expenditure shares α. In addi-
tion, time costs vary significantly by mode of transport and therefore influence the prices of
airborne and seaborne trade unequally. The interpretation of the quantitative importance
of time costs on an aggregate country-by-country level therefore remains difficult, as a
result of the many possible combinations and variations of these factors. The next section
investigates how changes in per unit time costs materialise into changes in overall prices
and thus changes in welfare.
4.6 Counterfactuals
In this section, I analyse changes in real income associated with environmental policies in
international transport. Because the drag resistance and thus fuel consumption is propor-
tional to the squared speed in maritime transport, I investigate the policy case associated
with slowing down the average sailing speed of container ships by 30% (referred to as policy
case A), which would reduce their CO2 intensity by approximately 50% (0.7
2) (Corbett,
Wang and Winebrake, 2009). Furthermore, because the transport of goods via air is ap-
proximately 100 times more carbon intensive than the transport of goods via sea37, I
investigate the hypothetical case of shutting down the air cargo industry and transporting
all goods by sea (referred to as policy case B). Policy case B is thus also illustrative for
36In should be noted that the actual quantities exported are not taken into consideration in computing
Figures 4.1 to 4.3.
37Using typical emission indexes for jet fuel and heavy fuel oil and average energy intensities by mode
of transport from Gucwa and Schäfer (2013), I obtain average CO2 emissions intensities of 900gCO2 per
tonne-kilometre for air transport and 10gCO2 per tonne-kilometre for sea transport.
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quantifying aviation’s "contribution" to the welfare gains from trade.
Both policies influence the time of goods in transit and therefore the time costs associated
with importing those goods from foreign countries. Common starting point of the coun-
terfactual exercises in this section is therefore to link changes in transport and time costs
to changes in prices and subsequently to changes in real income Wj ≡ Yj/Pj .
Starting with the price index Pj , I first combine Equations 4.4 and 4.6
Pj =
M∏
m=1
(
Pmj
)αmj ⇐⇒
(
Pj
)1−σ
=
M∏
m=1
(
I∑
i=1
(
pmij
)1−σ)αmj
Following Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) and Costinot and Rodríguez-
Clare (2014), it follows immediately by Shephard’s Lemma that small changes in prices
d lnPj are given by
(1− σ) d lnPj =
M∑
m=1
αmj (1− σ)
I∑
i=1
pimij d ln p
m
ij ⇐⇒
d lnPj =
M∑
m=1
I∑
i=1
αmj pi
m
ij d ln p
m
ij ,
where pimij ≡ Xmij /Xmj is the share of expenditure on the bundle m goods from country i.
As small changes in prices are now measured using these expenditure shares, the value of
the trade elasticity (1− σ) becomes irrelevant to quantify changes in the price index Pj .
The trade elasticity would be added again to the welfare expression if it is specified for
domestic budget shares as e.g. in Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) and
Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014). In the case however, the differences in prices are
obtained from changes in transport and time costs of internationally traded goods, which
are unique for each country pair and therefore not linearly related to any domestic prices
changes. The standard welfare expression in international trade can therefore not be
applied to the counterfactual exercises in this study.
pimij is a variable that has already been indirectly defined in the theoretical framework. The
consumption shares are given by αmj = X
m
j /Xj (Equation 4.23), mode specific budget
shares are given by λmij = X
m
ij /Xij (Equation 4.8), and aggregated budget shares are given
by λij = Xij/Xj (Equation 4.24). These three expressions can be combined to substitute
for αmj pi
m
ij to obtain
d lnPj =
M∑
m=1
I∑
i=1
λijλ
m
ijd ln p
m
ij .
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λmij can be readily calculated from extra-EU imports using reported (CIF) trade values by
mode of transport. To calculate λij , total expenditures Xj ≡
∑I
i=1Xij (Equation 4.22)
are needed. I therefore add domestic expenditures Xjj from UNIDO
38 to the extra-EU
dataset before summing over all country pairs to obtain a value of Xj for each country.
Market clearing implies Xj = wjLj . Using labour in country j as the numeraire and
assuming that wj remains unaffected by policies A and B (i.e. d lnwj = 0), changes in real
income can be linked to changes in prices using d lnWj = −d lnPj .
Assuming country j’s labour endowment to be unaffected by policies A and B requires
further clarification. Because the demand for manufacturing imports is elastic, a price
increase of imported goods will ultimately lead to a substitution of imported goods with
goods produced domestically, thus affecting the labour endowment in country j. The
labour endowment is also affected through workers in country j who are employed in the
international transport sector and who are therefore subject to policies A and B. In both
cases however, the relative changes in labour endowments will remain rather insignificant
given that policies A and B affect prices only marginally39 and that a country’s contribution
to the international transport sector is small in comparison to total employment in the
manufacturing sector. To simplify the calculation in this section, I therefore consider
changes in wj to be small and insignificant
40 and hence d lnwj u 0.
Further, because domestic transport remains unaffected by policies A and B, domestic
prices of goods produced and consumed in j remain unchanged. It is therefore useful to
factor out pjj from the expression I obtained above
d lnWj = −
M∑
m=1
λjjλ
m
jjd ln p
m
jj −
M∑
m=1
I∑
i 6=j
i=1
λijλ
m
ijd ln p
m
ij ,
which simplifies to
d lnWj = −
M∑
m=1
I∑
i 6=j
i=1
λijλ
m
ijd ln p
m
ij .
as a result of ln pmjj ≡ 0. It should be noted however that, although pjj is not of any
relevance, Xjj still plays a significant role in the calculation of λij (see Equation 4.24).
38Trade with self (Xjj) for the year 2013 is approximated using 2014 UNIDO gross manufacturing
output data by country minus total exports from UN Comtrade data via WITS. Missing 2014 UNIDO
values are estimated using a time trend, or, in the case of missing panel data, the ratio of value added to
manufacturing value added in GDP as in Mayer and Thoenig (2016).
39Neither policy A nor policy B is associated with the hypothetical case of moving to autarky.
40Quantifying the changes in wj would require to analyse the general equilibrium impact of policies A
and B
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Integrating this expression before and after the policy has been introduced yields
Ŵj =
M∏
m=1
I∏
i 6=j
i=1
(
p̂mij
)−λijλmij (4.42)
where v̂ ≡ v′/v denotes the change in any variable v between the initial and the new partial
equilibrium.
Equation 4.42 allows to calculate partial equilibrium changes in real income associated
with changes in prices. The next step therefore requires to link changes in transport and
time costs to changes in prices. And to accomplish this link, it can either be assumed that
the shift from one mode of transport to another is insignificant or significant on the price
changes p̂mij .
Option 1: taking into account mode shifts. Common starting point is the MNL
model in Equation 4.16. For a given product variety ω, a firm in i chooses a cost optimum
transport mode to export to j, conditional on transport and time costs, tmij and s
m
ij , and the
number of available transport alternatives in the choice set Cij . If one of these attributes
changes as a result of a new transport policy (xij → x′ij), the systematic cost function
of a firm in i associated with a choice situation to export to j changes from Vij to V
′
ij
(recall that V mij = β
m
0 + β
m
3
(
tmij + V OT
m · TTmij
)
). It is therefore possible to integrate
the probability associated with a particular choice situation before and after a change in
Vij to obtain a measure of consumer surplus that is representative for the area under the
demand curve measured in units of Vij . Williams (1977) showed that the solution to this
integral is
M∑
m∈Cij
∫ V′ij
Vij
Pij (m|V) dV =
1
µ
ln
M∑
m∈C′ij
eµ(V
m
ij )
′
− 1
µ
ln
M∑
m∈Cij
eµV
m
ij , (4.43)
where each summation term represents the location parameter of the maximum of inde-
pendent Gumbel variates that have a common scale parameter µ, or simply, the expected
maximum utility (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). The maximum of independent Gum-
bel variates is therefore equivalent to a firm’s expected utility associated with a transport
choice situation to export to j
E
[
max
m∈Cij
(V mij + ε
m
ij )
]
=
1
µ
ln
M∑
m∈Cij
eµV
m
ij .
The expression in 4.43 therefore calculates the difference among expected maximum util-
ities of a firm before and after a change in xij . Because this measure is expressed in utility
terms, it is commonly divided by a coefficient of transport cost to transform it into monet-
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ary units41. By definition of the cost coefficient βm3 ≡ ∂V mij /∂tmij and estimates thereof in
the form of µ̂β
m
3 from Table 4.2, it is therefore possible to transfer the expected maximum
utility differences into expected marginal cost differences42. And because prices are mod-
elled as a constant markup over marginal costs, the changes in prices of a firm exporting
to j due to changes in xij are given by
p̂ij =
 M∑
m∈C′ij
eµ(V
m
ij )
′
/
M∑
m∈Cij
eµV
m
ij

1/(µ̂β
m
3 )
(4.44)
Equation 4.44 imposes a priori the restriction that firms choose only one mode of transport
for exporting. A change in xij due to e.g. changes in any of the air transport attributes
therefore only affects a firm, which chose to export to j using air transport as the preferred
mode of transport in the first place. Furthermore, by Equation 4.44, all utilities are
modified as a result of a shift from one mode of transport to another, due to a change
in either one or many of the choice attributes in xij . Equation 4.44 can therefore never
be exact, as the utility difference of all alternatives is divided by a cost coefficient that is
assumed to be representative for all bilateral flows (or trade routes) in the dataset. Because
the policy case A predominately influences the utility associated with goods transported
by sea, I transform the utility into monetary units using the coefficient estimate µ̂β
s
3 from
Table 4.2. Because the policy case B predominately influences the utility associated with
goods transported by air, I transform the utility into monetary units using the coefficient
estimate µ̂β
a
3 from Table 4.2.
Given those changes in prices as a result of changes in any of the variables in xij , it is
now possible to link changes in any of the transport attributes to changes in real income.
Substituting Equation 4.44 for the prices changes in 4.42 yields into the final expression to
quantify the changes in real income (at any given year) associated with policies A and B
Ŵj =
M∏
m=1
I∏
i 6=j
i=1
 M∑
m∈C′ij
eµ(V
m
ij )
′
/
M∑
m∈Cij
eµV
m
ij

−λijλmij /(µ̂β
m
3 )
, (4.45)
where
M∑
m∈C′ij
eµ(V
m
ij )
′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Policy A
= exp
[
µ̂β
a
0 + µ̂β
a
1 ln
(
qmij
qij
)
+ µ̂β
a
3
(
taij + V̂ OT
a · TT aij
)]
+
41See for example Small (1983) and De Jong et al. (2007) for the transformation of utility into monetary
units by dividing it with a cost coefficient.
42Note the negative sign of the coefficient estimate µ̂β3 in Table 4.2. A decrease in utility therefore
corresponds to an increase in marginal costs.
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exp
[
µ̂β
s
1 ln
(
qmij
qij
)
+ µ̂β
s
3
(
tsij + V̂ OT
s · TT sij/0.7)
)]
M∑
m∈Cij
eµ(V
m
ij )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Policy A
= exp
[
µ̂β
a
0 + µ̂β
a
1 ln
(
qmij
qij
)
+ µ̂β
a
3
(
taij + V̂ OT
a · TT aij
)]
+
exp
[
µ̂β
s
1 ln
(
qmij
qij
)
+ µ̂β
s
3
(
tsij + V̂ OT
s · TT sij)
)]
M∑
m∈C′ij
eµ(V
m
ij )
′
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Policy B
= exp
[
µ̂β
s
1 ln
(
qmij
qij
)
+ µ̂β
s
3
(
tsij + V̂ OT
s · TT sij ·)
)]
M∑
m∈Cij
eµ(V
m
ij )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Policy B
=
M∑
m∈Cij
eµ(V
m
ij )
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Policy A
.
A few comments are in order. First, because of linear-in-parameters utilities, the scale
parameter of the Gumbel distribution, µ > 0, cannot be determined. This is however
less of a concern as the coefficient estimates reoccur in the counterfactual calculations
as coefficient estimates multiplied by µ. Second, it is not necessary to keep track of the
changes in wages wi as the marginal production costs, wiqj(ω)/zi, are assumed to remain
identical for all bundles of goods exported to j (see Equation 4.14). Finally, in the policy
case B, the choice set Cij changes from air and sea transport to sea transport only (C′ij). The
value of the systematic cost component of air transport can be determined by examining
the hypothetical case of infinitely high transport costs. In this case, the systematic cost
component becomes
(
V aij
)′
= −∞ as a result of taij → ∞, and the expected maximum
utility becomes 0 + exp(
[
V sij
]′
) as a result of lim
(V aij)
′→−∞
exp
[
(V aij)
′] = 0.
Option 2: assuming mode shifts to be insignificant on p̂ij. Alternatively, holding
the mode shares fixed, the increase in prices from policy A and B can be calculated directly
from the marginal cost differences. Starting from the optimal pricing equation in 4.17
pmij (zi) =
σ
σ − 1
wi
zi
τmij , where τ
m
ij ≡ 1 +
tmij + s
m
ij
wi/zi
,
I immediately obtain
p̂mij = τ̂
m
ij =
(
τmij
)′
τmij
.
Using the expression above to substitute for prices changes in 4.42 yields into the final
expression to quantify the changes in real income associated with policies A and B, holding
the mode shares between country pairs fixed
Ŵj =
M∏
m=1
I∏
i 6=j
i=1
(
τ̂mij
)−λijλmij ∀m ∈ Cij , (4.46)
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where
(
τ sij
)′∣∣∣
Policy A
=1 +
tsij + V̂ OT
s · TT sij/0.7
wi/zi
τ sij
∣∣
Policy A =1 +
tsij + V̂ OT
s · TT sij
wi/zi
τ̂aij
∣∣
Policy A =1(
τaij
)′∣∣∣
Policy B
=1 +
tsij + V̂ OT
a · TT sij
wi/zi
τaij
∣∣
Policy B =1 +
taij + V̂ OT
a · TT aij
wi/zi
τ̂ sij
∣∣
Policy B =1.
The differences in transport costs for the policy case A are calculated by scaling the travel
time of goods imported via sea to account for the reduced sailing speed of container ships.
For the policy case B, the transport costs associated with imports of bundle a goods (i.e.
goods that would have been normally shipped by air) are calculated in the counterfactual
equilibrium using ocean freight rates (i.e. a reduction) and transit time values by sea
(i.e. an increase in marginal costs). The VOT however remains to be the VOT for goods
imported by air.
Because FOB values, or marginal production costs respectively, are not observed in the
data for extra-EU imports, I approximate them using wmi /z
m
i ≈ Xmij /qmij − tmij .
Results. Table 4.3 contains the results of policy cases A and B, which have been calculated
using options 1 and 2. Column 2 shows the approximated Cobb-Douglas share (using 4.41)
of the bundle of goods imported via sea transport for information only (αj is not used in the
calculation). Column 3 reports the share of expenditure on domestic goods λjj = Xjj/Xj .
Columns 4 and 9 are obtained from other sources and are for reference only. Column 4
shows the results of the welfare gains from trade of a one-sector Armington model
Gj = 1− λ1/(σ−1)jj where σ = 6
as calculated in Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) for the year 2008. Column 9 shows
the total CO2 emissions from fuel combustion of the entire economy from IEA (2015).
Columns 5 to 8 contain the results of the changes in real income, ∆Ŵj = Ŵ
′
j−Ŵj = Ŵ ′j−1,
and columns 9 to 11 contain the results of the changes in CO2, ∆CO2 = CO2
′−CO2, both
associated with policy cases A and B.
The relative contribution of international air transport to the overall gains from interna-
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tional trade are calculated in column 12 using
∆Gaj = ∆Ŵj,B2/Gj .
Except for columns 4 and 12, all numbers refer to year 2013 changes.
Table 4.3: Welfare impacts associated with slow steaming and substituting nearly all air with
ocean freight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Country αs λjj G ∆ŴA1 ∆ŴA2 ∆ŴB1 ∆ŴB2 Tot.CO2 ∆ACO2 ∆BCO2 ∆G
a
[%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] MtCO2 MtCO2 MtCO2 [%]
Austria 48 88 5.7 -0.56 -0.12 -0.44 -1.34 65.1 -0.18 -0.25 24
Belgium 77 67 7.5 -2.06 -0.88 -0.10 -1.07 89.1 -3.34 -0.61 14
Bulgaria* 89 84 - -0.87 -0.72 -0.25 -0.64 39.3 -0.23 -0.03 -
Cyprus 90 36 - -1.70 -1.00 -0.20 -1.75 5.6 -0.03 -0.01 -
Czech Rep.* 92 81 6.0 -1.89 -0.21 -0.28 -0.43 101.1 -0.23 -0.07 7
Denmark 87 84 5.8 -1.03 -0.38 -0.10 -1.06 38.8 -0.52 -0.20 18
Estonia* 74 69 - -2.15 -0.73 -0.61 -4.47 18.9 -0.04 -0.03 -
Finland 80 92 4.4 -0.51 -0.22 -0.05 -0.65 49.2 -0.28 -0.09 15
France 72 87 3.0 -0.73 -0.30 -0.11 -0.90 315.6 -3.61 -1.61 30
Germany 67 89 4.5 -0.67 -0.17 -0.20 -1.35 759.6 -3.79 -4.58 30
Greece 91 84 4.2 -0.89 -0.52 -0.03 -0.39 68.9 -0.50 -0.06 9
Hungary* 68 73 8.1 -0.49 -0.04 -1.33 -0.69 39.5 -0.11 -0.24 8
Ireland 45 67 8.0 -1.23 -0.32 -1.34 -2.89 34.4 -0.16 -0.20 36
Italy 81 91 2.9 -0.51 -0.27 -0.05 -0.57 338.2 -3.81 -1.19 20
Latvia 70 26 - -5.05 -2.55 -1.30 -7.52 6.9 -0.06 -0.01 -
Lithuania* 87 83 - -1.52 -0.58 -0.04 -1.07 10.7 -0.07 -0.01 -
Netherlands 80 56 6.2 -3.34 -1.28 -0.22 -2.10 156.2 -7.22 -1.29 34
Poland* 83 90 4.4 -0.83 -0.23 -0.50 -0.78 292.4 -0.72 -0.28 18
Portugal 81 91 4.4 -0.52 -0.32 -0.03 -0.55 44.9 -0.34 -0.09 13
Slovakia* 77 79 7.6 -1.96 -0.30 -0.56 -3.64 32.4 -0.13 -0.22 48
Slovenia* 91 62 6.8 -2.41 -1.09 -0.06 -0.76 14.3 -0.20 -0.02 11
Spain 87 88 3.1 -0.77 -0.38 -0.05 -0.78 235.7 -2.54 -1.03 25
Sweden 79 86 5.1 -1.09 -0.30 -0.12 -1.31 37.5 -0.60 -0.31 26
UK 68 77 3.2 -1.39 -0.44 -0.22 -2.26 448.7 -4.13 -2.94 71
Average 78 76 5.31 -1.42 -0.56 -0.34 -1.62 - - - 31
Sum - - - - - - - 3243.0 -32.84 -15.37 -
Notes: Baseline data are 2013 extra-EU manufacturing imports. Emissions intensities for air transport are
assumed to be 900 gCO2/t.km and for sea transport 10 gCO2/t.km. Economies in transition are indicated by a
*.
Both policy cases A and B implicate price increases of goods consumed in the importing
country and therefore a reduction in real income. The differences in real income in columns
4 to 7 are therefore negative. The Netherlands, Belgium and Latvia obtain relatively higher
welfare impacts due to entrepôt trade. Latvia’s welfare impact is even more pronounced
due to its relatively small output in manufacturing (indicated by a small value of λjj).
A comparison of the policy cases A and B against each other reveals that the welfare
impacts as a result of slow steaming (policy case A) are in general smaller and that slow
steaming is more effective in reducing CO2 from international trade. The smaller welfare
impacts of slow steaming are a result of a relatively low VOT of goods imported by sea
(see Table 4.2), whereas the higher emissions reductions are a result of larger quantities
imported by sea. For the policy case B in replacing air cargo with sea cargo transport,
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the higher price increases and thus welfare impacts are a result of a higher VOT of goods
imported by air (offsetting the reduction in prices due to lower transport costs tsji instead
of taji), whereas the smaller reductions in CO2 are a result of smaller quantities imported
by air (irrespective of a 100 times higher emissions intensity).
The discrepancies in the results obtained from method 1 and 2 are a result of the many
sources of non-linearity in Equation 4.44 of method 1, including the exponentiated system-
atic cost differences as well as their transformation into monetary units using the coefficient
estimate µ̂β3. In addition, the price changes of relatively small or large flows of imports are
not accurately predicted by method 1, as µ̂β3 is a parameter that is assumed to be common
to all flows. Aggregating the changes by importing country however compensates for some
of these differences imposed by non-linearity and common scaling parameters. For policy
case A, the discrepancies in the aggregated results obtained from method 1 and 2 can be
reduced to a linear scaling issue (Figure A.6). For policy case B, due to significant changes
in the systematic cost function (exp
[
(V aij)
′] = 0), non-linearities prevail and therefore also
materialise into the aggregated results (Figure A.7). Given these observations, the results
in columns 6 and 8 (using method 2) are my preferred results.
Putting the welfare impacts into context with the gains from trade in column 4 shows
that a 30% reduction in the average speed of container ships would, on average, reduce
the gains from trade by 10% (0.56/5.31), whereas a substitution of all air cargo with sea
cargo transport would reduce the gains from trade by 30% (column 12). All else equal,
aviation’s contribution to the gains from international trade is therefore roughly 30%,
which is considerable, given that only a small amount of goods (measured in tonnes) is
imported by air. The relatively important contribution of airborne trade to the economy
can also be seen from the consumption shares (1− αsj) in column 2.
Putting the emissions reductions into context shows that, if the emissions from inter-
national trade were attributable to a country, then the reductions in a country’s overall
emissions associated with policy cases A and B would be relatively small (close to 1%). On
a global basis however, the slow steaming of ships could reduce the CO2 from international
transport by a significant amount (in this case by 50%) and with only little impacts on
welfare (-0.56%).
Finally, although some of the economies in transition (indicated by a *) obtain a relatively
higher welfare impact, a common pattern of discrimination against these economies cannot
be determined.
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4.7 Summary
Time is a determinant of product differentiation in international trade. The need for,
availability, and use of faster means of transport enabled the efficient trading of vertically
differentiated products across boarders on the one hand and shaped the landscape of the
global supply chain of manufacturing firms on the other. In this chapter I model a firm’s
cost function to be minimising in production, transport, and time costs, and a set of
distinctive transport modes that have idiosyncratic appeal. The resulting MNL model is
embedded in a general equilibrium trade model and allows firms to choose a cost-effective
transport mode for exporting.
Transforming the MNL model into a nonlinear probability model for empirical evaluation, I
estimate the per hour per tonne VOT of goods shipped via air to be by factors of hundreds
larger than the VOT of goods shipped via sea. For total manufacturing airborne trade
I obtain a VOT of 50 Euros per tonne per hour, for total manufacturing seaborne trade
a VOT of 0.3 Euros per tonne per hour. Controlling for marginal transport and time
costs, I find that firms pay on average an additional 2,7 Euros per tonne air premium
for the transport of goods by air. These costs reflect the additional cots that arise from
transporting hazardous, temperature sensitive, fragile or valuable goods by air.
The transport of goods by faster means of transport in international trade is therefore
costly. Yet, for products with higher unit values, these costs remain low relative to the
goods price. Time sensitive goods can therefore be sold competitively in foreign markets,
despite higher per unit freight rates and time costs. If vertical specialisation—as a global
phenomenon of firms optimising their production processes—continues, high-tech products
with relatively higher unit values will remain key components of the functioning of global
supply chains. Time sensitivity will therefore play an increasingly important role in in-
ternational trade, while the need for transporting time sensitive goods fast will persist or
even gain momentum.
Time is also important for products with low unit values. Although per unit time costs
may seem small, they represent a significant share of the overall costs associated with the
transport of these goods. The reason for this is twofold. First, per unit freight costs of time
insensitive goods tend to be relatively small. Second, the transit times are much longer for
time insensitive goods which thus sums to relatively higher values of time costs. Relative
to prices however, the costs associated with the transport of time insensitive goods remain
strikingly similar to the costs associated with the transport of time sensitive goods. One
of the key determinants of transport costs in international trade thus remains to be the
price of the good itself.
Because the MNL model derived in this chapter is embedded in a general equilibrium model
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of international trade, the model and estimated parameters can be used in counterfactual
exercises to evaluate changes in real income associated with changes in time costs. I find
that slow steaming could reduce the CO2 emissions from international trade by a significant
amount and with only little impacts on welfare and that aviation’s relative contribution to
the welfare gains from trade are on average, as large as 30%. As one of the key mitigation
options in the basket of measures available, slow steaming could therefore prove to play
a unique role in reducing CO2 from the international maritime transport industry. Given
the continued and rapid growth in vertically differentiated products, the international air
cargo industry may play an increasingly important role in international trade, not only in
terms of providing the fast and secure means of transporting goods with higher unit values
across countries, but also in terms of contributing to the welfare gains from international
trade within a country.
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Chapter 5
Model of international tourism
This chapter develops a model of comparative advantage in international tourism. It
describes a demand function with an underlying population of consumers having discrete
choices over worldwide locations to undertake activities. The resulting system of equations
is shown to be observationally equivalent to the standard gravity equation in international
trade, implicating a parsimonious way to learn about a country’s competitiveness and
economic dependency on international tourism.
This chapter focuses on international tourism by air travel and therefore describes column
3 of Table 1.1. Chapter 6, which follows after this chapter, combines the trade model from
Chapter 4 with the tourism model developed in this chapter to investigate changes in real
income associated with environmental policies in the international aviation and maritime
industry.
5.1 Background
Tourism is a key driver of economic growth and development. As an economic sector, tour-
ism represents a major source of income for many developing countries, creates millions of
jobs worldwide, and contributes significantly to export revenues. One out of every eleven
jobs is related to the tourism industry, contributing to global GDP by 10% (World Bank,
2015). The WTO (2016) and UNWTO (2017) therefore promote tourism as a driver of
economic growth, inclusive development, and environmental sustainability, given by the
sector’s importance for services exports, trade, and development, especially for small eco-
nomies. Tourism is also included in the UN Sustainable Development Goal "Decent Work
and Economic Growth" through creating jobs and promoting local culture and products
(UN, 2015).
Tourism is a global phenomenon, already significantly large in scale, and expected to
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continue to grow at an accelerated pace. In 2015, international tourist arrivals reached a
total of 1.2 billion travellers, resulting into an estimated spending of US$ 1.26 trillion in
foreign countries and a 7% share of the world’s exports in goods and services (UNWTO,
2016). International tourist arrivals double almost every 20 years, driven (in part) by the
emergence of new tourist destinations (UNWTO, 2016) as well as the decline in air travel
costs as illustrated in e.g. Schäfer et al. (2009).
While domestic tourism still represents the major source of tourism income for many ad-
vanced economies, its contribution to local employment and income is more difficult to
quantify. According to the UNWTO (2016) an estimated 5 to 6 billion tourists travelled
within their national borders in 2015. Although the number of global domestic tourist
arrivals is 4 to 5 times higher than global international tourist arrivals, the average per
person spending of domestic tourists in comparison to international tourists is approxim-
ately 4 to 5 times lower (U.S. Travel Association, 2015). A rough estimate of the world’s
tourism contribution to the global economy can therefore be obtained by doubling world-
wide international tourism spending to obtain US$ 2.5 trillion in total spending. To put
these numbers in perspective, world exports in goods and services was US$ 21.4 trillion
and world GDP US$ 73.4 trillion in 2015 (World Bank, 2017).
Because international tourism flows are spatial flows, a first intuition to quantifying them
would be using the gravity equation. Gravity models have a long history in social sciences to
explain and help predict spatial flows of commuters, air-travellers, migrants, commodities,
capital, and even messages (Carey, 1858). Irrespective of their specification, these models
are often found to have significant explanatory power, which led to a rapid uptake in
usage (Deardorff, 1998). With respect to international tourism, studies exist in which the
gravity equation is used as a tool to estimate the impact of bilateral distance, bilateral visa
restrictions or immigration on bilateral tourism flows (Keum, 2008, Neumayer, 2010, 2011,
Artal-Tur et al. 2013, Balli, Balli and Louis, 2016). Yet, the coefficients estimates obtained
in these studies do not represent coefficient estimates of structural model parameters of
theoretical macroeconomic models and are therefore not informative towards determining
macro-level predictors of global tourism flows.
Motivated by these general observations, I build on Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (1992),
as demonstrated in Head and Mayer (2014), and Eaton and Kortum (2002) and develop
a theoretical framework for international tourism. The model features an aggregated util-
ity and a location-specific systematic utility component. Consumers consume activities
to maximise a CES objective. To undertake those activities, they choose from a set of
locations worldwide and consider accommodation and travel services, which are sold or
offered for sale at a lump-sum price, as well as characteristics of the destination country
(climatic conditions, visa requirements, etc.). The idiosyncratic error term is assumed to
be distributed Fréchet, which results into a multinomial logit model of worldwide choices of
locations. Under these assumptions, the demand equation can be shown to be structurally
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equivalent to the Ricardian trade model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and observationally
equivalent to the standard gravity equation in international trade (Head and Mayer, 2014),
featuring bilateral accessibility and multilateral resistance terms. The model is then taken
to air travel itinerary and economic tourism data to estimate the outbound tourism de-
mand elasticity with respect to prices. For this elasticity, I find a value of four, which is
similar to average values of price elasticities in international trade. Using this macro-level
predictor in combination with micro-level data, the chapter then proceeds by quantifying
the welfare gains from international tourism across countries. For countries with a high
dependency on international tourism receipts such as the Maldives, I find that the gains
from international tourism are as large as 54%, whereas for countries with a low depend-
ency on international tourism receipts such as the US, the gains from international tourism
can be as low as 0.2%.
Furthermore, given the gravity setup and the influence of common bilateral (dyadic) ob-
servables on bilateral flows, I explore the influence of a range of bilateral variables in
explaining global patterns of tourism flows. Next to visa restrictions, common language,
and colonial ties, I find that global tourism patterns are also explained by common pref-
erences in activities. For example, I find that international tourism flows are 40% higher
between countries where winter sports are popular.
In its entirety, this chapter contributes to both the international tourism and the inter-
national trade literature. It adds a theoretical foundation to international tourism flows
that can be adapted in many ways to e.g. include heterogeneity in services, products and
activities, or spillovers on manufacturing production. It therefore also contributes to the
international trade literature as an additional application of the many trade models that
have been developed over the past years1, particularly also with respect to quantifying the
welfare gains from globalisation2.
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework.
Section 5.3 describes the data, and Section 5.4 provides a first look at this data. Section
5.5 deals with the structural estimation of the tourism demand elasticity, the discovery
of global tourism patterns, and the estimation of an index of tourism competitiveness.
The section after that uses counterfactual exercises to estimate the welfare gains from
international tourism. Section 5.7 concludes.
1With an overview given by Head and Mayer (2014), the main variants of the demand side models
include: the Anderson-Armington model of national product differentiation (Anderson, 1979 Armington,
1969, and Anderson and Wincoop, 2003), the CES monopolistic competition (Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman)
model (derived by many authors), the CES demand with CET production model (Bergstrand, 1985), and
the heterogeneous consumers model (Anderson, De Palma and Thisse, 1992). The main variants of the sup-
ply side models include: the heterogeneous industries (Ricardian Comparative Advantage) model (Eaton
and Kortum, 2002) and the heterogeneous firms model (Chaney, 2008, Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein,
2008, and Melitz, 2003).
2In particular: Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) and Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare
(2014).
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5.2 Theoretical framework
In this section, I build on Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (1992) (as demonstrated in Head
and Mayer, 2014) and Eaton and Kortum (2002) and develop a theoretical framework of
international tourism. Although the model is described by explicitly referring to travel
associated with leisure activities in the text below, it remains generally valid for leisure as
well as business related travel activities.
Setup. There are i = 1, . . . , I countries. Each individual country exhibits specific climatic,
geographic, historical, and cultural characteristics Ai, which makes it a tourist destination.
Consumers in country j spend the fraction αj of their income wj on the set of leisure
activities {s} and choose the best location l ∈ i for it. In doing so, they become outbound
or domestic tourists. They become outbound tourists if the chosen location l ∈ i to carry
out activity s is outside their home country i 6= j. They become domestic tourists if the
chosen location l ∈ i to carry out activity s is within their home country i = j.
Consumers maximize their utility by carrying out as many activities as possible. Activities
are location specific. As each country is endowed with a large variety of unique locations,
there is a large variety of activities to be carried out. However, I consider each location to
be unique in offering the possibility to carry out only a subset of specific leisure activities
s(ωl), where ωl ∈ Ω refers to a unique variety of activities {s}. Furthermore, I consider
consumers to have idiosyncratic preferences over locations l ∈ i.
As a result, individual activities s are carried out in different locations l and thus countries
l ∈ i due to location specific preferences and country-individual characteristics Ai. Because
of idiosyncratic preferences however, it is possible for a representative consumer to never
visit location l. In equal measures, it is also possible for a representative consumer in
country j to consider location l and a representative consumer from the same or another
country to consider a different location k 6= l to be the prime location to carry out the
same activity s. Furthermore, if consumers with identical location preferences for activity
s are confronted with identical prices to carry out activity s in two different locations, then
the selection over which location to travel to results from different consumer tastes. The
combination of considering utility-maximising consumers to have idiosyncratic preferences
over locations and each location to be unique therefore provides flexibility in the reasoning
for consumers to travel. Yet these characteristics also allow to obtain a parsimonious model
to explain global tourism flows.
Preferences. Consumers have utility functions uji defined over activities sji(ω ∈ Ωi),
which are carried out in location l ∈ i
uji(ω) = ln
[
sji(ω)ψji
]
, (5.1)
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where sji is the amount spent in quantities of activities consumed and ψji is an idiosyncratic
preference shock for a particular location l ∈ i associated with activities sji(ω).
By referring to a particular location implies referring to a set of activities {s} because of
l ∈ i being a prime location for s(ω), where ω ∈ Ωi. uji is therefore the (lower-level) utility
associated with an individual activity sji(ω) in a specific location l ∈ i.
Preferences for individual locations are assumed to be distributed Fréchet with a cumulative
distribution function (CDF) given by
Fji(ψji) = exp
{
−Si
(
ψji
Aiaji
)−θ}
(5.2)
where θ > 0 is the shape parameter of the CDF and therefore an inverse measure of
consumer heterogeneity, which is assumed to be common to all countries. A larger θ
implies less variability and thus consumers becoming less heterogeneous in their tastes
over locations worldwide.
Si ≡
∫
ω∈Ωi dω is a measure of the number of activities available in country i. The higher
this number, the more developed the tourism sector in country i in offering activities to
foreign and domestic tourists. A larger Si implies that a high popularity draw for location
l ∈ i is more likely, as country i offers plenty of activities to choose from. The more
activities, the more likely that consumers find their preferred activity within the set of
available activities in country i, {si}. This in turn increases the probability of consumers
in country j to travel to country i to undertake their preferred activity. Si is therefore a
measure of country’s i popularity as a tourism destination, which is in part determined by
it’s current state of development of the tourism sector3.
Ai and aji ≡
Aji
Aj
are utility shifters. An increase in Ai or Aji shifts utility upwards.
Ai is location specific and related to the set of a country’s specific characteristics such
as climate, geography, history, and culture as well as political turmoil, epidemics and the
like. The parameters, Si, Ai and θ can therefore be used to describe country-by-country
differences in the basic Ricardian senses of absolute and comparative advantage4 across a
continuum of locations: while Si and Ai jointly refer to a country’s absolute advantage,
the parameter θ governs a country’s comparative advantage across this continuum.
Aji is a bilateral tourism preference parameter and measures quality aspects associated
with proximity, common language and visa requirements to name a few. In combination
with location specific preferences Ai however, these quality aspects are perceived relative
3The popularity parameter in the context of international tourism resembles the technology parameter
in the context of international trade as in Eaton and Kortum (2002)
4Many theoretical frameworks in international trade build on Ricardian comparative advantage after
the influential work of Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977) and Eaton and Kortum (2002).
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to the quality aspects at home, and therefore measured in terms of aji ≡
Aji
Aj
. An increase
or decrease in Aj therefore also shifts aji downwards or upwards, holding everything else
constant. For example, if average temperatures during summer in the home country j are
too cold to enjoy a swim, or, for another example, if country j isn’t rich in history and
culture, the domestic preference parameter Ai obtains a relatively smaller value, while the
bilateral preference parameter aji obtains a relatively higher value. Consumers in these
countries may therefore consider travelling over longer distances or paying the additional
cost of tourism visas to undertake such activities in a foreign country than they would be
otherwise.
Prices. As there is a large number of available activities in each country, the market
structure can be characterised by perfect competition. With no markup, prices result from
the pre-set combination of accommodation and travel services, which are sold or offered
for sale at a lump-sum price. The price paid by consumers therefore simply consists of the
price paid for the activity pi(ω) (inclusive of lodging, food, services, etc.) plus the expenses
associated with travelling to location l ∈ i, fji
pji(ω) = pi(ω) + fji.
Assuming labour as the only factor input with wage w = {wi} and transferring the travel
cost into an ad valorem travel cost measure to enter the price equation multiplicatively
gives
pji = wi
(
1 +
fji
wi︸ ︷︷ ︸
τji
)
, (5.3)
where τji ≥ 1 represents the one plus the ad valorem price equivalent of bilateral travel
costs. Domestic travel costs are quantitatively important for large countries and therefore
also affect the reallocation of tourists such that fii ≥ 0 and thus τii ≥ 1. The specification
of τji in this model is therefore equivalent to Samuelson’s (1954) "iceberg" transport cost
specification, where, in this case, a transport equivalent fraction of the total amount of
activities in i—that are visible to and consumed by consumers in country j—"melt" along
the way.
Demand for individual activities. Let there be N statistically identical and independ-
ent consumers of activities (tourists), each with income wj = Yj/N , where Yj is aggregate
final expenditure from the tourism and non-tourism sectors. To carry out activities sji(ω),
each representative consumer chooses the location giving the highest utility and then spends
a fraction αj of her income wj .
Starting from the conditional direct utility function uji(ω) = ln sji(ω) + lnψji (Equation
5.1), consumers maximise their utility (conditional on the chosen location l ∈ i) with
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respect to the number activities consumed and subject to a budget constraint
max
{sji(ω)}ω∈Ωi
(
ln sji(ω) + lnψji
)
s.t. pjisji(ω) ≤ αjwj .
Individual demand to carry out activity s in location l ∈ i is therefore5
sji(ω) = αjwj/pji (5.4)
and zero for all other destinations.
The conditional indirect utility function of a consumer in j travelling to i to consume
activity sji(ω) can therefore be written as
vji(ω) = ln(αjwj)− ln pji + lnψji. (5.5)
However, because consumers choose the location l ∈ i providing the highest utility to carry
out their preferred activity s, the conditional indirect utility they actually receive will be
the highest across all locations l ∈ i from all countries i ∈ I
vj(ω) = max
{
vji(ω); i . . . , I
}
. (5.6)
Tourism flows (Aggregate demand). Faced with these prices and utility, consumers in
each country purchase individual activities in amounts s(ω) to maximise a CES objective:
Uj =
(∫
ω∈Ωi
(
euji(ω)
)σ−1
σ
dω
) σ
σ−1
=
(∫
ω∈Ωi
(
evj(ω)
)σ−1
σ
dω
) σ
σ−1
(5.7)
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between activities6. The homothetic CES
preferences imply that all available locations are visited by at least some tourists from
country j, while locations with higher perceived utility will proportionally receive the
most tourists from country j.
Faced with a choice set of potential alternatives of locations {l; l ∈ i, i . . . , I}, their prob-
ability of travelling to location l ∈ i to carry out these activities is
Gji(v) = Pr
[
vji(ω) ≥ v
]
,
5The Lagrangian is: L : (ln sji(ω) + lnψji) − λ (pjisji(ω)− αjwj). FOC are: ∂L/∂sji(ω) = 0 ⇔
1/sji(ω) = λpji, and ∂L/∂λ = 0⇔ αjwj = pjisji(ω).
6The CES utility functions resemble aggregations of exponentiated utilities in multinomial choice models
(Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985), with σ/(σ − 1) being the scale parameter of the Gumbel distribution.
Similar to the welfare calculations in multinomial choice models (Williams, 1977), the CES functions as
described in the text can therefore be interpreted as a measure of consumer surplus. They also ensure that
country j’s overall price index of consuming activities worldwide is equivalent to the Dixit-Stiglitz price
index Pj ≡
(∫∞
0
pj(ω)
1−σ
dω
) 1
1−σ
.
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which can be shown to be dependent on prices and idiosyncratic preference shocks
Gji(v) = Pr
[
ln(αwj)− ln pji + lnψji ≥ ln(αwj)− ln p+ lnψ
]
= Pr
[− ln pji + lnψji ≥ − ln p+ lnψ]
= Pr
[− ln pji + lnψji ≥ v]
= 1− Pr [lnψji ≤ v + ln pji] ,
Assuming the number of activities available in each country, Si ≡
∫
ω∈Ωi dω, to be i.i.d.
across varieties of activities, the probability of travelling to country i, Pr
[
vji(ω) ≥ v
]
, will
be the same for all activities s(ω).
Fréchet for ψ implies Gumbel for lnψ, and using the price specification pji = wiτji from
Equation 5.3, the above expression can be rewritten as the worldwide distribution of util-
ities Gji(v) consumers in country j face in choosing a location l ∈ i to carry out their
preferred activity s(ω)
Gji(v) = 1− Fji
(
vpji
)
= 1− exp
{
−Si
(
vwiτji
Aiaji
)−θ}
.
Because consumers in country j however only choose the location giving the highest utility,
the distribution Gj(v) = Pr
[
vj ≥ v
]
country j actually receives is7
Gj(v) = 1−
I∏
i=1
(
1−Gji(v)
)
= 1− e−Φj/v
θ
where
Φj =
I∑
i=1
Si
(
wiτji
)−θ (
Aiaji
)θ (5.8)
is the price parameter.
In international tourism, Gj(v) = 1−e−Φj/v
θ
is the distribution of systematic utility across
activities, whereas in international trade, Gj(v) = 1 − e−Φjp
θ
is the distribution of prices
across goods (Eaton and Kortum, 2002). An increase in prices p refers to a decrease in
utility v and both distributions are therefore isomorphic. The only difference between the
two is specifying individual demand either to be dependent on utility (including prices) or
limiting this utility to prices only (excluding idiosyncratic preferences shocks).
7This can be shown using
Gj(v) = 1−
∏
i∈I exp
{
−Si
(
vwiτji
Aiaji
)−θ}
= 1− exp
{
−v−θ∑Ii=1 Si ( wiτjiAiaji )−θ
}
.
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The model isomorphism also applies to the price parameter in 5.8. In international tour-
ism, the price parameter additionally includes the utilities associated with location and
geography as a result of the utility shifters Ai and Aji. Whereas in international trade,
the price parameter takes the form Φj =
∑I
i=1 Ti
(
wiτji
)−θ, where Ti refers to a country’s
state of technology. The model presented in this chapter therefore exhibits strong parallels
to the Ricardian trade model described in Eaton and Kortum (2002), and it is therefore
possible to simply adopt the three key properties of this model, as outlined in Eaton and
Kortum (2002), for the tourism model in this chapter.
(a) The probability of consumers in country j to travel to location l ∈ i to undertake
activities is country i’s contribution to country j’s price parameter
Sji
Sj
=
Si
(
wiτji
)−θ (
Aiaji
)θ
Φj
. (5.9)
With a continuum of activities, this probability is also the fraction of activities that con-
sumers from country j consume from country i.
(b) The utility that consumers from country j receive by actually travelling to location l ∈ i
to undertake activities also has the distribution Gj(v). Conditioning on the destination
country therefore has no bearing on the consumers’ perceived utility vji or input prices
wiτji. Destination countries with a higher state of development of the tourism sector,
lower input costs, or lower barriers exploit their comparative advantage by offering a wider
range of activities ω, exactly to the point at which the distribution of utility of consumers
from j in i, is the same as j’s overall utility distribution. As a result, country j’s average
expenditure per activity does not vary by destination country and the fraction of activities
that country j undertakes in country i is also the fraction of its expenditure on activities
in country i, Sji/Sj = Xji/Xj , where Xj refers to country j’s overall tourism spending,
and Xji to j’s tourism spending in i, inclusive of any travel costs.
(c) The exact price index for the CES objective function in Equation 5.7 is
Pj ≡
[
Γ
(
θ + 1− σ
θ
)] 1
1−σ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
η
Φ
−1/θ
j , (5.10)
where Γ is the Gamma function and σ < 1 + θ.
Gravity. Properties (a), (b), and (c) imply that the demand function for international
tourism can be formulated as
Xji = Xjλji = XjP
θ
j SiA
θ
iw
−θ
i a
θ
jiτ
−θ
ji , (5.11)
where λji = Xji/Xj is the fraction of the amount spent in country i on the total number
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of activities Si of consumers from country j.
As in Eaton and Kortum (2002) for international trade models, the price index Pj =
ηΦ
−1/θ
j is critical in determining spatial flows. In international tourism, the price index
summarises how (i) the state of countries as a tourism destination around the world, (ii)
their attractiveness as a destination country around the world, (iii) the costs associated
with tourism activities around the world, and (iv) geographic barriers govern prices in
country j (see Equation 5.8). In other words, it summarises how geographic barriers lead
to different prices of activities worldwide, which in turn lead to deviations from purchasing
power parity in tourism.
Equation 5.11 in combination with the definition of the price index is what I will refer to
as gravity equation in international tourism, consisting of origin (j), destination (i) and
bilateral variables (ji). If θ > 0, Equation 5.11 implies that international tourism spending
Xji is
• increasing with country’s j spending on tourism Xj ,
• increasing with j’s price index Pj as activities in the destination country i are be-
coming relatively cheaper if Pj increases (any increase in pji results into a higher
value of Pj , holding Aiaji fixed),
• increasing with the number of available activities in country i (Si), location specific
preferences Ai, and bilateral preferences aji, all of which make country i a more
attractive tourist destination,
• decreasing with wage wi in country i as higher wage means higher costs to be paid
by tourists in country i (lodging, services, etc.), and
• decreasing with increasing travel costs τji.
Equation 5.11 therefore includes variables, which are similar in their definition and inter-
pretation to variables commonly used in international trade models, such as expenditures,
price indexes, the number of products, wages and bilateral transport costs. To better see
the analogy to gravity models in international trade, it is helpful to transform Equation
5.11 into its logarithmic form to obtain
lnXji = δj + δi + θ ln aji − θ ln τji (5.12)
where δj ≡ lnXj + θ lnPj is the origin fixed effect, absorbing country j’s endogenous
spending and price index, and δi ≡ lnSi + θ lnAi − θ lnwi is the destination fixed effect,
absorbing country i’s endogenous number of activities and prices as well as country i’s
exogenous attractiveness as a destination country. Similar to international trade models,
this transformation is possible as all the variables entering Equation 5.11 can be grouped
into i, j, or ji terms, thereby remaining multiplicatively separable, as I will show further
below.
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The logarithmic transformation shows that the gravity equation in international tourism
is observationally equivalent to the gravity equation in international trade. Both mod-
els feature multilateral resistance terms (as popularized by Anderson and Wincoop, 2003,
for international trade models) as well as bilateral variables, with τ referring to the same
iceberg definition. The only difference between the two specifications is the demand elasti-
city. For the international tourism model, the key structural parameter measuring demand
responses with respect to prices is −θ, whereas, for an international trade model with a
CES demand system, this parameter is defined as 1 − σ, where σ > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution between goods. As Head and Mayer (2014) notes however, there is a very
strong parallel between those two. An increase in σ means that products (or activities
respectively) are becoming more homogeneous. An increase in θ means that consumers are
becoming less heterogeneous. Hence, both models should yield similar aggregate predic-
tions as consumers becoming more alike in their tastes is intuitively equivalent to products
(or activities) becoming more substitutable. This point is also made by Anderson, De
Palma and Thisse (1992) in Proposition 3.8. (p.88), stating that the demand functions
derived from a CES representative consumer model are equivalent to those generated from
a multinomial logit model with the structural parameters of both models being inversely
related.
Having obtained the analogy to international trade models, it is straightforward to define
the remaining components of the international tourism model.
Market clearing. To close the model, I assume that markets in service provision associ-
ated with the set of activities {s} clear. That is, country i’s income from tourism Yi = wiLi
(inclusive of travel costs) is equivalent to the sum of i’s tourism receipts from all origins j,
including i’s tourism receipts from its own home market Xii
Yi = wiLi ≡
I∑
j=1
Xji =
I∑
j=1
λjiXj . (5.13)
Li is the number of workers in the tourism sector. Equation 5.13 ensures market clearing
at the sector level.
Unlike in trade, domestic spending must equal domestic income in tourism in each country8
Xjj ≡ Yjj . (5.14)
Equation 5.14 ensures market clearing at the domestic level. In combination with Equation
5.13, it allows to separate domestic tourism income from international inbound tourism
8In trade, domestic spending is not equivalent to domestic income due to exports.
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income
Yi = Yii +
I∑
j=1
j 6=i
Xji. (5.15)
In addition, I assume that country j’s tourism spending is equivalent to the sum of j’s
spending on activities in all destination countries i, including j’s spending on activities in
its own home market Xjj
Xj ≡
I∑
i=1
Xji = αjY
E
j . (5.16)
αj = Xj/X
E
j is country j’s consumption share on tourism. X
E
j denotes the total ex-
penditure of the entire economy (denoted with an E), consisting of consumption in the
tourism sector and in sectors other than the tourism sector. In equal terms, total income
Y Ej consists of income generated in the tourism sector Yj = wiLi plus income generated
outside the tourism sector Y 0j = w
0
j Lj
Y Ej = Lj
(
wj
)γj (w0j )γ0j , (5.17)
where country j’s endogenous output elasticities are given by γj = Yj/Y
E
j , γ
0
j = Y
0
j /Y
E
j ,
and γj + γ
0
j = 1.
Finally, total expenditure must equal total income in each country
XEj = Y
E
j +D
E
j = wjLj(1 + dn). (5.18)
Equation 5.18 ensures market clearing at the aggregate level of the entire economy. DEj =
LEj d
E
j accounts for any exogenously determined deficits (in trade and tourism) on a per
capita basis (Head and Mayer, 2014).
Jointly, Equations 5.13 and 5.16 allow to determine a country’s bilateral budget shares
associated with tourism activities (at home and abroad) as well as tourism wages.
Budget shares are given by λji ≡
Xji
Xj
=
Xji∑I
i=1Xji
and remain independent of country j’s
income from tourism, as can be shown by substituting Xji for the gravity equation in 5.11
λji =
XjP
θ
j SiA
θ
iw
−θ
i a
θ
jiτ
−θ
ji∑I
i=1XjP
θ
j SiA
θ
iw
−θ
i a
θ
jiτ
−θ
ji
=
SiA
θ
iw
−θ
i a
θ
jiτ
−θ
ji∑I
i=1 SiA
θ
iw
−θ
i a
θ
jiτ
−θ
ji
. (5.19)
Budget shares therefore remain multiplicatively separable, ensure compliance with struc-
tural gravity (Head and Mayer, 2014), and sum to one
I∑
i=1
λji =
I∑
i=1
Xji∑I
i=1Xji
= 1. (5.20)
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For the theoretical framework to be compliant with gravity, I adopt the specification by
Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) and assume a country’s tourism demand
system to be CES. Formally:
Restriction 1: The tourism demand system is such that for any country j and any pair
of countries i 6= j and l 6= j, (−θ)ilj ≡ ∂ ln
(
Xji/Xjj
)
/∂ ln τlj = (−θ) < 0 if i = l, and zero
otherwise.
In other words, R1 imposes the restriction to only substitute for local activities in case of
any prices increases of activities consumed abroad, and rules out the possibility for country
j to substitute for activities to be consumed elsewhere (l 6= j).
Given these observations it is now possible to also define the partial elasticity of relative
outbound tourism spending with respect to travel costs, which I referred to as outbound
tourism demand elasticity in the introduction
 ≡ −θ = ∂ ln
(
Xji/Xjj
)
∂ ln τji
(5.21)
where Xjj refers to domestic tourism spending i.e. the total spending of all travellers
choosing their home country as their destination country (j = i) to undertake activities
sjj(ω). R1 in combination with Equation 5.21 ensures that  measures the proportionate
change in factor proportions Xji and Xjj associated with a change in travel costs τji or
tourism prices respectively.
This completes the description of international tourism flows in equilibrium in this economy.
5.3 Data
Data for estimating the outbound tourism demand elasticity. To estimate the
outbound tourism demand elasticity  using the gravity equation, data on bilateral tourism
spending Xji as well as data on iceberg travel costs τji are needed.
Unlike in international trade statistics, bilateral tourism expenditures are not yet reported
by statistical authorities. This problem can be overcome by transferring the dependent
variable of the gravity equation from international tourism spending Xji into the bilateral
number of tourist arrivals Nji, as will be shown mathematically in Section 5.5.1. The
number of tourist arrivals by country are commonly reported by statistical authorities and
collected by the UNWTO.
Like in international trade statistics however, information about iceberg travel costs or
iceberg transport costs are not included in trade and tourism statistics. The data for
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estimating the demand elasticity is therefore complemented with information about τji,
which can only be obtained from external sources.
The approach utilised in this chapter to jointly obtain data on Xji and τji is to first
restrict international tourism flows to international tourism flows by air transport, and
subsequently, to exploit air passenger itinerary data to jointly obtain values of Xji and
τji. In most of the cases, air transport is the preferred and only mode of transport for
long-distance travel. The dataset is therefore sufficiently accurate to estimate the demand
elasticity and geographic barriers in Sections 5.4 and 5.5. To calculate the welfare gains
from tourism in Section 5.6 however, tourism to nearby or neighbouring countries where
surface transport (such as road and rail) in addition to air transport can be utilised be-
comes quantitatively important and a different dataset is therefore used instead (see further
below).
For the Sections 5.4 and 5.5, bilateral tourism flows by number of tourists are extracted
from the global aviation market intelligence database of Sabre (2016), containing passen-
ger traffic and sales data over different time periods (daily to yearly) and at different
aggregation levels (postal code level to country level) for airline and non-airline customers.
The data is collected from bookings made via the three major global distribution systems
Sabre, Amadeus and Travelport. To be compliant with the gravity equation for tourism,
return trips have to be excluded. The final dataset therefore only includes flows where the
point of origin country (the country passengers started their journey) is identical with the
origin country (see Appendix B.2 for the details). The airfares paid by tourists to travel
to foreign countries is however the airfare paid for the entire journey, including both out-
bound and inbound travel (i.e. including return trips). The dataset for estimation contains
the air passenger itinerary passenger and airfare data in aggregated form by country and
year. Table B.1 shows that numbers of international air tourist arrivals compare well to
the aggregate tourism statistics of UNWTO (2016).
To be able to transfer airfares into iceberg travel costs, the dataset is complemented with
international tourism receipts (Y int’li ) and international inbound tourists (N
int’l
i ) data from
the World Bank (2017). The average prices9 paid by international tourists in the destina-
tion country can then be approximated using
pint’li =
international tourism receiptsi
international inbound touristsi
=
Y int’li
N int’li
=
∑I
j=1,j 6=iXji∑I
j=1,j 6=iNji
. (5.22)
Because international tourism receipts from the World Bank however also include pay-
9The prices paid by domestic tourists may in many cases be significantly lower. One of the rare
authorities reporting the number of inbound tourists as well as tourism receipts for both international
and domestic tourists is the U.S. Travel Association (2015). Using Equation 5.22 for international and
domestic tourism separately reveals an average domestic price of $374 and an average international price
of $1,716 in 2015.
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ments to national carriers for international transport (see Appendix B), it remains unclear
whether or not pint’li includes the cost paid for travel. For the travel cost to be included
in pint’li , the destination country must have a national carrier and the consumer must have
chosen this carrier to travel to the destination country. In all other circumstances, the
travel cost is not included in pint’li . To calculate τji, I assume that all consumers in country
j book their flights with their national carriers in country j and pint’li therefore to be ex-
clusive of travel costs10 such that τji = 1 + fji/p
int’l
i . With labour as the only factor input
(pi ≡ wi), this expression becomes equivalent to the definition of iceberg travel costs in
Equation 5.3.
The realised dataset is used to estimate the outbound tourism demand elasticity in Section
5.5.1. A number of additional bilateral variables from different data sources as described
in Appendix B are added to this dataset to investigate global tourism patterns in Section
5.5.2. To establish the results in Section 5.5.3, bilateral international tourism spending is
approximated using
X¯airji ≈ pint’li τjiNji, ∀j 6= i. (5.23)
Data for calculating the gains from international tourism. For the counterfac-
tual exercises in Section 5.6, international tourism expenditure data, given by X int’lj =∑I
i=1
i 6=j
Xji, and total tourism receipts data, given by Y
int’l
i =
∑I
j=1
j 6=i
Xji, both from the World
Bank are combined with domestic tourism receipts data (Yjj) from the World Travel and
Tourism Council (WTTC, 2015). These datasets are described in detail in Appendix B.2.
As domestic tourism receipts are equivalent to domestic tourism expenditures (Yjj = Xjj),
total tourism expenditure by country can be calculated using Xj = X
int’l
j +Xjj and total
tourism income using Yj = Y
int’l
j + Yjj . In equal terms, the share of domestic relative to
total tourism spending11 can be calculated using λjj = Xjj/Xj .
To calculate the output elasticity γj = Yj/Y
E
j and expenditure share αj = Xj/X
E
j , the
dataset is complemented with gross output values (Y Ej ) for 60 countries from the OECD
Input-Output tables using 2011 data (the latest available year is 2011). In combination
with GDP, population, and labour data from the World Bank, gross output values are
estimated for the remaining countries in the dataset (see Appendix C.2 for the details). A
country’s total expenditure XEj is obtained by subtracting net trade BOP values in goods
and services from gross output. Net trade BOP data is obtained from the World Bank.
10Note that this approach in calculating this variable is different from the theoretical framework in
assuming that (consistent with macroeconomic theory) the revenue generated from international travel is
counted towards country i’s income. This conceptual difference, however, has no further implications on
the obtained results.
11It should be noted that λjj is in this case a statistic that is representative for all tourism activities in
the respective country and incorporates all tourism flows by all modes of transport of international and
domestic tourism. Similar to the import penetration ratio in international trade, the inbound tourism
penetration ratio could then be specified as IPR = 1− λjj .
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5.4 Tourism, geography, and prices: a first look
As the gravity model is essentially derived from a MNL model, it is possible to use the
IIA property and specify the odds ratio of bilateral flows relative to domestic flows12. This
normalisation is helpful to show how changes in prices relate to changes in tourism flows.
I start by deriving a ratio of foreign to domestic tourism spending. The nominator of
the odds ratio is therefore given by the standard gravity equation in 5.11 in the form of
Xji = XjP
θ
j SiA
θ
iw
−θ
i a
θ
jiτ
−θ
ji . As the standard gravity equation also holds for domestic
tourism (i = j), the denominator of the odds ratio can either be specified for country j
Xjj = XjP
θ
j SjA
θ
jw
−θ
j a
θ
jjτ
−θ
jj = XjP
θ
j SjA
θ
jw
−θ
j
or for country i
Xii = XiP
θ
i SiA
θ
iw
−θ
i
respectively. To ease notation, the above expressions assume that domestic travel costs
are zero fjj ≡ 0, which thus gives τjj = 1. Relative domestic preferences ajj cancel by
definition as the country specific preferences A must be equivalent to bilateral preferences
for domestic tourism Aj ≡ Ajj , which thus gives ajj = Ajj/Aj = 1.
As the choice of the reference category in the odds ratio is arbitrary, either the expression
forXjj or the expression forXii can serve as the denominator in the odds ratio specification.
The odds ratio can be specified as the ratio of international outbound tourism spending
(spending abroad) relative to domestic tourism spending (spending at home)
Xji
Xjj
=
(
Si
Sj
)(
Ai
Aj
)θ (pj
pi
)θ
aθjiτ
−θ
ji =
(
Si
Sj
)(
Ai
Aj
)θ ( pj
pji
)θ
aθji (5.24)
where I used p ≡ w and pji = piτji, and specified the inverse of the pi/pj price ratio with
a positive price parameter θ.
The expression above shows that, relative to undertaking activities in their home country,
consumers in j travel to i conditional on the relative number of available activities S,
relative preferences A, and relative prices p (including the cost of travel) as well as bilateral
preferences aji. As expected, country j’s relative tourism spending in i is dependent on
the price ratio pji/pj . With θ > 0, the higher pji, the smaller Xji, holding everything else
constant. Equation 5.24 also suggests that any increase in the relative number of activities
(Si/Sj) or preferences (Ai/Aj , aji) results into larger international tourism receipts for
country i.
12This approach is standard in the international trade literature, see e.g. Eaton and Kortum (2002) and
the earlier version Eaton and Kortum (1997), as well as Head and Mayer (2000).
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Are consumers willing to pay a higher price in a foreign country than at home for under-
taking the same activity? According to Equation 5.24, yes.
In the case of pji > pj , a consumer must have a higher utility associated with consuming
the activity abroad than consuming the same activity at home (noting that if only one but
the same activity is consumed in different countries it follows that Si = Sj). Because A
and a are utility shifters per definition, it must be that Ai > Aj (location l ∈ i preferred
over location l ∈ j) and/or aji > 1 (e.g. visiting family or friends), both justifying a
consumer to accept to pay for higher prices in the destination country. The presence of
the utility shifters in the gravity equation is therefore essential to explain price differences
in international tourism.
Alternatively, the odds ratio can be specified as the ratio of j’s relative spending in i,
relative to i’s (relative) spending at home
Xji/Xj
Xii/Xi
=
(
Pj
Pi
)θ
aθjiτ
−θ
ji , (5.25)
or, in other words, as the ratio of relative international tourism receipts (foreign income)
to domestic tourism receipts (domestic income). In this case, the expression indicates that,
relative for consumers in i to undertake activities in their home country, consumers in j
travel to i conditional on the relative price indexes P , bilateral preferences aji and travel
costs τji. As a result, if country j faces a high price index, it’s relative spending in i for
tourism activities will be higher. Vice versa, if Pi is high, j’s spending in i will be lower,
while, at the same time, country i’s spending at home will be reducing as well. Given the
large spendings in domestic tourism however, Xii/Xi will decrease at a smaller rate than
Xji/Xj , so that overall, (Xji/Xj)/(Xii/Xi) decreases with increasing price index Pi.
The normalised tourism share (Xji/Xj)/(Xii/Xi) may exceed one, if—in the aggregate—
the majority of consumers travelling to country i are willing to pay higher prices in the
destination country as a result of a higher perceived utility aji. The aggregated data
however indicates that this is rarely the case.
Figure 5.1 graphs the measure of the normalised tourism share (in logarithms) against ad
valorem travel costs τji. Consistent with theory, there is an obvious negative relationship of
international tourism spending with increasing travel costs. In other words, international
tourism falls with higher travel costs (or distance respectively, as indicated by Figure 5.2).
The scatter in Figure 5.1 indicates heteroskedasticity at higher price levels, which is a
common phenomenon when dealing with gravity equations as a result of their logarithmic
transformation (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The influence of heteroskedasticity on the
coefficient estimates will therefore receive further attention below.
The relationship between relative international outbound tourism spending and relative
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prices in Figure 5.1 cannot be perfect as the influence of the price indexes and bilateral
preferences is ignored. However, given the specification of the odds ratio in 5.25, the
slope of the relationship in Figure 5.1 provides a rough estimate on the value of the price
parameter θ. Using a simple method-of-moments estimator13 I obtain a value of θ = −12.8.
1.3 1.6 2 2.5 
1e−05 
0.0001 
0.001 
0.01 
0.1 
1 
10 
Ad valorem travel cost τji [−]
R
el
at
iv
e 
to
ur
is
m
 fl
ow
s 
[(X
ji/X
j)/(
X ii
/X
i)] 
[−]
Figure 5.1: Tourism and prices. International tourism expenditures are calculated using X¯ji =
pint’li τjiNji. Data from Sabre, the World Bank, and the WTTC. Excluded are flows where the
annual number of international inbound tourists is less than 1,000. Both axes are in logarithmic
scale.
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Figure 5.2: Tourism and geography. Data as in Figure 5.1. Using a simple method-of-moments
estimator I obtain a value of -0.70 for the distance elasticity. Both axes are in logarithmic scale.
.
Lastly, a ratio of ratios can be obtained by dividing the ratio of relative international to
domestic tourism receipts (Equation 5.25) by the ratio of international to domestic tourism
spending (Equation 5.24), such that Xji cancels
Xjj/Xj
Xii/Xi
=
(
Pi/pi
Pj/pj
)θ (Sj
Si
)(
Aj
Ai
)θ
. (5.26)
13I divide the mean of the left-hand-side variable by the mean of the right-hand-side variable as e.g.
used in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
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This expression is helpful to investigate the case of a closed economy (similar to the case
of autarky in international trade). In a closed economy, no international tourism will take
place and all consumers in j will undertake all activities in their home country. As a result,
the domestic tourism expenditure is equivalent to j’s total tourism spending Xjj = Xj .
In addition, as no spending occurs abroad, the price paid by consumers in j is equivalent
to j’s overall price index Pj . In a closed economy (indexed with an A), the ratio of ratios
therefore simplifies to (
SiA
θ
i
)A
=
(
SjA
θ
j
)A
. (5.27)
Hence, if the hypothetical case of a closed economy is imposed on the model, the model
implies for a consumer in j to have no incentive whatsoever to travel to i, as the aggregate
of the number of activities and location specific preferences are identical across countries.
5.5 Estimating the tourism equation
The gravity equation given by 5.11 and 5.10 in combination with 5.13, 5.16, and 5.20
comprise the system of equations that are necessary to describe international tourism in
general equilibrium. Jointly, these equations determine price levels, budget shares, and
wages.
Section 5.6 quantifies the gains from international tourism using counterfactual exercises.
This section presents the estimation of the macro-level predictors that are necessary to
calculate these counterfactuals. In particular, the first empirical exercise focuses on the
estimation of the outbound tourism demand elasticity , which is one of the key parameters
to calculate the gains from tourism. The second empirical exercise adds proxies for geo-
graphic barriers aji to the estimating equation to explore impediments and enhancements
in international tourism flows, referred to as global tourism patterns in the text. The
third and last empirical exercise estimates a country’s relative tourism competitiveness by
extracting useful information from estimates of the fixed effects by country.
Each exercise in this section uses a different subset of the data compiled from different
tourism statistics. The initial dataset contains 46,656 bilateral flows between 216 countries
in 2015. Of these observations are 30,153 (or 65%) in both directions, 2,120 (or 5%) in
only one direction, and 14,383 (or 30%) account for zero flows. The empirical extent of
zero flows in international tourism is therefore substantial but of smaller magnitude in
comparison to international trade with approximately 50% of zero flows (Helpman, Melitz
and Rubinstein, 2008). As a result of the different requirements of each of the exercises
that follow, only a fraction of the observations in the initial dataset can be used. The
first empirical exercise estimates the outbound tourism demand elasticity using data on
airfares and international tourism receipts. As airfares are only reported in combination
with tourism demand, zero flows cannot be accounted for in this regression. The second
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empirical exercise estimates the impact of global tourism patterns on tourism demand using
distance, common language, colonial ties, information, and variables explaining common
activities. It draws upon the entire dataset by excluding airfares from the list of independ-
ent variables. Zeros are accounted for in this regression. Data limitations only arise in case
of missing observations of the independent variables. The last empirical exercise estim-
ates the tourism competitiveness across countries using domestic tourism receipts data. In
this case, the data is constrained by the availability of domestic flows and the estimation
technique, resulting into a dataset of tourism between 41 countries with nonzero flows.
5.5.1 Tourism, transport and prices
Using the theoretical framework outlined above and the dataset of bilateral tourism spend-
ing and prices, this section explores the range and magnitude of the price elasticity of
demand in international tourism. As per the definition in Equation 5.21, the key variables
of interest are bilateral tourism spending Xji and iceberg travel costs τji. The collected
data reveals values of τji in the range of 1.42 for short-distance return trips to 2.20 for
long-distance return trips, and an average value of 1.88 for the entire dataset in 2015 (Table
B.2). This means that, dependent on how far tourists are willing to travel, the costs as-
sociated with air travel takes up between 42% and 120% of the total cost incurred in the
destination country. For tourism activities associated with long-distance travel therefore,
the amount spent on transport is higher or equal than the amount spent on accommoda-
tion, goods and services in the destination country. On average, the cost paid for air travel
amounts to $1,137, corresponding to approximately 88% of the total cost incurred in the
destination country. The data illustrates that consumers use a significant amount of their
budget for transport relative services in tourism.
Because the definition of τji in international tourism is structurally equivalent to the defin-
ition of τij in international trade, it is possible to compare the average value of τji = 1.88
in international tourism (Table B.2) with the average value of τij = 1.05 in international
seaborne trade (Table A.2) and conclude that the cost share associated with transport is
on average at least a factor of ten higher in international tourism. Any cost increases asso-
ciated with the transport of goods or passengers will therefore inevitably lead to relatively
higher price increases in international tourism than in international trade.
As only the number of tourists travelling from j to i are commonly observed in tourism
statistics, it is advantageous to perform a transformation of the dependent variable in
Equation 5.11 from international tourism expenditures Xji to the number of international
tourist arrivals by country Nji. By assuming that each individual tourist consumes only
one activity every time a trip is undertaken, the number of international tourist arrivals
is equivalent to the number of activities undertaken and hence Nji ≡ sji. "Individual
tourists" describe in this context consumers choosing a unique activity sji(ω), where ω ∈
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Ωi. A consumer consuming multiple activities sji is therefore counted multiple times in Nji
(within the observed time period), as long as each unique activity requires the consumer to
travel from j to i. In all other cases, the assumption Nji ≡ sji is invalid and would require
to specify additional variables to account for the different amounts of activities consumed.
Because Xji ≡
∫
ω∈Ωi pjisji(ω), it is possible to divide Equation 5.11 by the price pji (which
is common to all activities) to obtain
Nji = XjP
θ
j SiA
θ
iw
−θ−1
i a
θ
jiτ
−θ−1
ji , (5.28)
where I assumed that
∫
ω∈Ωi sji(ω) ≡ Nji. Aside of having changed the left-hand-side
variable, the price elasticities now take the value of  − 1 = −θ − 1 instead of  = −θ.
The advantage of this model is that Nji is actually observed in the data (whereas Xji
is not, see Section 5.3 above). Equation 5.28 therefore forms the basis of the structural
estimations below, by transferring it into its logarithmic form and specifying the usual
origin and destination fixed effects
lnNji = δj + δi + θ ln aji + (− 1) ln τji + ςji, (5.29)
where ςji is a heteroskedastic error term as a result of the logarithmic transformation (Silva
and Tenreyro, 2006) and −θ ≡ . I explore estimates of  with respect to airfares (violating
the iceberg form), iceberg travel costs, and bilateral distance Dji (as a proxy for aji), using
naive gravity (ignoring δj and δi) and structural gravity (including country fixed effects δi
and δj). Table 5.1 reports the results.
Table 5.1: Tourism and prices.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OLS 2SLS PPML GPML
ln airfare fji ρf  -1.54 -1.82 — — — -2.44 — — —
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ln airfare τji  — — -2.41 -5.97 -4.33 — -6.07 -4.93 -6.13
(0.08) (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.13) (0.06)
ln dist. Dji ρdθ — — — — -0.53 — — — —
(0.04)
Fixed effects δj , δi no yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations (total) 31,406 31,406 11,782 11,782 11,782 31,406 11,782 11,782 11,782
therein Nji = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
R
2 0.24 0.78 0.12 0.81 0.81 0.77 0.81 N/A N/A
Notes: Estimated is Equation 5.29 using OLS, 2SLS, PPML, GPML, 2015 tourism data as described in Section
5.3, and the number of international tourists arrivals Nji (in logs or in absolute values) as dependent variable.
Observations with τji > 3 or Nji < 50 are excluded. Each column represents a separate regression. Because
fji (and thus τji) is only reported if Nji > 0, zeros cannot be accounted for. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
The specifications in columns 2, 3 and 7 in Table 5.1 use airfares instead of iceberg travel
costs as the independent variable to infer values of . Because of the multiplicative form of
the gravity equation however, the price paid by consumers needs to be specified differently
using pji = pi · (fji)ρf , where ρf ≡ ∂ ln fji/∂ ln τji measures the effect of airfares on
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iceberg travel costs τji. The estimated coefficients therefore take the form ( − 1)ρf ≡
(−θ − 1)ρf ≡
∂ lnNji
∂ ln τji
∂ ln τji
∂ ln fji
. In line with existing literature14, the results in Table 5.1
indicate that demand is elastic. A 1% increase in airfares or prices respectively results into
a 2% decrease in international outbound tourists (number of departures) or international
tourism spending.
The specifications in columns 4-6 and 8-10 use, compliant with gravity theory, iceberg travel
costs as the independent variable. In all these cases, it is possible to obtain estimates of
. Equation 5.29 is estimated in columns 2 and 4 using naive gravity, and in columns
3 and 5-10 using structural gravity. The combination of structural gravity with iceberg
travel costs allows to identify unbiased estimates of  (Anderson and Wincoop, 2003). The
coefficient estimates are in these cases compliant15 with the definition in 5.21, given by
− 1 ≡ −θ − 1 = ∂ ln
(
Nji/Xjj
)
∂ ln τji
. The outbound tourism demand elasticity takes a value
of  = −5.97 (column 5). Controlling for endogenous price indexes, income and number
of activities in each country by including country fixed effects in the regression therefore
has a strong effect on the estimated coefficients. Because airfares are strongly correlated
with distance (0.54), much of the variation in iceberg travel costs is explained by bilateral
distance and the absolute value of  therefore drops slightly in column 6.
Because prices and airfares are determined in a supply-demand equilibrium, they are endo-
genous. A valid instrument for airfares is the amount of airfare related taxes and surcharges
paid by air travellers for their journey. These additional costs nowadays account for a sub-
stantial part of the overall airfares paid by consumers (see Table B.2). Further, as they
are imposed by civil aviation authorities and local governments upon national and inter-
national airlines, they are exogenous. The standard statistical tests indicate that airfare
related taxes and surcharges are a strong and valid instrument for τ and that the model is
identified. Instrumenting on iceberg travel costs using iceberg taxes results into a slightly
higher elasticity estimate (column 8). With a value of the outbound tourism demand
elasticity of  = −6.07 it follows that a 1% increase in iceberg travel costs results into a 6%
reduction in outbound tourism expenditures or a 6% reduction in international outbound
tourists respectively.
Because θ ≡ − is defined as the shape parameter of the underlying CDF, it is repres-
entative for the consumers heterogeneity in activities offered worldwide. A high value of
θ generates less heterogeneity and indicates a higher substitutability of activities across
countries. While a value of θ = 6.07 certainly indicates high substitutability, it is similar
to the parameter estimates in international trade, with an average value of approximately
14Similar coefficient estimates of air passenger demand elasticities w.r.t airfares—using a specification
without fixed effects—can be found in e.g. Verleger (1972) and Dray et al. (2009).
15Because of the inclusion of country fixed effects in the regression, the dependent variable ln(Nji/Xjj)
can be specified without accounting for domestic spending Xjj .
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five (Head and Mayer, 2014), reflecting small heterogeneity of the goods consumed or a
high substitutability of goods respectively.
As OLS on a log-linear model becomes an inconsistent estimator in the presence of hetero-
skedasticity (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006), I explore the robustness of the coefficient estimates
in 5.33 using Poisson PML (PPML) and Gamma PML (GPML) as proposed in Head and
Mayer (2014) in columns 9 and 10. As the coefficient estimates obtained from OLS, PPML
and GPML are similar, the model is well specified and the error term appears to be ap-
proximately log-normal with a constant variance16. In the prevailing case of using a large
sample, similar OLS and GPML and smaller PPML coefficient estimates (in absolute value)
indicate17 that prices have a non-constant elasticity, a phenomenon that occurs frequently
in gravity regressions.  therefore varies across country pairs due to barriers to market
(e.g. distance). The pattern of the variability of the price elasticity (i.e. whether or not it
is declining or increasing with easiness of market) will be investigated in the next section.
Are travel costs purely ad valorem in international tourism so as to comply with the multi-
plicative form of the tourism gravity equation? Using a similar specification as in Hummels
and Skiba (2004), the elasticity of airfares with respect to prices can be investigated by
writing airfares as a function of prices, the number of outbound tourists by destination
country, and the distance travelled
ln fji = β0 + β1 ln p+ β2 lnNji + β3 lnDji + εij , (5.30)
where β1 is the coefficient of primary interest. β1 is measured using either prices inclusive
of transport costs pji or exclusive of transport costs pi = wi. The error term captures any
unobserved cost shifters and measurement errors. Equation 5.30 is estimated using OLS
and 2SLS using the same data as described in Section 5.3.
Table 5.2: Travel costs and tourism prices.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables (in logs) OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Price pji [$/person] 0.478 (0.009) 0.202 (0.026) — —
Price pi [$/person] — — 0.164 (0.006) 0.134 (0.018)
Quantity Nji [PAX] -0.049 (0.001) -0.054 (0.001) -0.059 (0.001) -0.059 (0.001)
Distance Dji [km] 0.339 (0.006) 0.420 (0.009) 0.450 (0.006) 0.455 (0.006)
Observations 11,401 11,401 11,401 11,401
R2 0.82 0.79 0.76 0.76
Notes: Estimated is Equation 5.30 using OLS and 2SLS using the log of airfares in [$/PAX] as depend-
ent variable. Prices are instrumented by destination GDP per capita. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
The results in Table 5.2 illustrate that travel costs in international tourism are in part
determined by the prices paid in the destination country. Although this effect is relat-
16Similar PPML and GPML estimates that are distinct from OLS would indicate that OLS estimates
are unreliable and that heteroskedasticity is a problem (Head and Mayer, 2014).
17Major divergence between PPML and GPML coefficients would be a sign of model mis-specification
(Head and Mayer, 2014).
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ively small (a 1% increase in price results into a 0.2% in airfares), it is significant. More
importantly however, the elasticity of airfares with respect to prices is far from a unitary
elasticity value imposed by the transformation of airfares into iceberg travel costs to com-
ply with the multiplicative form of gravity using Equation 5.3. In other words, airfares are
not "purely ad valorem" to tourism prices and the iceberg assumption on travel costs is
therefore rejected. In international trade, estimates of β1 are in the range of 0.5-0.7 (see
Table 4.1 and Hummels and Skiba, 2004), and although these estimates are also sufficiently
different from a unitary elasticity value, the iceberg assumption could at least be somewhat
justified in an empirical context. In contrast to trade, estimates of the demand elasticity
 using iceberg travel costs in international tourism need to be interpreted with caution.
Because the elasticity of airfares with respect to prices is lower than the unitary elasticity
value imposed by the iceberg assumption, estimates of the demand elasticity with respect
to iceberg travel costs in international tourism as shown in Table 5.1 are biased upwards.
In other words, as the ad valorem component of iceberg travel costs is small, the coeffi-
cient estimate is biased upwards due to smaller variance. As airfares are determined on a
per unit rather than an ad valorem basis, they should also be specified in per unit terms
using fij in the gravity equation. Such a specification would violate the multiplicative
form of the gravity equation however, and the demand elasticity with respect to per unit
travel costs is therefore biased downwards. In other words, because the partial elasticity
of iceberg travel cost with respect to per unit travel costs ρf ≡
∂ ln τji
∂ ln fji
is not accounted
for in the regression, the coefficient estimates is biased downwards due to larger variance.
The actual value of the outbound tourism demand elasticity with respect to airfares most
probably therefore lies somewhere between the two estimates in columns 7 and 8 in Table
5.1 with a value of approximately four. This value is chosen as the preferred estimate to
calculate the gains from tourism in Section 5.6.
The additional coefficient estimates obtained in Table 5.2 illustrate the importance of
non-price portions, such as distance and quantity, in determining per unit airfares. The
elasticity of per unit airfares with respect to quantity is negative, indicating that per unit
travel costs are falling in market size due to transport economies of scale.
5.5.2 Global tourism patterns
This section explores common patterns across countries in international tourism. A com-
mon pattern can be identified if countries engaging in tourism activities exhibit similar
preferences with respect to common bilateral observables. Using the gravity equation, it is
therefore possible to investigate the impact of e.g. proximity, common language, colonial
ties, and even common activities (as implied by the theory) on international tourism flows.
Common differences in prices across countries are difficult to measure and are therefore
not included in this section (see the previous section for estimates of the price elasticity of
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demand).
Proximity is measured using the great circle distance between countries. Distance is correl-
ated with airfares and therefore also serves as proxy for prices in the regression. To measure
the influence of proximity on the value of the estimated distance elasticity, the continuous
distance variable in logs is interacted with a categorical distance variable dk(k = 1, . . . , 6),
where dk is the distance between j and i lying the in the kth interval.
All other variables (information, visas, language, and activities) describe the bilateral
preference term aji. In particular, by assuming the underlying function to be log-linear,
aji is described using
ln aji = ln iji × ph + ll × dk + v + l + c+ s+ o+ ςji, ∀j 6= i (5.31)
where i is the amount of information exchanged between j and i, ll is an indicator variable
if the preferred direction of travel is mainly north to south (or south to north) as opposed
to east-west18, v is the effect of tourism visa requirements between j and i, l is the effect
of j and i sharing a language, c is the effect of j and i having colonial ties, s is the effect
of both countries having at least one major ski resort, and o is the effect of both countries
being near a coast. All these variables are described in detail in Appendix B.
Common language and colonial ties are proxies for geographic barriers that are commonly
used in the trade literature (Head and Mayer, 2014). Frequently used in the international
tourism literature is an indicator variable for visa requirements (see e.g. Neumayer, 2010).
Having one major ski resort and being near a cost are proxies for common winter and
summer activities across countries.
Like in international trade, information frictions may be quantitatively important in inter-
national tourism. Allen (2014) finds that it is costly to learn about the market conditions
in foreign countries in international trade, which, intuitively, might also apply to interna-
tional tourism activities. Hence, if information barriers are large, consumers in country j
have difficulties to establish a benchmark for the location specific preferences Ai and the
number of available activities Si in country i.
The impact of information barriers on international tourism is measured using data of
internet users (per 100 people) per country from the World Bank, by assuming that the
lower value of internet users of the matched partners j and i is indicative for the amount
of information exchanged between the two countries
iji ≡ min
[
internet usersj , internet usersi
]
. (5.32)
18The preferred direction of travel is measured using the absolute difference in degrees of latitude between
the country centroids, relative to the absolute difference in degrees of longitude between the country
centroids.
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To measure the influence of relatively large and relatively small tourism flows on inform-
ation barriers, the continuous variable iji is interacted with a categorical demand variable
ph in Equation 5.31, where ph(h = 1, . . . , 6) is the number of tourists travelling between j
and i lying the in the hth demand interval.
Imposing the above specifications of proximity, information, visa, language, and common
activities, Equation 5.28 becomes
lnNji =δj + δi − θ lnDji × dk+
θ ln iji × ph + ll × dk + v + l + c+ s+ o+ ςji, ∀j 6= i,
(5.33)
where the coefficients for the binary variables (ll, v, l, c, s, and o) have been suppressed
for notational simplicity. The error term ςji captures geographic preferences (or barriers
respectively) from all other factors. The six distance intervals (in kilometres) are: [0,1500);
[1500,3500); [3500,6500); [6500,10000); [10000,14000); [14000,maximum]. The six demand
intervals (in numbers of international tourism arrivals) are: [0,100); [100,500); [500,2000);
[2000,10000); [10000,100000); [100000,maximum].
Because the log transformation of the variables may prevent the error term of having a
zero conditional expectation (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006), I explore the robustness of the
coefficient estimates in Equation 5.33 using PPML and GPML as above. Table 5.3 contains
the results and indicates that the error term is robust against heteroskedasticity.
The results indicate that the distance elasticities decline with easiness of market. That
is, the further the countries are apart, the higher the distance elasticity. As distance is
correlated with airfares, a declining pattern of the outbound tourism demand elasticity 
with increasing distance can be inferred, implying that demand is relatively less elastic for
tourism to nearby or neighbouring countries and relatively more elastic for long-distance
tourism activities. Higher elasticities yield into smaller welfare impacts on the consumption
side. If the tourism sector is dependent on international inbound tourists travelling long
distance however (such as remote island countries), small price changes will lead into
relatively larger reductions in tourism demand and thus higher impacts in terms of a
country’s income (see Equation 5.37 below).
Many papers provide evidence of the variability of elasticities in international trade with
easiness of market (e.g.Novy, 2013; Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein, 2008). The results
in this study illustrate that the same declining pattern applies to international tourism.
The related PPML and GPML estimates indicate robustness of this pattern against het-
eroskedasticity and against including zero flows, where Nji = 0. Zero tourism flows occur
naturally in the model as consumers select the location l ∈ i providing the highest utility
to carry out their preferred activity (see Equation 5.6). The probability of consumers in
country j to travel to some other location to undertake this activity can therefore also be
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Table 5.3: Global tourism patterns.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS PPML GPML
Variable est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e.
Distance [0,1500km) θd1 -0.89 (0.06) -0.05 (0.06) -1.38 (0.08)
Distance [1500km,350k0m) θd2 -0.86 (0.06) -0.11 (0.06) -1.39 (0.07)
Distance [3500km,6500km) θd3 -0.90 (0.05) -0.26 (0.05) -1.42 (0.06)
Distance [6500km,10000km) θd4 -0.96 (0.05) -0.30 (0.05) -1.47 (0.06)
Distance [10000km,14000km) θd5 -0.98 (0.05) -0.32 (0.05) -1.47 (0.06)
Distance [14000km,maximum] θd6 -0.99 (0.05) -0.38 (0.05) -1.49 (0.06)
Information [0,100N) θijip1 1.08 (0.02) 2.54 (0.17) 0.98 (0.03)
Information [100N,500N) θijip2 0.56 (0.02) 1.39 (0.14) 0.45 (0.03)
Information [500N,2000N) θijip3 0.28 (0.02) 0.80 (0.13) 0.20 (0.03)
Information [2000N,10000N) θijip4 -0.08 (0.02) 0.34 (0.13) -0.30 (0.04)
Information [10000N,100000N) θijip5 -0.62 (0.03) -0.34 (0.12) -0.83 (0.06)
Information [100000N,maximum] θijip6 -1.51 (0.08) -1.38 (0.12) -1.59 (0.08)
Direction N-S/E-W [0,1500m) θlld1 0.16 (0.06) 0.00 (0.08) -0.13 (0.16)
Direction [1500km,3500km) θlld2 -0.08 (0.04) 0.02 (0.07) -0.13 (0.06)
Direction [3500km,6500km) θlld3 -0.17 (0.03) 0.22 (0.10) -0.28 (0.04)
Direction [6500km,10000km) θlld4 -0.01 (0.03) 0.09 (0.08) -0.18 (0.04)
Direction [10000km,14000km) θlld5 -0.26 (0.04) -0.08 (0.13) -0.62 (0.06)
Direction [14000km,maximum] θlld6 -0.41 (0.06) -0.44 (0.16) -0.74 (0.08)
Visa restrictions θv -0.43 (0.02) -0.55 (0.08) -0.44 (0.03)
Common language θl 0.83 (0.02) 0.51 (0.06) 1.02 (0.04)
Colonial ties θc 0.20 (0.03) 0.33 (0.11) 0.25 (0.04)
Ski resort θs 0.44 (0.03) 0.01 (0.09) 0.20 (0.04)
Near coast θo 0.05 (0.03) 0.06 (0.07) 0.16 (0.04)
Fixed Effects δj , δi yes yes yes
Number of observations (total) 26,172 32,232 32,232
therein Nji = 0 0 6,060 6,060
R
2 0.90 N/A N/A
Notes: Estimated is Equation 5.33 using 2014 data (see Appendix B). Standard errors are in paren-
theses. Dependent variable for OLS is lnNji and for GPML and PPML Nji ≥ 0.
zero. The data illustrates that this is the case for approximately 20% of all observations in
the restricted dataset, the majority of which are flows between small countries over long
distances.
Information barriers are quantitatively important for small tourism flows. That is, the
more information exchanged between two countries, the higher the probability that they
also engage in international tourism activities with each other. Vice versa, if information
is limited, consumers in country j cannot learn about country’s i attractiveness Ai and
available activities Si and consumers in country j therefore engage less in international
tourism activities with country i, holding everything else constant. As indicated by the
coefficient estimates, the effect of the amount of information exchanged becomes smaller
and eventually negative with increasing demand. It becomes smaller as information be-
comes relatively less important with an increasing population or an increasing number of
international tourist arrivals N respectively, as more information is exchanged between
the two countries in absolute terms, given by Nji × iji. It eventually becomes negative,
once relative tourism demand on any given tourism route becomes larger than the fraction
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of internet users per 100 people λji > iji. On busy and well established tourism routes,
the lower number of internet users per 100 people between country pairs is therefore not
indicative to measure the effect of information barriers on tourism demand.
The results in Table 5.3 also indicate that for tourism to nearby or neighbouring countries,
tourists prefer to travel north to south (or south to north), rather than east to west (or
west to east respectively). All else equal, the advantage of travelling north to south is the
chance of entering a different climate zone at the destination country. In other words, it
is more likely that a tourist confronted with identical prices in two locations may choose
the location which is further south rather than east or west to enjoy good weather. For
long distance tourism however, the preferred direction of travel is east-west (as indicated
by changing sign of the coefficient estimates) as a result of the earth’s topography (travel
between continents). This pattern becomes more pronounced when controlling for zero
tourism flows using PPML but less so using GPML. Robust and significant results of this
pattern are however obtained once the distance variable is excluded. This is because of
a strong correlation between the distance variable Dji and the indicator variable of the
preferred direction of travel ll.
The additional cost of and effort to obtain a tourist visa reduces the incentive for consumers
to visit a foreign country to undertake activities. The coefficient estimates indicate that
outbound tourism demand decreases by over 40% if bilateral visa restrictions are in place.
Neumayer (2010) finds even higher coefficient estimates of this variable, ranging from -0.7
to -1.0.
The impact of common official language on international tourism is large and robust. The
results indicate that bilateral tourism flows are almost twice as a large if countries share
the same official language, the same national language, or a language spoken by at least
20% of the population in either country. Artal-Tur et al. (2013) find a similar value of
this coefficient estimate using global tourism data from the UNWTO. For comparison, the
mean coefficient estimate of this variable in international trade is only 0.33 (Head and
Mayer, 2014). Intuitively, speaking the same language should have a higher influence on
international tourism than on international trade. This is because a large part of inter-
national tourism might be due to travellers visiting family and friends who live in foreign
countries whereas in international trade, common language is associated with familiarity in
foreign products or bilateral trade relationships. In international tourism therefore, com-
mon language might have a more immediate impact on bilateral flows than in the case of
international trade.
The coefficient estimate for colonial ties is similar to values in Neumayer (2011) and Artal-
Tur et al. (2013), and similar to typical coefficient estimates in international trade (Head
and Mayer, 2014).
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And finally, the results indicate that bilateral tourism patterns can also be explained by
common activities. The coefficient estimates for common winter activities suggest that
international tourism flows are higher between countries that have at least one major ski
resort. Growing up in a country where it is possible to learn to ski, tourists may seek
to also explore other ski resorts worldwide and therefore engage in international tourism
activities. And these activities may be more common among those countries having at
least one major ski resort, as in all other cases, it is more difficult to (even start) engaging
with such winter activities like skiing. One might think that such pattern may also be
apparent for typical summer activities like swimming, sailing or scuba diving. In this
case however, those activities are not bound to a country’s topology or geography. For
instance, someone could learn to swim in a lake or in an indoor swimming pool. Being
near a coast is therefore not a good indication of tourists travelling to foreign countries to
undertake similar summer activities as indicated by the low significance and volatility in
the coefficient estimates in Table 5.3. The main challenge lies therefore in finding bilateral
variables explaining common preferences in activities that coincide with certain country
characteristics, be it geographical, topological, cultural or climatological to name a few.
The primitive results obtained in this study indicate that the search for variables explaining
common preferences in activities may prove to be successful in explaining global tourism
patterns.
5.5.3 Tourism competitiveness
Gravity equations relate bilateral flows to relative differences in the countries’ character-
istics and the geography between them. As demonstrated by Eaton and Kortum (2002)
for international trade models, estimating the gravity equation with origin and destination
country dummies therefore also provides a way to learn about the state of a country’s
competitiveness in tourism.
Starting from the odds ratio of international outbound tourism spending relative to do-
mestic tourism spending (Equation 5.24)
Xji
Xjj
=
SiA
θ
iw
−θ
i
SjA
θ
jw
−θ
j
aθjiτ
−θ
ji ,
specifying the inbound tourism effect I as
Ii ≡ lnSi + θ lnAi − θ lnwi (5.34)
and taking logs gives
ln
Xji
Xjj
= Ii − Ij + θ ln aji − θ ln τji − θOj ,
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where, in addition to the specified variables, an overall outbound tourism effect has been
included, denoted Oj , which will be described further below.
By definition, Ii reflects a country’s comparative advantage adjusted for its labour costs.
More specifically, Ii provides a way to learn about a country’s tourism competitivenesses as
a service provider, both in terms of it’s number of activities offered (S) and it’s popularity
as a destination country (A), adjusted for its labour costs (w). For example, country i
may compensate for higher labour costs and therefore remain (relatively) competitive if
it e.g. offers a rich set of tourism activities or is popular among tourists as a destination
country. In this case, the index Ii obtains a positive value: lnSi + θ lnAi > θ lnwi. Vice
versa, a country’s tourism competitiveness is lower (relative to all other countries in the
dataset) if lnSi + θ lnAi < θ lnwi.
The inbound tourism effect Ii is therefore a measure that is similar to the WEF’s Travel and
Tourism Competitiveness Index (TTCI; WEF, 2015). The TTCI is a normalised, weighted
average of quantitative and qualitative indicators and has become widely accepted within
government, industry, and academia. As a verification exercise, the results obtained in this
section are therefore compared against the TTCI.
The outbound tourism effect Oj captures the willingness of travellers to exploring new
frontiers in visiting foreign countries and should therefore not be confused with the general
term of tourism openness19. The higher the value of Oj , the more countries are visited by
tourists from country j. Oj is therefore a measure of a country’s diversity in international
tourism across countries.
I calculate the odds ratio lnXji/Xjj using data from Sabre, the World Bank, and the
WTTC (see Section 5.3). Because Ii is estimated relative to all other countries in the
dataset, I restrict the dataset for this estimation to the set of countries who are engaging
with all other countries in tourism activities, leaving 41 countries in the dataset20 and
41 × 41 − 41 informative observations. Because the odds ratio of international outbound
tourism spending relative to domestic tourism spending is vacuous if j = i, the dataset
does not contain any diagonal elements, reducing the number of observations by 41.
Due to the restricted dataset, categorical interaction variables and variables with a non-
constant elasticity (such as information barriers and the direction of travel) are excluded
from the log-linear function of bilateral preferences aji in Equation 5.31. In combination
19Tourism openness is the inbound plus outbound tourism expenditure OECD (2012). A country’s
tourism openness is therefore embedded in the inbound tourism effect Ii. In contrast, if Oj is specified
for international trade models as in Eaton and Kortum (2002), the index j would indicate the importing
country and Oj would therefore be a measure of a country’s openness.
20The dataset for estimation does therefore not contain any zero flows. Whether or not tourism flows
exist between country pairs which are missing in the dataset remains unknown. Missing observations can
either be a result of zero flows (no actual bilateral tourism activities between countries) or reporting issues
(availability of data).
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with the definition of the inbound and outbound tourism effects Ii and Oj , the gravity
equation then becomes
ln
Xji
Xjj
= Ii − Ij + θv + θl + θc− θ ln τji − θOj + θκji ∀j 6= i, (5.35)
where κji is an error term orthogonal to all other explanatory variables. To be able to
capture potential reciprocity in geographic barriers, I use a variation of Eaton and Kortum
(2002) and assume that this error term (with variance σ2) affects two-way tourism such that
the variance-covariance matrix of κ has nonzero off-diagonal21 elements E(κji, κji) = σ
2.
The procedure to obtain estimates of Ii is therefore to first estimate Equation 5.35 using
OLS to obtain a set of residuals εˆji. The second step involves estimating θ
2σ2 by averaging
εˆjiεˆij using ((εˆji + εˆij)/2)
2 (Figure 5.3). In a final step, these parameter estimates of the
variance-covariance matrix are used to estimate Equation 5.35 by feasible generalized least
squares (FGLS). Table 5.4 contains the results.
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Figure 5.3: Parameter estimates of θ2σ2 of the reduced dataset comprising 41 countries. Circle
areas represent the size of each weight ((εˆji + εˆij)/2)
2.
The estimates of the inbound tourism effect Ii indicate that the US is—relative to all other
countries in the dataset—the most competitive country in 2014 in tourism, closely followed
by the UK and China. Popular tourist destinations such as France, Brazil, Spain, Italy,
Turkey, Thailand, Malaysia and Greece also obtain a relatively high and positive value of
the competitiveness index Ii. Countries with relatively high unit labour costs in accom-
modation and food services—such as Switzerland, Ireland, Austria, Poland, Finland, and
Belgium (OECD, 2017b)—are only moderately competitive, if at all. The least competitive
countries are the ones where the tourism industry has not been fully developed (Si and Ai
are therefore relatively small in their value), such as Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka, Oman, Pakistan and Jordan. The mean centred 2015 TTCI of the respective
countries is reported in column 5 and compares well to the estimates of the inbound tour-
21The diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix can be excluded as a result of the constraint
j 6= i.
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Table 5.4: Tourism competitiveness.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variable est. s.e.
Airfare −θ -5.79 (0.28)
Visa restrictions θv 0.03 (0.15)
Common language θl 0.41 (0.07)
Colonial ties θc 1.52 (0.14)
Destination Country Origin Country
Country est. s.e. TTCI est. s.e.
United States I1 2.38 (0.08) 0.86 −θO1 2.30 (0.12)
United Kingdom I2 2.18 (0.11) 0.86 −θO2 2.21 (0.18)
China I3 1.87 (0.11) 0.28 −θO3 0.26 (0.25)
France I4 1.71 (0.13) 0.98 −θO4 1.47 (0.16)
Brazil I5 1.47 (0.15) 0.11 −θO5 0.87 (0.23)
Spain I6 1.47 (0.07) 1.05 −θO6 1.19 (0.10)
Italy I7 1.45 (0.07) 0.72 −θO7 1.09 (0.11)
Germany I8 1.39 (0.16) 0.97 −θO8 0.35 (0.20)
Russian Federation I9 1.12 (0.09) -0.18 −θO9 0.52 (0.10)
Japan I10 1.08 (0.13) 0.68 −θO10 0.71 (0.17)
Canada I11 1.01 (0.11) 0.66 −θO11 1.72 (0.20)
Turkey I12 0.78 (0.10) -0.18 −θO12 -0.01 (0.18)
Thailand I13 0.73 (0.07) 0 −θO13 0.77 (0.18)
Netherlands I14 0.52 (0.14) 0.41 −θO14 1.43 (0.18)
United Arab Emirates I15 0.49 (0.11) 0.17 −θO15 2.10 (0.17)
Malaysia I16 0.49 (0.15) 0.15 −θO16 0.01 (0.25)
Switzerland I17 0.30 (0.08) 0.73 −θO17 0.96 (0.14)
Greece I18 0.19 (0.07) 0.10 −θO18 0.25 (0.13)
Austria I19 0.12 (0.12) 0.56 −θO19 -0.25 (0.16)
Denmark I20 0.12 (0.13) 0.12 −θO20 0.82 (0.21)
Korea (the Republic of) I21 0.04 (0.16) 0.11 −θO21 0.41 (0.22)
India I22 -0.23 (0.14) -0.24 −θO22 -1.57 (0.24)
Egypt I23 -0.30 (0.24) -0.77 −θO23 -1.11 (0.31)
Philippines I24 -0.34 (0.11) -0.63 −θO24 -0.33 (0.15)
Poland I25 -0.36 (0.07) -0.18 −θO25 0.59 (0.17)
Nigeria I26 -0.43 (0.17) -1.47 −θO26 -0.62 (0.27)
Czech Republic I27 -0.47 (0.21) -0.04 −θO27 -0.23 (0.23)
Portugal I28 -0.55 (0.12) 0.38 −θO28 -1.20 (0.23)
Ireland I29 -0.62 (0.18) 0.27 −θO29 0.68 (0.22)
Norway I30 -0.62 (0.07) 0.26 −θO30 -0.35 (0.17)
Belgium I31 -0.71 (0.11) 0.25 −θO31 -0.07 (0.15)
Sweden I32 -0.84 (0.07) 0.19 −θO32 -1.41 (0.14)
Finland I33 -1.26 (0.05) 0.21 −θO33 -1.27 (0.09)
Ghana I34 -1.55 (0.17) -1.25 −θO34 -0.78 (0.27)
Kenya I35 -1.61 (0.08) -0.68 −θO35 -1.31 (0.15)
Uganda I36 -1.63 (0.16) -1.15 −θO36 -0.49 (0.25)
Bangladesh I37 -1.69 (0.17) -1.36 −θO37 -3.10 (0.30)
Sri Lanka I38 -1.82 (0.19) -0.46 −θO38 -1.77 (0.34)
Oman I39 -1.84 (0.09) -0.47 −θO39 -0.91 (0.23)
Pakistan I40 -2.04 (0.15) -1.34 −θO40 -3.22 (0.25)
Jordan I41 -2.09 (0.08) -0.67 −θO41 -0.73 (0.13)
Number of observations: 1,640
Notes: Estimated is Equation 5.35 by FGLS using 2014 data (see Appendix B). The parameter
estimates are normalised to that
∑41
i=1 Ii = 0 and
∑41
i=1−θOi = 0. Standard errors are in
parentheses. The table also displays the mean centred 2015 TTCI from WEF (2015) (the mean of
the 41 countries listed is 4.26).
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ism effect Ii. The majority of positive values of the Ii index are also positive in terms of
the TTCI. Many countries also compare well in terms of the overall ranking (highest Ii -
highest TTCI and vice versa).
The estimates of the outbound tourism effect Oj indicate that the US and the UK are the
most diverse in terms of exploring foreign countries to undertake tourism activities, while
Bangladesh and Pakistan are the least diverse.
As for bilateral preferences, common language and colonial ties remain prominent, while
visa restrictions are not of importance (and therefore insignificant) in the reduced dataset
of 41 countries. The price parameter obtains a value of θ = 5.79.
5.6 Counterfactuals
This section quantifies the welfare gains from international tourism across countries using
the gravity equation and structural models parameters thereof in counterfactual exercises.
The exercises involve moving the economy to a new equilibrium without international
tourism. The resulting changes in real income Wj = Y
E
j /P
E
j are then associated with the
gains from international tourism.
Because international tourism receipts may represent a large or a small share of a country’s
gross value of domestic output and therefore result into relatively small or relatively large
changes in real income, the gains from tourism need to be quantified in a multi-sector equi-
librium model. Crucial for quantifying the gains from tourism are therefore the expenditure
share αj = Xj/X
E
j as well as the output elasticity γj = Yj/Y
E
j , as already illustrated by
the theoretical framework outlined above. Accounting for the relative differences in αj
and γj ensures that the calculated gains from international tourism across countries can
be compared against a common benchmark.
As in Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012), I start by considering a foreign
price shock in country j which affects labour endowments L ≡ {Li} and travel costs
τ ≡ {τji}, but leaves unchanged country j’s labour endowment Lj and domestic travel
costs τjj . Furthermore, I assume that this shock leaves unchanged a country’s number of
available activities S ≡ {Si}, individual characteristicsA ≡ {Ai}, and bilateral preferences
a ≡ {aji}. Formally
Restriction 2: A foreign price shock in the tourism sector in country j is a change from
(L, τ ,S,A,a) at time t to (L′, τ ′,S′,A′,a′) at time t + 1 such that Lj = L
′
j , τjj = τ
′
jj ,
S = S′, A = A′, and a = a′, with L ≡ {Li}, τ ≡
{
τji
}
, S ≡ {Si}, A ≡ {Ai}, and
a ≡ {aji}.
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In other words, foreign price shocks correspond to any changes in foreign labour endow-
ments and international travel costs that leave everything else unchanged, including coun-
try j’s labour endowment, domestic travel costs, and all economic activity not related to
tourism.
As is standard in the related literature22, country j’s overall consumer price index PEj in
a two-sector economy is given by
PEj =
(
Pj
)αj(
P 0j
)1−αj
.
Sector 0 combines all economic activity not related to tourism. Combining this expressions
with the definition of income given by Equation 5.17, real income can be written as
Wj = Lj
(
wj
)γj (w0j )γ0j (Pj)−αj (P 0j )−α0j .
As only the tourism sector is subject to foreign price shocks in the counterfactual equilib-
rium by R2, and using labour L as the numeraire, this expression reduces to
Ŵj =
(
ŵj
)γj (P̂j)−αj (5.36)
where v̂ ≡ v′/v denotes the change in any variable v between the initial and the new
equilibrium (indexed with a prime). To be able to evaluate the changes in real income
therefore, one needs to keep track of the changes in prices (Step 1) as well as the changes
in income (Step 2 in the Appendix B.1).
As is standard in the macroeconomics literature, the thought experiment of moving to
autarky provides insight into the total gains from tourism. In autarky, a country’s domestic
consumption equals its domestic output of all tourism activities. Output levels result from
the optimum allocation of resources to economic activities, given employment and the
exogenous preference parameters.
To evaluate the welfare gains from international tourism, I move to a new equilibrium
where all countries impose infinitely high visa restrictions. For notational simplicity, I
assume that these visa costs are measured in terms of iceberg travel costs τji. Similar to
the case of autarky in international trade, I consider the visa costs in the new equilibrium
in international tourism to be τ ′ji = +∞ for any pair of countries j 6= i.
Proposition 1: Suppose that R1 and R2 hold. Then the change in real income associated
22For example Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014), Donaldson (2010), Costinot, Donaldson and
Komunjer (2012), Anderson and Yotov (2010), and Chaney (2008).
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with moving to autarky in country j can be computed as
ŴAj =
(
Xj
Yj
)(γj−αj)
1−γj
︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in income
(
λjj
)−αj/︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in prices
(5.37)
Proof: See Appendix B.1.
The welfare formula to quantify the gains from tourism consists of two components: the
left factor quantifies the changes in tourism income as a result of changes in overall tourism
demand (consisting of domestic and international tourism), the right factor quantifies the
changes in prices as a result of substituting international tourism with domestic tourism
activities.
The right factor is structurally equivalent to the standard welfare formula in international
trade, as first demonstrated by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and generalised by Arkolakis,
Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012). It builds on the intuition of the demand elasticity,
which links changes in the factor proportions λji and λjj , with changes in foreign and
domestic prices. From the market clearing condition, and because budget shares need to
some to one, a drop in foreign expenditure λji must correspond to an increase in domestic
expenditure λjj , the extent of which is measured by the demand elasticity . Given the
definition of the demand elasticity however, these changes can also be associated with
changes in prices, as illustrated by the right factor in Equation 5.37. The occurrence of
the expenditure share αj in this factor ensures that changes in prices only materialises
into overall changes in the consumer price index to the extent tourism spending relative
to overall spending occurs in the economy.
The left factor of Proposition 1 is new to the macroeconomics literature in that it accounts
for the changes in income from tourism, given by Y Ej = Lj(wj)
γj . Using labour as the
numeraire, this expression reduces to Ŷ Ej = (ŵj)
γj . In a subsequent step it can be shown
that changes in wages are determined by ŵj =
(
Xj/Yj
)1/(1−γj) in autarky (see Appendix
B.1). The fraction Xj/Yj therefore defines the level of changes in income. The intuition
derives from the definition of income and spending. Total income from tourism Yj consists
of domestic (Yii) and international (Y
int’l
i =
∑I
j=1
j 6=i
Xji) tourism receipts. Total expenditure
in tourism Xj consists of domestic (Xjj) and international tourism spending (X
int’l
j =∑I
i=1
i 6=j
Xji). The share of tourism expenditure relative to tourism income can therefore be
rewritten as
Xj
Yj
=
Yj − Y int’lj +X int’lj
Yj
= 1 +
Tourism deficit
Tourism output
, (5.38)
where X int’lj − Y int’lj is the tourism deficit, given by the difference of international tourism
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spending and international tourism receipts. In autarky therefore, tourism output changes
by the amount of the tourism deficit. If international tourism expenditure is larger than the
amount of international tourism receipts (X int’lj > Y
int’l
j ), a country’s income from tourism
will increase in the autarky case. This is because tourism income in autarky (consisting of
Yjj +X
int’l
j ) is larger than what it used to be (Yjj + Y
int’l
j ).
Having described the determinants of the level of changes in income, the scale of the changes
in income is defined by the relative difference in the output elasticity23 and expenditures
share. If γj > αj , consumers benefit from higher income if Xj/Yj > 1. If γj < αj however,
consumers loose from higher income if Xj/Yj > 1, as in this case, the higher income
materialises into higher prices (driven by the wage adjustment ŵj) to an extent larger than
consumers can benefit from higher income. The opposite is true however if total income
from tourism decreases in autarky such that Xj/Yj < 1. With γj > αj , this would lead
consumers to benefit from less tourism output as a result of price reductions in the sector,
which are larger than the reductions in income. Whether or not a tourism deficit leads
to an increase or reduction in income can thus only be identified if relative income and
spending in the sector are additionally taken into account.
Considering both, the left and the right factor of Equation 5.37, allows to quantify the
changes in real income comprehensively as both the changes in income and the changes
in prices are considered. Both factors are important. Some countries run large tourism
deficits, resulting into a higher volatility with respect to changes in prices, while others
are primarily dependent on international tourism receipts, resulting into a higher volatility
with respect to changes in income. In either case, the changes in real income are predicted
sufficiently accurately by Proposition 1. Using the data described in Section 5.3 and
an outbound tourism demand elasticity of  = −4 (see Table 5.1), the welfare gains from
international tourism can be calculated using Gj = 1−ŴAj . Table 5.5 contains an overview
of the results; Table B.3 contains the results of all of the 135 countries analysed.
Depending on a country’s income from international tourism, the tourism deficit, and the
relative size of the tourism sector, the gains from international tourism24 range from 0.03%
for Sierra Leone, to 0.19% for the US, to 54% for the Maldives.
For Sierra Leone and the US, domestic tourism contributes significantly to gross tourism
output (indicated by a high value of λjj). The gains from international tourism due to
23It should be noted that the output elasticities γj = Yj/Y
E
j are determined endogenously. That is, in
the new partial equilibrium, they actually take the value γj = Y
′
j /Y
E
j
′
= Xj/(Xj + Y
0
j ), as all spending
must be equivalent to all economic output in autarky. As tourism spending is much smaller than tourism
income for many countries, the gains from tourism can however only be quantified by leaving the output
elasticity in moving from the initial to the new equilibrium unchanged.
24Faber and Gaubert (2016) calculate the gains from international tourism for Mexico to be 2.43% using
a tourism trade elasticity of 1.7. The results I obtain for Mexico are significantly lower (0.17%), as a result
of higher absolute value of the demand elasticity (4), and the scaling of the tourism sector to the entire
economy using income and expenditure shares.
125
lower prices of activities consumed elsewhere are therefore small. In addition, for both
countries, the tourism deficit is close to zero (indicated by an approximate unit value of
Xj/Yj). The gains from international tourism in terms of income are therefore small. The
tourism sector also plays a relatively unimportant role in both country’s gross value of
domestic output (indicated by a low value of γj). Jointly, the relatively low demand in
international tourism combined with a small tourism deficit and a relatively small size of
the tourism sector result into marginal to no gains from international tourism.
At the other extreme, the gains from international tourism can be large if Xj/Yj takes
a relatively small and γj a relatively large value. For the Maldives, almost all income
from tourism is generated by international tourism (indicated by a small value of Xj/Yj).
Furthermore, the economy is largely dependent on the tourism sector (indicated by a high
value of γj). Jointly, the relatively high economic importance of international tourism com-
bined with a relatively large size of the tourism sector result into significant to extremely
large gains from international tourism.
Another view on the gains from international tourism can be obtained by classifying the
countries by their level of development. Table 5.5—which is rank ordered by the size
of the gains from international tourism—shows that the countries with the highest gains
from international tourism are small island developing states (SIDS, indicated by a ‡). This
result is striking as five out of the first ten countries by gains from international tourism are
SIDS (noting however that the list of countries in Table 5.5 is a nonexhaustive list). SIDS
gain significantly from international tourism due to their disproportional high income from
and dependency on the international tourism sector. Developing countries (indicated by a
∗) on the other hand seem to be evenly distributed across the entire table. Large gains are
obtained for many developing countries, which are also popular tourist destinations such
as Jamaica and Thailand, due to the significant contribution of international tourism to
the national economy (see Table B.3). Small gains are obtained for developing countries
with large tourism deficits such as China and Brazil.
It should be noted that the results calculated in this section strictly refer to the gains from
international tourism. These are not to be confused with the overall gains from tourism,
which include both the gains from domestic and international tourism. If international
tourism spending is as high as international tourism receipts, the gains from international
tourism are insignificant (conditional on the gains due to lower prices however), whereas
the overall gains from tourism may in many cases remain largely significant (e.g. due to a
large domestic tourism sector).
Further, it should also be noted that Table 5.5 indicates that the range of the gains from
international tourism (0.03-54%) is much larger than the range of the gains from inter-
national trade (1.5-8.1%, as calculated by Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2014, for the
majority of OECD countries using the Armington trade model). This is because of the
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much higher variation of the relative size of the tourism sector across countries, as indicated
by the large variation in the level of the output elasticity γj .
Table 5.5: Gains from international tourism.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Country Xj/Yj λjj αj γj Ŵj,w Ŵj,λjj Ŵj
[-] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
1 Maldives‡ 0.12 19 3.5 28.5 52.96 1.46 53.65
2 Fiji‡ 0.18 53 1.9 11.0 15.84 0.31 16.10
3 Croatia 0.23 69 2.7 11.5 13.67 0.25 13.89
4 Cambodia* 0.31 56 3.9 13.2 11.90 0.56 12.39
5 Montenegro 0.24 71 2.1 9.4 10.99 0.18 11.15
6 Belize‡ 0.27 58 2.7 10.2 10.26 0.37 10.59
7 Kuwait* 3.53 25 7.9 1.7 7.59 2.73 10.11
8 Bahamas‡ 0.32 65 3.3 11.0 9.37 0.36 9.69
9 Jordan* 0.30 32 2.0 7.2 6.58 0.56 7.10
10 Jamaica‡* 0.36 55 2.9 8.9 6.47 0.44 6.88
...
71 Gambia* 0.58 42 1.1 2.0 0.48 0.25 0.73
72 Vietnam* 0.68 74 2.7 3.9 0.48 0.21 0.69
73 Uruguay* 0.91 42 2.9 3.3 0.03 0.64 0.67
74 New Zealand 0.79 75 4.8 6.0 0.30 0.35 0.65
75 Sri Lanka* 0.74 51 2.2 3.0 0.27 0.37 0.63
76 Serbia 1.00 33 2.3 2.4 0.00 0.62 0.62
77 Germany 1.14 74 6.4 5.4 0.14 0.47 0.61
78 Switzerland 0.96 47 3.2 3.1 0.00 0.61 0.61
79 Netherlands 1.11 44 2.7 2.3 0.04 0.55 0.59
80 Sweden 1.12 58 3.9 3.4 0.06 0.52 0.58
...
120 Ecuador* 0.83 54 1.3 1.6 0.05 0.19 0.25
121 Romania 1.07 55 1.5 1.4 0.01 0.23 0.24
122 Mozambique* 1.12 66 2.5 2.6 -0.02 0.25 0.23
123 Kazakhstan 1.08 67 1.8 1.5 0.02 0.18 0.20
124 Malawi* 1.18 77 2.4 2.2 0.03 0.16 0.19
125 United States 0.91 85 3.6 4.0 0.04 0.14 0.19
126 Sudan* 0.83 84 2.1 2.6 0.09 0.09 0.19
127 Mexico* 0.97 90 6.3 6.5 0.01 0.16 0.17
128 Indonesia* 0.97 78 2.6 2.7 0.00 0.16 0.16
129 Chile* 0.97 83 3.3 3.4 0.00 0.15 0.15
130 Pakistan* 1.11 83 2.9 2.7 0.02 0.14 0.15
...
135 Sierra Leone* 0.92 82 0.4 0.5 0.00 0.02 0.03
Notes: Small island developing states indicated by a ‡. Developing countries indicated by a ∗.
As most of the international tourism is dependent on long-distance international air trans-
port, the results in Table 5.5 can also be indirectly linked with aviation’s socio-economic
contribution and impact. Vice versa, as the gains from international tourism are directly
related to a country’s dependency on international tourism, they are also informative to-
wards determining the potential welfare impacts associated with any type of policies in
this sector. For example, the results in Table 5.5 indicate that the recent policy agree-
ment of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, 2016) to stabilise aviation’s
CO2 emissions to 2020 levels through carbon offsetting would inevitable be discriminating
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against SIDS. Fortunately, the current scheme is designed to exempt SIDS (among others)
from participation, unless they volunteer to decide to do so.
5.7 Summary
This chapter provides intuition towards relating a consumer’s preference to travel to for-
eign countries to undertake activities. It then applies these preferences to a macroeconomic
framework featuring absolute and comparative advantage across a continuum of activities
consumed in locations worldwide to describe international tourism flows in a basic Ricar-
dian sense. The resulting system of equations determines price levels, budget shares and
wages and is shown to be observationally equivalent to the standard gravity equation in
international trade, featuring bilateral accessibility and multilateral resistance terms.
Comparative advantage facilitates, while geographic barriers inhibit potential gains from
international tourism. Tourism falls unequivocally and more elastic with distance due to
higher prices and information barriers. Speaking the same language and colonial ties both
attenuate these barriers, which are in some cases even compensating for the additional cost
of visa restrictions.
The global phenomenon of tourism can to some extent also be attributed to common
preferences in activities. The results obtained in this chapter indicate that the search
for variables explaining common preferences in activities may prove to be successful in
explaining global tourism patterns.
A country’s comparative advantage adjusted for its labour costs provides insight into a
country’s competitiveness as a tourism service provider. The gravity equation can be used
as a tool to quantify the tourism competitiveness across countries. The obtained indexes
compare well to the well-established Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Index of the
World Economic Forum.
The welfare gains from international tourism predominantly depend on (i) the size of the
tourism sector in each country and on (ii) the contribution of international tourism to this
sector, and range from 0.03% for Sierra Leone, to 0.19% for the US, to 54% for the Maldives.
While developing countries may either have a high or a low dependency on international
tourism, the majority of SIDS are found to have a disproportional high income from and
thus dependency on it.
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Chapter 6
International trade and tourism in a CO2-
constrained world
This chapter builds on theory-consistent, multi-country gravity models of international
trade and tourism and uses comparative static exercises to show the welfare implications
associated with environmental policies in international sea and air transport. This chapter
therefore combines the international trade model from Chapter 4 and the international
tourism model from Chapter 5 into a model of the global economy and jointly describes
column 2 well as column 3 of Table 1.1.
The analysis in this chapter builds on comparative-dynamic exercises in a Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) framework to show the welfare implications associated with
cost increases in international transport, by linking a theoretical framework of consumer
demand with a theoretical framework of transport supply.
Consumers in each country maximise their utility from the consumption of goods and activ-
ities from the industry and tourism sectors. Industry production and consumption involves
goods trade. Tourism service output and consumption involves international tourism. On
the supply side, countries produce goods and services using only labour. The export of
goods and travel of tourists to foreign countries is accomplished by international sea and
air transport.
In equilibrium, supply equals demand. Introducing a price on the CO2 emitted in inter-
national transport will result into foreign price shocks and therefore into macroeconomic
imbalances. By solving for a new equilibrium state in which these prices shocks are taken
into account, one can determine the changes in real income in each country associated with
the introduction of carbon emissions pricing schemes in the international maritime and air
transport industry.
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6.1 Theoretical framework
The mathematical derivations used to describe the theoretical framework of trade, tourism,
and international transport involve the transfer of supply-side related changes in transport
costs to demand-related changes in prices in three main parts.
The first part specifies the gravity equations for international trade and tourism from
Chapters 4 and 5 to link prices of goods and tourism activities to transport costs. Inter-
national goods trade is limited to trade via sea transport. The trade model used in this
chapter is therefore a simplified version of the trade model described in Chapter 4. Inter-
national tourism is restricted to international tourism via air travel. Both simplifications
are a result of the underlying data limitations. They are however reasonable, considering
that the realised model covers about 94% of all international transport related CO2 as
illustrated in Table 1.1.
The second part specifies a cost function of a representative transport firm that uses exo-
genous input prices (including fuel) to produce a certain level of transport output with a
given technology and operational efficiency.
The third part then specifies the exogenously determined carbon price, which later takes
the form of a bunker fuel levy (charged per tonne of fuel purchased for consumption),
before trade and tourism demand are balanced with transport supply using equilibrium
prices.
Setup. The model builds on a world economy comprising i = 1, ..., I potentially asymmet-
ric countries and h = 1, ...,H economic sectors. The sectors considered are the industry
(I), tourism (T ), services, and international transport sectors. Industrial activity is re-
lated to goods trade; tourism activity to passenger travel. The service sector combines all
economic activity other than those in the industry and tourism sectors. The international
transport sector is comprised by the international maritime and aviation industry.
Labour Lh is the only factor input with wage w = {wi}. Country i’s total output is
therefore given by Yi = wi · Li, where Li =
∑
h∈H L
h
i . In comparison to all other sectors,
the number of workers in the international transport sector is small and insignificant and
therefore ignored. The service sector is the catch-all labour category and includes all
workers who are neither employed in the industry nor in the tourism sector. This sector is
therefore immune to exogenous price shocks from international transport and will remain
unchanged in the counterfactual exercises below.
Index notation relates the variables of economic activity to either the industry or tourism
sector. Irrespective of the type of macroeconomic activity (trade or tourism), country
j refers to the reporting country and country i to the partner country. The order of
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the indices of each variable indicates if the variable is related to international trade or
tourism activities using the concept of the direction of flow between the reporting and
partner country. For example, if country j engages in international trade with country
i, its expenditure X on imports from country i is denoted Xij . If country j engages in
international tourism with country i, its outbound tourism expenditure on country j is
denoted Xji. Using the index notation ij therefore denotes trade flows whereas the index
notation ji denotes tourism flows.
Supply heterogeneity. Partner countries differ in terms of their production costs due
to differences in labour—with factor income (wage) denoted as wi—and supply capacity
Si ≡ {zi, Ni, fei , Ai}. Si consists of all attributes other than labour, which make country
i attractive as a supplier and/or destination country. It includes labour productivity1
(zi), the number of firms and the number of tourism activities in each country (Ni), sunk
entry costs2 (fei ), as well as other country-specific variables and attributes
3 (Ai). Fixed
costs differ across countries but do not vary between countries. Firms in each country
are therefore confronted with increasing returns to scale (IRS) in production but constant
returns to scale (CRS) in international transport.
Taken together, Si comprehensively describes country i’s "capacity" to become a partner
for country j, in terms of international trade as well as in terms of international tourism.
As Si will be assumed to remain constant between the initial and the new (environmentally
constrained) equilibrium of the world economy, a precise definition of the attributes in Si
is not required.
Transport costs. International trade and tourism involve the transport of goods from
country i to country j (trade), or the transport of passengers from country j to country i
(tourism). The expenses related to these transport services are denoted with fij and fji
respectively. To comply with the multiplicative form of gravity however, these costs are
measured in units of the one plus the ad valorem price equivalent of supply prices wi
τij = 1 + fij/wi ≥ 1 , τji = 1 + fji/wi ≥ 1, (6.1)
where
(a) τjj = 1, τii = 1, and
1The term productivity essentially describes a firm’s total factor productivity (TFP). For manufacturing
trade with no other inputs than labour, TFP reduces to labour productivity. For non-manufacturing trade,
TFP includes inputs such as the quantity of arable land and natural resources (see e.g. Costinot, Donaldson
and Smith, 2016).
2I consider producing firms in country i to be homogeneous with respect to the marginal and fixed costs
of production as in e.g. Melitz and Redding (2015). In order to produce, firms face a sunk entry cost and
draw an exogenous productivity from a degenerate productivity distribution. Due to the presence of fixed
costs, only firms drawing a productivity zi find it profitable to produce.
3In terms of tourism, countries differ in terms of their attractiveness as a destination country Ai (in-
cluding climatic, geographic, historical, and cultural characteristics), factor inputs (wi), and the number
of available activities (reflecting a country’s state of the tourism sector)
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(b) τij ≤ τil · τlj , and τji ≤ τjl · τli for any third country l.
Part a of Equation 6.1 states the domestic transport costs are zero. Part b of 6.1 rules
out cross-country arbitrage opportunities and restricts tourism travel to flights via direct
routes only.
Market structure. The prices faced by consumers in country j for goods imports from
country i and for tourism activities consumed in country i are a constant markup over
marginal cost
pa(zi) = mwiτa/zi, (6.2)
where a = {ij, ji} denotes the type of activity and m ≥ 0 the markup. The market struc-
ture is either characterised by monopolistic competition (m > 0) or perfect competition
(m = 0).
Consumers (including firms) of internationally traded goods therefore pay the price of the
good at the factory gate wi/zi, plus the expenses related to shipping those goods from the
producing country to the importing country, given by τij . The marginal cost of producing
the quantities Q ≡ {qi} by a representative firm in country i using productivity zi is
therefore given by wiqj(ω)/zi, where ω ∈ Ω denotes the type of good consumed.
Consumers of worldwide tourism activities pay a price pi ≡ wi for the activity they carry
out in location l ∈ i (inclusive of lodging, food, services, etc.) and the expenses associated
with travelling to location l ∈ i, given by τji, both of which are sold or offered for sale at
a lump-sum price. The marginal cost of the activities S ≡ {si} in country i consumed by
tourists from country j is therefore given by wisj(ω), where ω ∈ Ω refers to the type of
activity consumed.
Expenditure functions (gravity). Consumers in each country purchase goods and
activities in amounts q(ω) and s(ω) to maximise a CES objective. Their overall expenditure
in each sector is given by4
Xha =
(
w
h
i τ
h
a
)h
Xhj
(
P hj
)−h
Si, where a = {ij, ji} , (6.3)
and with  as the price elasticity of demand. Xij therefore refers to country j’s total
spending on goods imported from country i, whereasXji refers to country j’s total spending
on tourism activities in country i. The CES price index Pj is given by
P hj ≡
(
I∑
i=1
(
w
h
i τ
h
a
)h
Si
)1/h
, where a = {ij, ji} , (6.4)
4See Chapters 4 and 5, and in particular Equations 4.29 and 4.4 for trade and Equations 5.11 and 5.10
for tourism
132
and summarises how prices (whi ) around the world, supply capacity around the world
(Si) and geographic barriers (τ
h
a ) govern prices in country j and lead to deviations from
purchasing power parity.
For all sectors combined, country j’s aggregate consumer price index is given by
Pj =
H∏
h=1
(
P hj
)αhj
where
H∑
h=1
αhj = 1. (6.5)
To be compliant with the gravity structure imposed by 6.3, the price elasticity of demand
 is defined as the proportionate change in factor proportions Xij and Xjj , and Xji and
Xjj respectively
h ≡ 1− σ =
∂ ln
(
Xha /X
h
jj
)
∂ ln τha
, where a = {ij, ji} . (6.6)
In international trade,  refers to the partial elasticity of relative imports with respect to
transport costs (or prices respectively, with  being the "Armington" elasticity) and Xjj to
the value of goods produced in country j and also consumed in country j. In international
tourism,  refers to the partial elasticity of relative outbound tourism spending with respect
to international travel costs and Xjj to domestic tourism spending i.e. the total spending
of tourists choosing their home country as their destination country (i = j) to undertake
activities.
Market clearing. Assuming that markets in each sector and country at the macro level
clear ensures that aggregated supply and demand are consistent with a country’s total
output Y hi and expenditure X
h
j in each sector (see Chapters 4 and 5) such that
Y hi ≡
∑
j
Xha , X
h
j ≡
∑
i
Xha , where a = {ij, ji} , (6.7)
where Y hi = w
h
i L
h
i is the value of production in sector h, and X
j is spending in sector h.
Both values Y hi and X
h
j are inclusive of a country’s spending in its home market (Xjj).
Sector spending relative to total spending is thus determined by αhj ≡ Xhj /Xj .
Cross-sector substitutions and spillover effects are not accounted for. The former is negli-
gible as the considered price changes are small. The latter may however be quantitatively
important for remote countries such as SIDS. Trade also consists of traded tourism goods.
Both sectors are therefore interlinked through goods trade. However, no spillover effects
of changes in tourism demand on trade demand are accounted for in the model.
Budget shares across countries in each sector are given by
λha ≡ Xha /Xhj , where a = {ij, ji} . (6.8)
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To comply with structural gravity on the one hand (Head and Mayer, 2014) and ensure
internal consistency of the model on the other (see counterfactuals below), the following
two conditions must hold:
1. Budget shares are independent of country j’s factor income wj and therefore remain
multiplicatively separable (proof see counterfactuals below).
2. Budget shares sum to one, i.e
∑I
i=1 λ
h
a ≡ 1, a = {ij, ji}, and therefore ensure that
the market clearing condition given by Equation 6.7 holds.
A country’s total income from all sectors is given by
Yi = wiLi ≡ Li
H∏
h=1
(
w
h
i
)γhi
, (6.9)
where γhi = Y
h
i /Yi is country i’s endogenous output elasticity in sector h.
A country’s total expenditure in all sectors is given by
Xi ≡
∑
h
Xhi +D
h
i , (6.10)
where D accounts for any deficits in trade and tourism. Adopting the specification of Head
and Mayer (2014), these deficits are assumed to be exogenously given on a per capita basis
in each sector
∑
hD
h
i = Di = Lidi. The model is closed using
Xi = wiLi(1 + di). (6.11)
Transport supply. Firms involved in the transport of goods and passengers use factor
inputs (including fuel) to produce optimum levels of transport output (given prices), meas-
ured in either tonne-kilometres [t.km] or passenger-kilometres [p.km]. In doing so, trans-
port firms continuously employ short-run cost-minimisation routines5 with respect to vari-
able (fuel, labour, material) and fixed inputs (capital). Their cost function6 ζ is given
by
Cτ = ζ(y,ϑ,P, F, ξ(t)), (6.12)
where Cτ refers to the variable costs a transport firm faces (at time t) to produce transport
output y, ϑ =
[
ϑ1, ϑ2, . . . , ϑq
]
is a vector of output related quality differentials (e.g. average
5The relationship between optimum levels of exogenous factor inputs and output quantity is captured
by a production function. Yet, the dual problem to maximising output s.t. a budgetary cost constraint
is to minimise costs s.t. a budgetary production level constraint. Optimum levels of inputs can therefore
also be found by specifying a cost function instead of a production function. And as the link between
a theoretical framework of consumer demand with transport supply is accomplished through changes in
prices as a result of variations in cost, I choose to adopt a cost function.
6For specifications of variable cost functions of transport firms see e.g. Caves, Christensen and Trethe-
way, 1984, Gillen, Oum and Tretheway, 1990, and Oum and Yu, 1998 for air transport and De Borger and
Nonneman, 1981 and Tolofari, Button and Pitfield, 1986 for sea transport.
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load factor, utilisation, and trip length), P = [Pfuel,Plabour,Pmaterial, . . . ,Pk] is a vector of
variable, exogenous factor input price indices (including a price index for fuel), F denotes
exogenous factor inputs which are treated as fixed in the short run (e.g. capital costs),
and ξ(t) is a general index of pure technical change.
Assuming CRS in international transport (considering the large number of available ship-
pers, charterers, and airlines), the cost function can be transformed into a marginal cost
function by dividing the firm’s total costs by its total transport output
Cτ
y
= ζ(ϑ,P, F, ξ(t)). (6.13)
Internalisation of externalities. The class of carbon emissions pricing schemes con-
sidered have in common the introduction of an (exogenously determined) price per unit of
CO2 released (a carbon price) to reduce and/or limit the amount of CO2 emitted. As the
release of CO2 is directly related to the amount of fuel burned in the consumption process
via an emissions factor, the carbon costs a transport firm faces under carbon emission
pricing schemes can be expressed in units of the amount of fuel consumed
carbon cost
[
$
t fuel
]
= CO2 emissions factor
[
tCO2
t fuel
]
× CO2 price
[
$
tCO2
]
.
In other words, the costs associated with the release of CO2 can be expressed as a fuel
price surcharge. Under a carbon emissions pricing scheme, the overall fuel-related price a
transport firm faces therefore amounts to
Pfuel = Pfuel(oil) + ηfPCO2 , (6.14)
where Pfuel(oil) is the petroleum-based fuel price (without environmental surpluses), ηf is
the fuel-related CO2 emissions factor (which is assumed to be common to all sectors), and
PCO2 is the carbon price.
Similar to the transformation of international transport costs in trade and tourism, and to
remain compliant with the multiplicative form of the gravity equations and transport cost
function, the carbon costs ηPCO2 are transformed into "iceberg carbon costs" using
Pfuel = Pfuel(oil)
(
1 +
ηfPCO2
Pfuel(oil)︸ ︷︷ ︸
χ
)
, (6.15)
where χ ≥ 1 is the one plus the CO2 tax equivalent of net fuel prices.
Conditional on the level of transport output y, the amount of CO2 released by both the
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international maritime and air transport industry can be calculated using
CO2 =
H∑
h=1
ηhyκ
h
I∑
i=1
I∑
j=1
QhaD
h
a︸ ︷︷ ︸
t.km, p.km
, a = {ij, ji} , (6.16)
where ηy is an emissions factor related to total transport output y, measured either in
tonnes of CO2 per tonne-kilometre [tCO2/t.km] or tonnes of CO2 per passenger-kilometre
[tCO2/p.km]. κ
h accounts for return trips7 as the macro-theoretical framework (gravity)
only accounts for flows in one direction. In international trade, imported goods remain
in the destination country. In international tourism however, tourists need to return back
to their country of origin. The round-trip factor therefore takes a value of κh = 2 in
international tourism and κh = 1 in international trade.
Turning back to the description of the variables in Equation 6.16, Qh refers to the quantities
of tonnes shipped (qIij) or number of passengers transported (N
T
ij ), and Da is the distance
between countries. Qh times Dha therefore yields into transport output measured in either
tonne-kilometres (t.km) or passenger-revenue-kilometres (p.km).
Total transport output of a transport firm (or transport work performed) is assumed to
remain constant. It is given by
y =
H∑
h=1
sh(Qh)κh
I∑
i=1
I∑
j=1
QhaD
h
a ≡ const., a = {ij, ji} , (6.17)
where sh(Qh) refers to the firm’s market share in sector h. Holding total transport fixed
is helpful to be able to straightforwardly determine equilibrium prices as will be shown
below.
The intuition behind Equation 6.17 is as follows. A reduction in the quantities shipped
or number of passengers transported will force smaller transport firms to exit the market,
thus leaving a higher market share sh for the remaining transport firms. Jointly, and on
an aggregate level, these changes are assumed to perfectly counterbalance any changes in
transport output y.
Balancing trade and tourism demand with transport supply. Trade and tourism
7
κ
h could also be defined as the ratio of tonne-vehicle-kilometres to revenue-tonne-kilometres (κh =
t.vkt/t.rkt) and passenger-vehicle-kilometres to passenger-revenue-kilometres (κh = p.vkt/p.rkt) to spe-
cifically account for average distance travelled empty (average allocative utilisation), average vehicle ca-
pacity (vehicle economies of scale), and average load factors (average payload utilisation) (see e.g. Gucwa
and Schäfer (2013)). All these factors increase the amount of CO2 per unit of transport output emitted,
provided however that they are not already accounted for in the emissions factor ηy as in Equation 6.16.
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demand are linked with transport supply using equilibrium prices
fha ≡ mh
Chτ (y,ϑ,P, F, ξ(t))
yh
Dha , a = {ij, ji} , (6.18)
where f are freight rates or airfares respectively in units of [$/t] or [$/p], m ≥ 0 is the
markup that is assumed to equivalently apply to all country pairs8, and Cτ (·) /y are mar-
ginal transport costs given by Equation 6.13 in units of [$/t.km] or [$/p.km] respectively.
From the consumer’s perspective, transport takes the form of extended supply. From the
transport carrier’s perspective however, this extended supply takes the form of transport
demand. The supply and demand models can therefore be linked using Equation 6.18.
Equation 6.18 is valid for any theoretical framework of consumer demand which incorpor-
ates transport as one additional element of economic supply. Yet, the usage of the term
transport costs in this context may cause confusion, especially when dealing with a mac-
roeconomic and microeconomic framework simultaneously. This is because on the demand
side, freight rates and airfares are referred to as the additional costs faced by consumers
in purchasing goods and activities, whereas on the supply side, freight rates and airfares
are the prices charged by transport firms passed down the supply-chain to consumers.
Equation 6.18 also makes clear that any variables measuring transport costs in the mac-
roeconomics literature are endogenous. This is because, by transport costs, the theoretical
demand framework actually refers to transport prices, which are determined in a supply-
demand equilibrium. As the consumption of goods and activities from foreign countries
requires some form of transport, a change in consumer demand inevitably materialises into
a change in transport demand. A change in transport demand on the other hand will
lead the transport carrier to adjust their output and hence price (given by f) to a new
cost-minimising solution. At the same time however, consumers will adjust their demand
in response to an increase in the overall price of goods and services (pτ ), as a result of
higher transport costs f . Changes in transport costs therefore also involve changes in
prices as well as changes in demand. Given this endogeneity problem, determining the
demand elasticity from transport costs in international trade and tourism should make
use of instrumental variables techniques and appropriate instruments. In models used to
predict changes in prices however—as is the case in this study—the endogenous treatment
of transport costs in a supply-demand equilibrium is subject to the underlying modelling
assumptions (see Equation 6.17).
8International transport services involve a number of firms, which makes the markup structure complex
and non-transparent. The transport of goods by sea involves shipowners, charterers as well as shippers,
all of which may use a different markup structure. In international air travel, the airline operating the
flight may be part of a global alliance, which thus also influences its markup structure. These examples
illustrate that the competitive product strategy of a transport firm on individual trade and tourism routes
is difficult to analyse, partially also because of the lack of relevant but confidential pricing information.
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This completes the description of the theoretical framework. The next section uses this
framework to derive a general equilibrium model consisting of the industry, tourism, and
international transport sectors.
6.2 General equilibrium model
This section describes a general equilibrium model that allows to investigate the welfare
impacts associated with environmental policies in both the international maritime and
aviation industry. Employing the theoretical model described in the previous section, this
section uses counterfactual exercises to quantify the change in each variable of interest, by
starting from the variables describing the demand for goods and activities at the micro
level, and by continuing with the variables describing international trade and tourism as
well transport supply at the macro level.
The data collected to measure asymmetries across countries (see Section 6.3) describes the
world economy in general equilibrium. This state of the world economy is referred to as
equilibrium initial state of the model at time t. Once price shocks in the form of carbon
prices to the international transport sector are introduced, a new state of the general
equilibrium needs to be determined. This state of the world economy is referred to as new
equilibrium state of the model at a point in time t+ 1. The movement from the initial to
the new equilibrium occurs along a balanced transition path and only keeps track of the
changes of the key variables of interest. These include transport costs, consumers prices,
wages, as well as total income and expenditure in each country. Formally:
Definition 1: Exogenous price shocks due to a tax on the CO2 released by the international
maritime and air transport industries is a change of the world economy from its initial
general equilibrium state at time t
[
PCO2 ,Pfuel,P, F, y,ϑ, ξ(t), χ,f , τ ,p,P ,w ,Y ,X,L,D,S
]
to a new general equilibrium state at time t+ 1
[
P′CO2 ,P
′
fuel,P
′, F, y,ϑ′, ξ(t+ 1), χ′,f ′, τ ′,p′,P ′,w ′,Y ′,X′,L′,D′,S′
]
such that
P = P′, F = F ′, y = y′, τjj = τ
′
jj, L = L
′, D = D′ and S = S′,
with P ≡ {Pk 6= PCO2 ,Pfuel} , ϑ ≡ {ϑq} , f ≡ {fhij , fhji} , τ ≡ {τhij , τhji} , p ≡ {phij , phji}
, P ≡
{
P hi
}
, w ≡
{
w
h
i
}
, Y ≡
{
Y hi
}
, X ≡
{
Xhi
}
, L ≡
{
Lhi
}
, D ≡
{
Dhi
}
, and
S ≡ {Si}.
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The structural model parameters αh, γh, and h remain constant per definition.
In other words, after a change in the carbon price (PCO2), the model keeps track of changes
in fuel prices (χ), technology uptakes and operational improvements of a transport firm
(ϑ, ξ(t)), and the prices of goods and tourism activities from foreign countries (f , τ ,p)
faced by consumers in country i, including their overall price index (Pi), income (Yi) and
spending (Xi). The model leaves unchanged the input prices to a transport firm other
than fuel and fuel related taxes (PCO2 ,Pfuel, F ), a transport firm’s total output (y), as
well as country i’s ability to serve its own market (τjj = τ
′
jj), labour endowment (Li),
deficits (Di) and supply capacity Si. For the general equilibrium model derived in this
section therefore, there is no need to additionally keep track (and collect data) of the
variables that are assumed to remain constant per Definition 1 as they cancel out in the
counterfactual exercises. This will be shown below.
Leaving domestic transport costs unchanged (τjj = τ
′
jj) complies with the international
authority of and hence candidate policy designs of the ICAO and the IMO, to only tackle
CO2 from international transport activities.
Under the assumption of small price changes, the counterfactual exercises in this study are
carried out by taking logs of the respective demand or supply equation, differentiating the
equation with respect to prices (or costs respectively), and then integrating this expression
between the initial (t) and the new equilibrium state (t+1). To ease notation, any variable
indexed without a prime indicates the initial equilibrium state; any variable indexed with
a prime the new equilibrium state. Furthermore, changes in any variable v between the
initial and the new equilibrium are denoted v̂ ≡ v′/v.
In what follows, the demand and supply equations are one after another subject of this
exercise (the details of which can be found in the mathematical appendix C.1), before
combining them in the last section into a general equilibrium model that is representative
for the entire world economy. In accordance with the sequence of how the theoretical
framework was laid out, this section starts by deriving a counterfactual equilibrium of
the demand equations, then continues by deriving the counterfactual equilibrium of the
transport firm, before combining them both using the counterfactual equilibrium of the
link between trade and tourism demand and transport supply. To be able to keep track of
the welfare changes in moving from the initial to the new equilibrium, the last part of this
section deals with the quantification of changes in real income, given by Wj = Yj/Pj .
Trade and tourism demand. Combining the demand equations in 6.3, the definition of
budget shares in 6.8, expenditure functions in 6.3, and the market clearing conditions in
6.11 and 6.9, one can obtain a general equilibrium model for each sector that leaves the
vector of wages as the only variable to be determined.
Proposition 1: Small changes in wages in any country i ∈ I associated with any exogen-
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ous price shocks satisfy
ŵ
h
i =
1
Y hi
∑
j
λha
(
ŵ
h
i τ̂
h
a
)h
∑I
i=1 λ
h
a
(
ŵ
h
i τ̂
h
a
)h (ŵhj )γ
h
i
Xhj , a = {ij, ji} . (6.19)
Proof: see Appendix C.1.
After a change in iceberg transport or travel costs τha , Equation 6.19 can be solved iter-
atively to obtain a vector of relative changes in wages w ≡
{
w
h
i
}
in sector h. Assum-
ing that a country’s relative change in overall income equivalently applies to the relative
change in expenditure from all sectors, changes in income can be linked to changes in
expenditure using X̂hi ≡ X̂i. Market clearing then implies X̂hi = Ŷi =
(
ŵ
h
i
)γhi
. Ex-
posing 6.19 to changes in prices (τ̂a) and iterating over the vector of wages to obtain a
new equilibrium state of the model therefore also involves the quantification of a country’s
overall income ŶiYi =
(
ŵ
h
i
)γhi
Yi , overall expenditure X̂iXi = ŶiXi, and budget shares
λ̂haλ
h
a =
λha
(
ŵ
h
i τ̂
h
a
)h
∑I
i=1 λ
h
a
(
ŵ
h
i τ̂
h
a
)h in the new equilibrium and for each sector. The quantification
of these variables is crucial for determining the welfare impacts associated with transport
polices as described further below.
Transport Supply. Transport supply is characterised by Equation 6.12. Under CRS
and by Definition 1, changes in the marginal costs of a transport firm Ĉτ/ŷ ≡ Ĉτ can be
made dependent on changes in the fuel price index, technology uptakes, and operational
adjustments. Formally:
Proposition 2: Small changes in variable transport costs of a transport firm associated
with exogenous carbon price shocks satisfy
Ĉhτ = (P̂
h
fuel)
λ
h
fuel ξ˙h
Qh∏
qh=1
(ϑ̂hq )
ε
qh
ϑ ,
where P̂fuel measures the changes in fuel price, λfuel is the fuel cost share, ξ˙ ≡ ξ(t+ 1)/ξ(t)
is the rate of pure technical change, and ϑ̂q are operational adjustments of the transport
firm between a point in time t and t+ 1. Proof: see Appendix C.1.
Given that changes in the carbon price can be linked to changes in fuel prices using 6.14, the
above expression can be adjusted to directly account for the changes in prices associated
with a carbon emissions pricing scheme. Using Equation 6.15 and the fact that oil related
fuel prices remain unchanged by Definition 1 (Pfuel(oil) = P
′
fuel(oil)), changes in fuel prices
are given by P̂fuel = χ̂. In moving from an unconstrained (without a price on CO2) to an
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environmentally constrained scenario (with a price on CO2), changes in the iceberg CO2
cost component are given by χ̂ = χ′/1. Using these observations in the expression above,
the changes in the costs of a transport firm associated with a carbon emissions pricing
scheme can be calculated using
Ĉhτ =
(
χ′
)λhfuel ξ˙h Qh∏
qh=1
(ϑ̂hq )
ε
qh
ϑ . (6.20)
Equation 6.20 is meaningful as it links changes in the carbon price with changes in techno-
logy and operational patterns within a given time period (t+ 1)− t. It therefore captures
the transition dynamics of a transport firm that is confronted with higher fuel or car-
bon prices. Faced with these price increases, a transport carrier may therefore invest into
new technology and operational efficiency in order to reduce the increase in fuel or car-
bon costs. Assuming that the investment costs of these measures remain relatively small
in comparison to the overall (fixed and variable) capital costs of a transport firm, these
measures generally lead into overall cost reductions. Jointly, the uptake of new technology
and improvements in operational efficiency (ξ˙ < 1 and ϑ̂q < 1) therefore offset any cost
increases of a transport carrier (Ĉτ ) if confronted with a carbon price (χ̂ > 1). The extent
of which these cost reductions will materialise however depends on the carbon price itself.
Equation 6.20 is therefore central to quantifying the increases in costs that will be passed
on to the consumers in the form of price increases of goods and activities in international
trade and tourism. Section 6.4 therefore describes in detail the policy design investigated
in this study, which provides the link between the level of the carbon price and the level
of technology uptake and efficient improvements under a carbon emissions pricing scheme.
Link of demand and supply. The last step involves applying Equation 6.18 to the
counterfactual changes of moving from the initial to the new equilibrium. Under constant
markups9 and with transport output y remaining unchanged by Definition 1, changes in
freight rates and airfares can be calculated using
f̂ha = Ĉ
h
τ , a = {ij, ji} .
Furthermore, using the definition of iceberg transport costs in Equation 6.1, changes in
equilibrium prices in each sector can be shown to be dependent on the share of transport
costs in consumer prices fa/pa (see Appendix C.1 for the details). In particular:
Proposition 3: Small changes in equilibrium prices of transport supply and trade and
9The assumption of a constant markups is realistic for busy trade and tourism routes, which are com-
monly served by a large number of transport firms, but unrealistic for less busy trade and tourism routes,
which may be served by only a few transport firms if not by a single one. Because transport supply equals
trade and tourism demand in market equilibrium, a country’s bilateral expenditure on less busy trade and
tourism routes is small relative to it’s expenditure on the busy ones, which therefore influences the overall
welfare impacts in each country only marginally. The measurement error associated with the assumption
of a constant markup in international transport should therefore remain within acceptable limits.
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tourism demand satisfy
ŵ
h
i τ̂
h
a = ŵ
h
i
(
1− f
h
a
pha
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in
supply prices
+ Ĉhτ
(
fha
pha
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in
transport costs
, a = {ij, ji} (6.21)
where: 1− ŵiτ̂a = is the change in consumer prices,
fa/pa = is the share of transport costs in consumer prices,
1− ŵi = is the change in wages, and
1− Ĉτ = is the change in transport prices
in each sector h.
The occurrence of the wage adjustment 1/ŵi in 6.21 results from the fact that transport
costs fa are normalised by supply prices pi ≡ wi using τa = 1 + fa/wi. A change in
wi therefore changes the baseline to which iceberg transport costs are measured against.
Changes in wi therefore change the value of τij , even if fij remains unchanged.
Aside of keeping track of the changes in wages, Equation 6.21 is easily implemented into
the general equilibrium model as it only requires one statistic: the share of transport costs
in consumer prices fa/pa, which can readily be calculated from trade and tourism statistics
(see Section 6.3). It should be noted that this share is also the only bilateral variable in
6.21, as the changes in transport prices by a transport firm are assumed to equivalently
apply to all trade and tourism routes as a result of the assumption of constant markups in
the international transport sector.
Within the stated system boundaries, Equation 6.21 closes the model and links the theoret-
ical models of consumer demand with the theoretical model of transport supply. Equations
6.19, 6.20 and 6.21 therefore jointly describe a reduced form of the world economy in gen-
eral equilibrium that can be used to quantify the changes in real income associated with
exogenous price shocks in international transport by
1. introducing a price shock to the international transport system through
Ĉhτ =
(
χ′
)λhfuel ξ˙h∏Qhqh=1(ϑ̂hq )εqhϑ and subsequently
2. solving for a new general equilibrium by iterating over the vector of changes in wages
ŵ
h
i given by
ŵ
h
i =
1
Y hi
I∑
j=1
λha
(
ŵ
h
i
(
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h
a
pha
)
+ Ĉhτ
(
fha
pha
))h
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h
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(
ŵ
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h
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+ Ĉhτ
(
fha
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))h (ŵhj )γ
h
i
Xhj , a = {ij, ji} .
(6.22)
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Welfare. The welfare impacts in each country are measured in terms of changes in real
income Ŵj ≡ Ŷj/P̂j . It is therefore necessary to keep track of the changes in income
Yj =
∑H
h=1 Y
h
j as well as the changes in the price index Pj =
∏H
h=1
(
P hj
)αhj
to quantify
the changes in real income associated with exogenous price shocks.
Given the definition of the price index in Equation 6.5, changes in real income are given
by
d lnWj = d lnYj −
H∑
h=1
αhj d lnP
h
j .
Futhermore, given that the consumer demand equations and budget shares in each sector
are multiplicatively separable, changes in the price index can be shown to merely depend
on the domestic expenditure shares, the demand elasticities, and wages in each sector.
Formally:
Proposition 4: Small changes in the price index in any country j ∈ I associated with
any exogenous price shocks satisfy
d lnP hj =
−d lnλhjj
h
+ d lnwhj .
Proof: See Appendix C.1.
Using Equation 6.9 and labour Lj as the numeraire, changes in income can be calculated
sector by sector using
Yj = Lj
H∏
h=1
(
w
h
j
)γhj ⇐⇒ d lnYj = H∑
h=1
γhj d lnw
h
j .
Changes in the price index and changes in income can then be combined to calculate
changes in real income
d lnWj =
H∑
h=1
[
γhj d lnw
h
j +
(
αhj
h
)
d lnλhjj − αhj d lnwhj
]
d lnWj =
H∑
h=1
[(
γhj − αhj
)
d lnwhj +
(
αhj
h
)
d lnλhjj
]
.
Integrating this expression between the initial and the new equilibrium reveals that changes
in a country’s welfare from all sectors can be calculated using
Ŵj =
H∏
h=1
(
ŵ
h
j
)(γhj −αhj )︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in
income
(supply)
(
λ̂hjj
)αhj /h︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in
prices
(demand)
. (6.23)
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If only one sector is subject to a carbon emissions pricing scheme, this expression reduces
to Ŵ hj =
(
ŵ
h
j
)(γhj −αhj ) (
λ̂hjj
)αhj /h
.
The right factor of Equation 6.23 measures the welfare change associated with changes
in prices and has become the standard formula to quantify the gains from trade (which
involves assuming autarky), as it generally holds for an important class of trade models
(Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2012). The intuition of it derives from the
definition of the demand elasticity in 6.6, stating that any increase in domestic expenditure
(due to price increases on foreign goods and tourism activities) must correspond with a
decrease in expenditure on foreign goods or tourism activities (and vice versa), the extent
of which is measured by the demand elasticity  in combination with domestic trade and
tourism expenditure shares λhjj .
The left factor of Equation 6.23 measures the welfare change associated with changes in
income10 as described in detail in Section 5.6. If income (or output respectively) is higher
than spending in sector h (γhj > α
h
j ), any increase in wages ŵ
h
j > 1 will result into welfare
gains Ŵj > 1, as a result of higher income. The opposite is true however in the converse
case. If income is lower than spending in sector h (γhj < α
h
j ), any increase in wages ŵ
h
j > 1
will result into welfare losses Ŵj < 1, as consumers are affected more by price increases
within their own country, given by ŵhj > 1, as they are from higher income. This intuition
also applies to the case of decreasing wages (ŵhj < 1) with inverted signs.
It should be noted that, if average spending is approximately similar to average income in
each sector, γhj − αhj approaches zero and the gains or losses in terms of wages approach
unity. This is the case in international trade if trade deficits are small (given by imports
minus exports), and the case in international tourism if the tourism balance approaches
zero (given by the inbound minus outbound tourism expenditure). For many countries
therefore, the welfare changes in terms of income will be smaller than the welfare changes
in terms of prices. Furthermore, as the tourism sector is smaller in comparison to the
industry sector in many countries, γTj as well as α
T
j will be relatively small and the gains
or losses in terms of income will approach unity for most of the countries with a small
tourism sector. Both these effects are illustrated in Figures C.8 and C.9.
6.3 Data and input parameters
The dataset required for this study needs to consist of bilateral trade and tourism expendit-
ures along with transport costs and gross output data, and must therefore be assembled
10It should be noted that country j’s output elasticities γhj = Y
h
j /Yj are determined endogenously. That
is, in the new partial equilibrium, they actually take the value γhj = Y
h
j
′
/Y
′
j . Given that the expenditure
shares are approximated for many countries for which input-output tables are not available (as described
in Section 6.3), and—considering only small price changes—one can assume that Y hj /Yj ≈ Y hj
′
/Y
′
j .
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from a range of different data sources. Table 6.1 gives an overview. All values refer to
year 2014 data. The variables describing transport supply are self-explanatory and need no
further mention. The text below describes the collection and approximation of the demand
variables.
Table 6.1: Overview of data and input parameters of the realised CGE model
Variable Symbol Unit Trade Tourism
Trade and tourism demand
1 Price elasticity h [-] -5 -4
2 Transport cost share fha /p
h
a [%] OECD MTC Sabre & WB
3 Output elasticity γh [%] calculated calculated
4 Expenditure share αh [%] calculated calculated
5 Income (gross output) Y h [2014 US$] OECD IOTs WTTC
6 Expenditure Xh [2014 US$] calculated WTTC
7 Bilateral expenditure Xha [2014 US$] UN Comtrade calculated
Transport supply
8 Fuel cost share λhfuel [%] 0.5 0.3
9 Fuel price Phfuel(oil) [$/bbl] 75 75
10 Carbon price PCO2 [$/tCO2] variable variable
11 Fuel related CO2 factor ηf [tCO2/tfuel] 3.114 3.156
12 Output related CO2 ηy [gCO2/t.km] 6.5 N/A
factor [gCO2/p.km] N/A 130
13 Round-trip factor κh [-] 1 2
Notes: 1) Trade: e.g. Anderson and Wincoop (2004), Simonovska and Waugh (2014), Head and Mayer (2014),
Bas, Mayer and Thoenig (2015), Shapiro (2016). Tourism: Table 5.1 in Chapter 5. 2) OECD Maritime
Transport Costs (Korinek, 2011), Sabre (2016), World Bank (2017). 5) OECD (2017a) Input-Output tables,
World Travel and Tourism Council (2015). 7) UN Comtrade data via WITS (World Bank, 2016). 8) Sea: own es-
timate using a translog cost function and time charter rates and vessel specific data from Clarkson Research Services
(2014), operating costs from Moore Stephens LLP (2015), and operating characteristics from IMO (2014) and IMO
(2015). Results reveal a fuel cost share of 0.466 for bulk carriers, 0.568 for container ships, and 0.457 for tankers
(containers have higher average sailing speed and thus a higher fuel burn relative to tankers and bulk carriers).
Air: Johnston and Ozment (2013) found a value of 0.314 (this is one of the most recent studies using annual data
from 1987 to 2009); Fischer and Kamerschen (2003) a value of 0.152, Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1984) a
value of 0.196, and Gillen, Oum and Tretheway, 1990 a value of 0.254. 11) Heavy fuel oil: IMO (2012). Jet fuel:
Penner (1999). 12) Sea: Using 11) and average energy intensities from Gucwa and Schäfer (2013). Air: Table 3.1
and 6.1 in Schäfer et al., 2009. 13) See Equation 6.16.
Industry and total output. Trade data is taken from UN Comtrade via the World
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). Trade values refer to total industry trade and include
agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing, mining and quarrying (incl. crude petroleum), man-
ufacturing (of all sectors), electricity, and gas. Not included are the sectors construction,
wholesale and retail trade, and water works and supply.
Gross output and gross industry output values are obtained from the OECD Input-Output
tables (IOTs). The latest available year is 2011. Gross output refers to all economic activity
in all sectors (industry, tourism, and service sectors). Gross industry output refers to the
industry sector.
Gross industry output is calculated for each of the 60 countries for which OECD IOTs are
available, using the industry sectors which match the industry sectors of the UN Comtrade
trade data. Gross output is calculated as gross industry output plus all other output11.
11The sectors in addition to the industry sectors that are considered in the calculation of gross output are:
145
Gross industry output and gross output data is then used—in combination with GDP,
population, and labour data—to estimate gross output and gross industry output values for
each of the countries for which OECD Input-Output tables are not available (see Appendix
C.2 for a detailed description).
A country’s domestic consumption in the industry sector (Xjj) is calculated by subtracting
the total export value from gross industry output. A country’s total consumption in the
industry sector is obtained by adding to this value the total import value. A country’s
total expenditure in all sectors is obtained by subtracting net trade BOP values in goods
and services from gross output. Net trade BOP data is obtained form the World Bank.
Consumption and output data can then be used to calculate expenditure shares αI = XI/X
and output elasticities γI = Y I/Y in the industry sector.
Transport cost shares are obtained from the OECD Maritime Transport Costs (MTC)
database by dividing bilateral transport costs by CIF import values. The data is available
over a 1991-2007 time period and for 43 importing countries (including EU15 countries as
a custom union) from 218 countries of origin12. Transport cost shares are calculated using
data from the last available year an averaged across all product groups by country pairs.
Missing data is estimated using the mean value of all bilateral transport cost measures by
origin and destination country. The same approach and data is used to calculate bilateral
value-to-weight ratios, which, in combination with trade data from WITS and the output
related CO2 factor in Table 6.1, is used to calculate the amount of CO2 released and tax
revenue generated using Equation 6.16. Trade-weighted sea distance data is taken from
Newton (2009) and, in case of missing data, approximated using great-circle distance data
from Mayer and Zignago (2011).
Tourism. Bilateral tourism expenditure is calculated by multiplying per person tourism
expenditure in the destination country with the number of air passengers and iceberg
travel costs by origin and destination country using X¯airji ≈ pint’li τjiNji (Equation 5.23).
The number of air passengers by origin and destination country is obtained from air travel
itinerary data of outbound flights from Sabre (see Appendix B). Iceberg travel costs are
calculated using round-trip airfares by origin and destination country from Sabre and
dividing it by person tourism expenditure in the destination country (see Chapter 5 and
Equation 5.23 in particular). Per person tourism expenditure in the destination country is
calculated from international tourism receipts and international inbound tourists data from
the World Bank. Travel cost shares are then calculated by dividing the average round-trip
airfare per person by the average spending per person in the destination country. The
construction, wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, transport, post and telecommunications,
financial intermediation, real estate, renting, R&D and computer activities, education, health, and social
work.
12The only statistical authorities who collect data on transport costs are the United States, Australia,
New Zealand and Latin America (foremost Argentina and Brazil however). This information has been
made available collectively in the MTC database. See Korinek (2011) for more information.
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number of air passengers by country pair in combination with the output related CO2
factor and round-trip factor in Table 6.1 are used to calculate the amount of CO2 released
and tax revenue generated using Equation 6.16. Great-circle distance data is taken from
Mayer and Zignago (2011).
Gross tourism output Y T is obtained by summing domestic and international tourism
receipts data from the WTTC. Total tourism spending XT is calculated by adding to
the domestic tourism expenditures data from the WTTC13, the sum over all bilateral
expenditures by origin country (see Section 5.3). Consumption and output data can then
be used to calculate expenditure shares αT = XT /X and output elasticities γT = Y T /Y
in the tourism sector.
Industry, tourism, and total output. All data is merged by reporting and parter
countries. The final dataset consists of trade and tourism flows between 123 countries, of
which 18 have a negligibly small tourism sector. Manual data adjustments were necessary
for 17 countries where the sum of expenditure shares and output elasticities exceeded the
value of one. In a last step, bilateral budget shares in each sector were calculated using
Equation 6.8.
6.4 Policy scenario
At the time of writing, commitments towards reducing CO2 from international transport
have been made at the ICAO, but not at the IMO.
In 2010, the ICAO adopted sectoral aspirational goals, including an annual fuel efficiency
improvement of 2% per year and carbon neutral growth from 2020 onwards (ICAO, 2016).
The basket of measures available to achieve these goals include technological advances, op-
erational improvements and the uptake of biofuels. In the short to medium term however
the ICAO acknowledged that these measures are not enough to achieve a carbon neutral
growth from 2020 onwards. The 39th ICAO Assembly therefore agreed on implementing
a Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) by 2020
(ICAO, 2016). In CORSIA, airlines have the option to offset emissions—in excess of the
baseline target of a carbon neutral growth—by buying credits from the carbon market.
Participation in the pilot phase from 2021-23 and first phase from 2024-26 is voluntary.
During the second phase from 2027-35, all states with an individual share of aviation
activities above 0.5% of the total, or whose cumulative share reaches 90% of the total,
are required to participate. Least developed countries, SIDS, and landlocked developing
countries (LLDCs) are exempted from participation, unless they volunteer to participate
in the scheme. The amount of carbon emissions to be reduced each year will be determ-
13Domestic tourism receipts are equivalent to domestic tourism expenditures.
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ined by exceeding 2020 carbon neutral growth levels of all countries participating in the
scheme. The carbon price will be determined by the number of emission units offered
and the number of emission units demanded. Emission units are issued by the UNFCCC
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and forest Degradation in developing countries (REDD+) programme. Because the supply
of credits has far outstripped demand, the prices of Certified Emission Reductions (CER)
credits of the CDM are currently as low as $5 per tonne of CO2 (Economist, 2012). How
the price of CER credits might evolve in the future is difficult to predict. Considering a 5%
p.a. growth rate in air transport, the amount of credits to be purchased each year by the
aviation industry alone would amount to 20 million CER credits. With one billion of CER
credits available however in 2012 (Economist, 2012), the increased demand for CER credits
from the aviation industry is unlikely to cause significant price shifts. If more industries
demand purchasing these credits in a post-Paris world however, prices may raise steadily
and by a significant amount.
In contrast to the aviation industry, the shipping industry has to this date neither put
long-term sectoral aspirational goals in place, nor agreed on a baseline year for peak CO2
emissions (ICS, 2017). Shipping efficiency has been initially approached through the En-
ergy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) in 2011 as well as through mandatory Ship Energy
Efficiency Management Plans (SEEMP). Given the progress made at the UNFCCC in 2015
in Paris and the progress made at the ICAO in 2016, the IMO is under pressure to agree
on CO2 reduction goals as soon as possible. IMO Member States will therefore begin the
development of a road map to reduce CO2 emissions in June 2017, with the intention to
reach agreement of this roadmap by 2018 (ICS, 2017). Should the IMO decide to de-
velop an MBM for international shipping, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)
expressed that its preference would be for a global bunker fuel levy, while arguing that (i)
a significant proportion of the tax revenue should be used for research into the develop-
ment of alternative fuels for shipping and that (ii) any impacts on trade and sustainable
development of developing nations should be addressed appropriately (ICS, 2017).
In line with the aspirations of the maritime transport industry, this study considers the
policy case of introducing a global bunker fuel levy, in the form of a carbon price and
charged per tonne of fuel purchased for consumption. From a modelling perspective, an
exogenously determined carbon price yields into "similar" aggregate predictions as an
endogenously determined carbon price with peak CO2 emissions in a carbon offsetting
scheme or an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The results of this study are therefore also
informative towards determining the demand impacts from CORSIA at different levels of
carbon prices.
The considered policy scenario assumes a balanced transition path of the economy from
an unconstrained to an environmentally-constrained international transport industry at
different levels of carbon prices for each industry individually and jointly. Uptakes in tech-
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nology and operational efficiency improvements are treated endogenously and modelled as
a function of the carbon price as described next. To be able to investigate if global envir-
onmental policies in international transport trigger systematic patterns of discrimination
against economically disadvantaged countries, no countries are exempt from the scheme.
The intuition towards modelling this policy scenario using the theoretical framework out-
lined above is as follows: After the legal framework of the policy scheme has been put into
place at a point in time t, transport firms expect to be charged for the amount of emissions
attributable to them at a point in time t+ 1. Between the two periods t− (t+ 1), trans-
port firms will employ a cost optimisation routine and consider to invest into fuel efficient
technologies and adopt operational efficiency improvement measures to lower their costs.
Along this balanced transition path, the uptake and gradual phase-in of these mitigation
options will take place within the stated time period and reach full deployment at the point
in time t+ 1.
The extent of which technology uptakes and operational patterns materialise into cost
reductions under different carbon prices are often illustrated by marginal abatement cost
(MAC) curves. MAC curves indicate the abatement potential which could be achieved
cost-effectively under different levels of carbon prices. The more mitigations employed, the
higher the cumulative reductions in CO2. As it is economically feasible to first implement
the options with lower marginal cost, MAC curves are designed to show the available
mitigation options by their declining cost-effectiveness. In theory, a continuous increase
in the carbon price over time therefore ensures that the basket of available mitigation
options is exhausted in sequence of declining cost-effectiveness of the mitigation options
employed. Initially, the abatement potential therefore grows rapidly with higher carbon
prices. Once the basket of mitigation measures at lower cost is exhausted however, any
further, substantial reductions in CO2 will be much more difficult to achieve.
This study links the level of technology uptake and operational improvement with levels
of carbon prices using an approximated MAC curve for the aviation, and an approximated
MAC curve for the maritime industry. Each MAC curve is described by a power function
using the CO2 abatement potential and the abatement cost as variables. Appendix C.2
shows the steps undertaken to fit each power function approximation to actual estimates
of the MAC curve, after offsetting the curve to pass through the zero point. This approach
imposes a strong simplification of the complex interactions between abatement potential
and cost, and should therefore be regarded as a first order approximation under limited
modelling capacity14. The approximation is however legitimate, as all other factors influ-
14The extent of which the mitigation options will be adopted not only depends on the carbon price,
but also on the fuel price (see Equation 6.14), technology investment costs, discount rates, current fleet
composition (old vs. new), fleet turnover rates, and the interactions of potential new technology with
current technology (to name but a few). The quantification of technological uptakes and improvements
in operational efficiency, their associated reduction in CO2 and hence operational for cost reduction is
therefore subject of rigorous integrated assessment models in aviation and maritime transport research
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encing the uptake of these measures are assumed to remain unchanged between the initial
and the new equilibrium in the model (see Definition 1).
The offset of the approximated MAC curves to pass through the zero point requires further
clarification. MAC curves of the aviation and shipping fleet indicate substantial potential
of emissions reduction at zero or negative marginal cost (Schäfer et al., 2015; Alvik et
al., 2009). Given their cost-effectiveness, many of these mitigation options are already
pursued by transport firms, despite any environmental taxes in place. Yet, the substantial
amount of mitigation options at zero or negative cost still available illustrate that there may
be significant barriers to implementation as a result of market failures such as liquidity
shortages and information barriers. From an MBM perspective, this is problematic, as
the appearance of these options suggests that a (carbon) price is not a sufficient driver
to ensure a full uptake of these options. This is because of structural inefficiencies in
the system which could arise from many sources including legacy effects, institutional
structures, and contractual failures between ship and aircraft construction, ownership and
operation. To account for these barriers in the model, the MAC curve is offset to pass
through the zero point (see Appendix C.2). As such, the cost associated with these barriers
is fully internalised and assumed to exactly counterbalance the negative differences in cost.
This approach ensures that the mitigation options at zero or negative marginal cost are
accounted for in the model. Their actual cost to implementation may however be different
from this assumption and can only be quantified using sophisticated models, which are
however beyond the scope of this study.
Denoting the percent reductions in CO2 of the transport industry as φ
h = f(PCO2), which
take the form of a power function dependent on the carbon price as described in Appendix
C.2, the cost reductions due to all of the technology and operational efficiency improve-
ments employed by all firms in each sector are given by
ξ˙h
Qh∏
qh=1
(ϑ̂hq )
ε
qh
ϑ ≡ (χ′)−φh(·)λhfuel . (6.24)
At any given carbon price therefore, the mitigation options employed by a transport firm
reduces its operational cost by the amount of CO2 mitigated through the implementation
of these options. It should be noted that at any given carbon price, not all of the mitigation
options that are available will be adopted. Only the ones that are cost-effective will be
considered by the transport firm at different levels of carbon prices.
From the overall cost increases the transport firm faces
(
χ′
)λhfuel , the amount φh (·) will
be offset by the uptake of technology, whereas the amount 1 − φh (·) will be passed on
the consumers in the form of price increases. To see this, Equation 6.24 can be used to
and therefore beyond the scope of this analysis.
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substitute for the technology and operational cost part in Equation 6.20 to give
Ĉhτ =
(
χ′
)λhfuel ξ˙h Qh∏
qh=1
(ϑ̂hq )
ε
qh
ϑ =
(
χ′
)(1−φh(·))λhfuel .
In combination with Equation 6.16, the tax revenue is then calculated from the remaining
amount of CO2 released and the carbon price
RCO2 = PCO2
H∑
h=1
(
1− φh(·)
)
ηhyκ
h
I∑
i=1
I∑
j=1
QhDha , a = {ij, ji} . (6.25)
Equation 6.24 in combination with the power functions described in Appendix C.2 allow
to obtain realistic values of changes in a firms’ total costs without the need to specify
dedicated models for technology uptakes and operational efficiency improvements. Any
barriers to technology uptake, operational constraints, or volatility in carbon or oil prices
(to name but a few) would violate the equilibrium condition described above and therefore
result into higher (or lower) price increases as the ones calculated. The base case scenario
underlying these calculations can therefore only reflect a balanced transition path of the
transport industry over time.
Given that not all of the costs increases can be offset cost-effectively by the uptake of
technology and operational mitigation strategies means that environmental policies in in-
ternational transport eventually lead to demand implications in the form of price increases
in each country.
How large can we expect the resulting price changes to be? Assuming that changes in wages
remain insignificant (ŵi = 1, for this section only) and that 50% of the cost increases can be
offset by technology, Equation 6.21, in combination with Equations 6.15 and 6.24, simplifies
to
p̂ha = 1 +
fha
pha
(1 + ηfPCO2
Pfuel(oil)
)0.5λhfuel
− 1
 , a = {ij, ji.} (6.26)
A key variable to quantifying the changes in prices is therefore the share of transport costs
in overall prices fha /p
h
a, which takes an average value of 0.05 for manufacturing trade (Table
A.2) and 0.83 for tourism (Table B.2). Given that transport costs only account for a small
price share in international trade, the price increases in international trade will be much
smaller than in international tourism.
Assuming a carbon price of $25/tCO2 and using the parameter values listed in Table 6.1,
results (conditional on the wage adjustment) into a net price increase of 0.2% of goods
imports and a 1.8% price increase of outbound tourism activities. Increasing the carbon
price to $150/tCO2 results into price increases of 0.9% of goods imports and a 8.5% price
increase of outbound tourism activities as illustrated in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of net price increases in trade and tourism as a result of a carbon emissions
pricing scheme in international transport, assuming a 50% cost reduction due to technology uptake
and operational efficiency improvements.
Although the changes in wages are not yet taken into account at this stage, these results
already demonstrate that consumers of outbound tourism services will be confronted with
higher price increases as consumers of goods imports. Yet, how these cost increases will
influence the aggregate consumer price index in each country will be determined by the
expenditure share αh and output elasticity γh. In comparison to trade, these shares are
much smaller in tourism, thus leading to smaller welfare impacts.
On an aggregated consumers level therefore, given (i) the aggregated income and spending
shares of trade and tourism in each country, (ii) the small share of international transport
costs in prices on the demand side, and (iii) the small share of fuel costs in overall trans-
port costs on the supply side, the price changes associated with environmental policies in
international trade and tourism can be expected to generally remain small. Changes in a
country’s consumer price index in each sector, in combination with the income elasticity
in Table 6.1, will then reveal the changes in real income in each country as per Equation
6.23.
6.5 Results
The welfare impacts associated with a carbon emission pricing schemes in international
transport are dependent on the level of transport costs relative to consumer prices and a
country’s economic dependence on foreign spending and income. Figures 6.2, 6.3, 6.5, and
6.6 display15 price asymmetries in the industry and tourism sectors across countries (no
data could be obtained for countries coloured in grey). The comparison of the two figures
in each sector indicates the level and thus importance of transport costs in international
trade and tourism. Figures 6.4 and 6.7 visualise the calculated changes in real income.
Starting with the industry sector, Figures 6.2 and 6.3 display asymmetries in supply prices
15Vector map data is obtained from Natural Earth.
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and transport costs across countries.
The supply price in the industry sector refers to the price at the factory gate, exclusive of
any transport costs (the FOB value), and is calculated by dividing the total export value
(Y Ii - X
I
jj) by the total export quantity (Q
I
i - Q
I
jj) in each country. The calculated prices
at the factory gate are therefore indicative of the per-unit value of the exported goods. If
data on a country’s productivity level zi were available, the asymmetries in supply prices
could be used to show asymmetries in industry wages across countries. As CGE models
merely calculate changes relative to a baseline however (the numeraire), the price levels
need not be determined uniquely. As shown in Equation 6.23, only the differences in wages
are calculated. The data displayed in Figure 6.2 is therefore not used in the CGE model
to compute changes in real income. They are however useful to illustrate the relative
importance of transport costs in international trade.
The data in Figure 6.2 indicates that supply prices are higher in countries with a focus on
manufacturing exports (such as the US, Europe, China and India) and lower in resource
producing countries (such as Russia, Australia, Canada, and Brazil). The absolute numbers
in Figure 6.2, ranging from values close to zero to 17.4$/kg, need to be interpreted with
caution however as inaccuracies exist in the approximation of the total quantity exported
(as these values are not observed in trade data), especially in countries with a relatively
low industry output, exacerbating the statistical error, as is the case for countries in Africa
for example.
Figure 6.3 illustrates the role of transport costs in international trade by origin country.
The data in this figure is calculated by dividing total transport costs
∑I
i 6=j
i=1
qIijf
I
ij by the
total export value Y Ij −XIjj (CIF) and is therefore indicative for the level of transport costs
a country faces to export their goods to foreign countries. The total export value is also
given by
∑I
i 6=j
i=1
qIijp
I
ij =
∑I
i 6=j
i=1
qIijw
I
i τ
I
ij/z
I
i . The average share of total transport costs in the
total export value can therefore also be expressed as
∑I
i 6=j
i=1
f Iijq
I
ij/
∑I
i 6=j
i=1
(
w
I
i /z
I
i + f
I
ij
)
qIij .
Relative to total export values, the data in Figure 6.3 illustrates that transport costs are
highest (with values above 20%) for resource exporting countries, such as Australia, Russia,
Brazil and Canada, as a result of the relatively lower per per-unit values (low pij) of the
exported goods. Remoteness, leading to higher transport costs (high fij), however, also
plays a role. Figure 6.3 also indicates that a common pattern of high versus low transport
costs across developed versus developing countries cannot be identified.
Figure 6.4 illustrates changes in real income Ŵj (using Equation 6.23) across countries,
after a carbon price of $300/tCO2 on goods trade by sea has been introduced. These
results represent general equilibrium results which are obtained from the realised CGE
model. Figure 6.4 is different from Figure 6.3 as it also includes a country’s economic
dependency on the industry sector—in terms of spending αIj as well as income γ
I
j—and
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the equilibrium changes in wages. Figure 6.4 therefore gives the only coherent view on the
welfare impacts associated with carbon emissions pricing schemes in international trade.
Since the carbon revenue is not used as a rebated lump-sum to consumers, all countries face
a reduction in real income, after a carbon emissions pricing scheme in the international
maritime industry has been introduced. All values shown in Figure 6.4 are therefore
negative. Figure 6.4 illustrates that it is not developing countries who will perceive the
highest welfare losses. Rather, the opposite is the case: Russia, Canada, Australia and
Saudi Arabia are among Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, South Africa, Vietnam
and Egypt with the highest welfare losses of around 0.1%. Countries with high entrepôt
trade, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Singapore, and Hong Kong also experience a
higher welfare loss16. The extent of which policies are discriminating against developing
countries or countries with a low GDP per capita will be evaluated in detail further below.
The relative differences in welfare impacts across countries displayed in Figure 6.4 will
remain approximately identical under higher carbon prices, as a result of the underlying
modelling assumptions. The model also assumes that the introduction of or a change in the
carbon price does not have any influence on the transport network and trade routes. This
can be seen from Equation 6.21, where the only bilateral variable relating to transport
costs to calculate changes in the consumer prices is in fact the share of transport costs
in consumer prices f Iij/p
I
ij . To account for competitive pricing with variable markups in
the transport industry, one would need to make the increase in transport costs ĈIτ to be
dependent on trade routes. Given that transport costs are however only a small fraction
of consumer prices (Figure 6.4) and that a country only buys a small amount from foreign
countries17, incorporating such price dynamics on selective trade routes would result into
only marginally different results.
Continuing with the tourism sector, Figures 6.2 and 6.5 display asymmetries in supply
prices and transport costs across countries in the tourism sector.
The supply price in the tourism sector refers to the price paid by foreign visitors in the
destination country, exclusive of any travel costs, and is calculated by dividing the total
of international tourism receipts Y Tj − XTjj by the total number of international tourist
arrivals in each country NTj − NTjj . The calculated prices in the destination country are
therefore indicative of the amount spent on tourism activities (including the prices paid
for accommodation) per visitor for all tourism activities in each country on average. If
data on the number of activities consumed in each country over a given time period were
available, the asymmetries in supply prices could be transformed to show asymmetries in
tourism wages across countries.
16Import values are manually adjusted to account for re-exports.
17Changes in real income are calculated on a country level. This is accomplished by aggregation over all
trade routes, including the ones, which may not subject to any variable markups.
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0.03
18.71
Figure 6.2: Average supply price wizi [$/kg] (Trade)
1.14
26.23
Figure 6.3: Average transport costs relative to consumer prices fij/pij [%] (Trade)
−0.06
−0.69
Figure 6.4: Change in real income Ŵj [%] due to a carbon price of $300/tCO2 in international
sea transport (Trade)
The data in Figure 6.5 indicates that the prices paid by international inbound visitors
are higher in developed countries (US, UK, Sweden, Switzerland, Australia) and lower in
developing countries (such as Mexico, China, Algeria, Egypt). Among others, one reason
for this are the relatively lower wages in developing countries. Another reason is that
the tourism sector is relatively less developed in some of these countries, thus offering
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373.64
4967.53
Figure 6.5: Average supply price wi [$/int’l inbound tourist] (Tourism)
27.85
64.32
Figure 6.6: Average travel costs relative to consumer prices fji/pji [%] (Tourism)
0
−1.7
Figure 6.7: Change in real income Ŵj [%] due to a carbon price of $300/tCO2 in international
air transport (Tourism)
less tourism services for visitors to consume. The average prices paid by tourists in each
country range from as low as $325 per person to as high as $5,000 per person. As in the case
above for average supply prices in the industry sector, statistical reporting issues however
exist. Australia for example is among the countries where average tourism spending per
person is highest. International tourism receipts include payments to national carriers
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for international transport. Hence, flights from London to Sydney using the flag carrier
airline of Australia (Qantas) are included in this statistic, whereas flights from London to
Sydney using e.g. the flag carrier airline of the UK (British Airways) are not. Hence, as
some of the airfares paid by tourists are taken into account proportionally, the reported
international tourism receipts are higher for countries with a flag carrier airline, as is the
case for Australia for example. The statistical error of the amount of travel costs included
in prices (or in total international tourism receipts respectively) is exacerbated for remote
countries (resulting into higher travel costs) in combination with relatively lower supply
prices (or spending per person), as is the case for India for example.
The data depicted in Figure 6.5 is used to calculate bilateral tourism flows Xji as these
are not observed in the data. They therefore also play a role in determining the value
of transport costs relative to consumer prices between country pairs given by fTji/p
T
ji =
fTjiN
T
ji/
[(
pint’li + f
T
ji
)
NTji
]
= fTji/
(
pint’li + f
T
ji
)
, where pint’li ≈ wTi .
Figure 6.6 illustrates the role of transport costs in international tourism by destination
country. The data in this figure is calculated by dividing total international travel costs∑I
i 6=j
i=1
fTjiN
T
ji by total international tourism receipts Y
T
j − XTjj (inclusive of travel costs).
These numbers are therefore indicative for the level of transport costs a country faces
to receive international inbound tourists from all over the world. International tourism
receipts are also given by
∑I
i 6=j
i=1
NTjip
T
ji =
∑I
i 6=j
i=1
NTjiw
T
i τ
T
ji . The average share of total
travel costs in total international tourism receipts can therefore also be expressed as∑I
i 6=j
i=1
fTjiN
T
ji/
∑I
i 6=j
i=1
(
w
T
i + f
T
ji
)
Nji. Relative to total international tourism receipts, the
data illustrates that the travel costs are higher (with values up to 64%) for countries where
supply prices are lowest, as is the case in most of Africa and Latin America, as well as
Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and Mongolia, next to China and most of South East Asia. Given
that travel costs take up a significant share of the overall prices paid by international in-
bound tourists as indicated in Figure 6.6, remoteness, leading to higher travel costs, plays
a more significant role in tourism than in trade. Figure 6.6 also indicates that a common
pattern of high versus low travel costs across developed versus developing countries cannot
be identified.
Figure 6.7 illustrates the change in real income Ŵ (using Equation 6.23) across coun-
tries, after a carbon price of $300/tCO2 on passenger travel by air has been introduced.
These results represent general equilibrium results and also include a country’s economic
dependency on the tourism sector—in terms of spending αTj as well as income γ
T
j —and
the equilibrium changes in wages. Figure 6.7 therefore gives the only coherent view of the
welfare impacts associated with carbon emissions pricing schemes in international tourism.
As is the case for international trade, the carbon revenue in international tourism is not
used as a rebated lump-sum to consumers, and all countries therefore face a reduction in
real income after a carbon emissions pricing scheme in the international aviation industry
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has been introduced. All values shown in Figure 6.7 are therefore negative. The countries
with the highest welfare impacts are the Maldives, Fiji, Cyprus, Jamaica, Cambodia, St.
Lucia, Malta, and Mauritius (given their small size, they are hardly visible in the plot).
These results indicate that most of the small island developing states (SIDS) will be among
the countries with the highest welfare impacts due to two main reasons. First, given their
remoteness, travel costs are high and therefore take up a significant share of the overall costs
faced by international inbound tourists to visit these countries (high fji/pji). Small changes
in travel costs therefore lead to relatively higher reductions in demand. Second, tourism
represents a major source of income for SIDS (high γTj ) and changes in real income in the
tourism sector are therefore felt by the entire economy. On an absolute level, the welfare
losses can therefore also be higher in the tourism than in the industry sector as a result
of relatively high travel costs in combination with a relatively high economic dependence
on foreign tourism income. While many countries also have a high economic dependence
on foreign spending and income in the industry sector, the transport costs in international
trade remain generally low, which thus leads to smaller welfare impacts. Finally, examining
the larger group of all developing countries against a common pattern of higher welfare
impacts leads to the conclusion that such a pattern cannot be identified from Figure 6.7.
The extent of which developing countries and SIDS are subject to systematically higher
welfare losses will be analysed in detail further below.
Before turning to the general results, total transport output and CO2 emissions of the
realised and actual transport system are compared against each other. Table 6.2 gives an
overview. Within the limits of the realised model, consisting of trade and tourism between
123 countries, the numbers compare well to the values in the literature and can therefore
be used as benchmark for calculating the tax revenue.
Table 6.2: Validation of the realised international maritime and air transport system in 2014
Variable Unit Int’l maritime industry Int’l aviation industry
model literature model literature
Transport work RTK billion t.km 88,403 97,363 N/A N/A
Transport work RPK billion p.km N/A N/A 3,366 3,838
Emissions million tCO2 575 607 438 454
Notes: Literature values obtained from UNCTAD (2014), ICAO (2014), and IEA (2015). Table 1.1 contains
detailed emission values by transport sector.
The realised CGE model is used to investigate changes in real income in each country at car-
bon prices ranging between $25/tCO2-$300/tCO2. The employed optimisation algorithm
builds on the work of Head and Mayer (2014) and solves for the vector of equilibrium
wages given by Equation 6.22 using a dampening factor. The algorithm has been extended
to additionally account for dynamic price changes as a result of changes in wages given
by Equation 6.21. To ensure model convergence, the dampening factor for the dynamic
changes in prices is set at a slightly lower value than the dampening factor for the changes
in wages. The magnitude of the dynamic prices changes remain generally small (as illus-
trated in Figures C.2 and C.3) but are of quantitative importance given that a carbon
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price in international transport also only induces small changes in prices. In addition, the
algorithm has been extended to solve for equilibrium changes in wages in international
tourism. This can be accomplished by interchanging the origin and destination indices be-
fore starting the optimisation run, provided that the data structure adheres to the notation
used in this chapter (using the indices ij for trade and ji for tourism).
Table 6.3 contain the results of changes in real income in the industry and tourism
sector after a carbon emissions pricing scheme has been imposed on the international
transport industries. Column 2 in each table reports the average price increase across
countries of consumer goods and services, which are purchased from foreign countries18.
Column 3 reports the average changes across countries in domestic expenditures in the
industry and tourism sectors. Average changes in real income (abbrev. RI) per capita
in column 4 and changes in Gross World Product (GWP) in column 5 are calculated us-
ing
∑I
j=1 Yj
(
Ŵj − 1
)
/
∑I
j=1 Lj and
∑I
j=1GDPj
(
Ŵj − 1
)
respectively, where the total
number of workers L and GDP data in each country is taken from the World Bank. The
tax revenue in column 6 and total CO2 abatement potential in column 7 are calculated
using Equations 6.25 and 6.24. Finally, the economic cost in column 8 is calculated by
dividing the change in GWP by the total change in CO2 abatement.
Depending on the carbon price ranging from $25/tCO2 to $300/tCO2, the price increases
of goods imports range from 0.3% to 1.2% (column 2). As a result of these price increases,
the goods produced domestically become relatively cheaper. Consumers (as well as firms)
therefore purchase a larger quantity of goods produced domestically. The results in Table
6.3 indicate that this increase in domestic consumption amounts to 0.5% to 2.1% (column
3). As domestically produced goods are more expensive than imported goods, this shift
causes an increase in the consumer price index and hence a reduction in demand. The
price increases are therefore felt by consumers (through an increase in the price index)
as well as by firms in the industry sector (through a reduction in demand). Table 6.3
shows that per capita real income is reduced by $15 to $58 on average (column 4). GWP19
reduces by $24 billion to $93 billion (column 5). Although the supply induced price changes
remain relatively small, the impacts in terms of real income and GDP are large. This is
because international trade broadly affects all consumers in a country as a result of a large
consumption share and a relatively large income from the industry sector. The total tax
revenue raised by the carbon emissions pricing scheme in international maritime transport
reaches $13 billion to $78 billion per year (column 6), while 52 Mt to 316 Mt of transport
related CO2 are abated cost-effectively each year (column 7; assuming zero growth in
maritime transport output over time). In the maritime transport industry, the maximum
18It should be noted that these numbers do neither represent changes in the consumer price index nor
"net" increases in transport prices. The relative price changes in column 2 in the Table 6.3 refer to price
changes of imported goods or price changes of tourism services. The goods price is inclusive of transport
costs. The price paid for tourism services includes the costs paid for (air) travel.
19Approximated by adding up the GDP of all of the 123 countries in the dataset.
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Table 6.3: International trade and tourism in a CO2-constrained world
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Carbon Av. Av. Av. delta Delta Tax Delta Economic
price p̂Iij λ̂
I
jj RI GWP rev. CO2 cost
$/tCO2 % % $/cap. $bn $bn MtCO2 $GWP/tCO2
International trade in a CO2-constrained world
25 .3 .5 -15 -24 13 -52 464
50 .5 .9 -26 -42 24 -96 438
75 .7 1.3 -35 -55 33 -133 415
100 .9 1.5 -41 -65 41 -166 394
125 1 1.7 -46 -73 48 -194 375
150 1 1.8 -49 -78 53 -219 358
175 1.1 1.9 -52 -83 58 -241 343
200 1.1 2 -53 -86 63 -260 329
225 1.2 2 -55 -88 67 -278 316
250 1.2 2.1 -56 -89 70 -294 304
275 1.2 2.1 -56 -90 73 -308 293
300 1.2 2.1 -58 -93 78 -316 293
International tourism in a CO2-constrained world
25 1.7 2.6 -5 -7 10 -26 291
50 3.1 4.7 -9 -13 20 -46 288
75 4.3 6.4 -12 -18 28 -63 285
100 5.3 7.9 -14 -22 36 -77 282
125 6.1 9.1 -16 -25 44 -89 280
150 6.9 10.2 -18 -28 51 -100 277
175 7.5 11.2 -19 -30 58 -109 275
200 8.1 12 -21 -32 64 -117 273
225 8.6 12.7 -22 -34 70 -125 271
250 9.1 13.4 -23 -35 76 -132 269
275 9.5 14 -24 -37 82 -138 267
300 9.9 14.5 -25 -38 88 -144 265
International trade and tourism in a CO2-constrained world
25 - - -20 -31 23 -77 407
50 - - -35 -55 44 -142 389
75 - - -46 -73 61 -196 373
100 - - -55 -87 77 -242 359
125 - - -62 -98 91 -283 345
150 - - -67 -106 104 -318 333
175 - - -71 -113 116 -350 322
200 - - -74 -118 127 -378 311
225 - - -77 -122 137 -403 302
250 - - -79 -125 147 -426 293
275 - - -80 -127 156 -446 285
300 - - -83 -131 166 -460 284
Notes: The base year for calculations is 2014 using data and input parameters as
specified in Table 6.1.
potential of mitigation options is exhausted at a carbon price of approximately $300/tCO2
(Alvik et al., 2009; IMO, 2011a). Table 6.3 therefore stops at a carbon price of $300/tCO2.
Finally, column 8 of Table 6.3 indicates that it costs between $293 and $490 in GWP to
reduce one tonne of CO2 in the maritime transport industry (column 8). This cost is
decreasing with higher carbon prices. That is, the higher the carbon price, the less the
economic cost to reduce a further tonne of CO2 in the international maritime transport
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industry.
The relative price increases in the tourism sector are larger than the price increases in the
industry sector. This is because the transport related costs (air travel costs) represent a
much larger share of the prices paid of international inbound visitors for tourism activities
(including hotel expenses etc.) in the destination country20 (Table B.2). Depending on
the carbon price ranging from $25/tCO2 to $300/tCO2, the results indicate that the lump-
sum price increases in tourism range from 1.7% to 9.9%. The relative changes to the
tourism sector are therefore substantial, even at relatively low carbon prices. Domestic
tourism expenditure increases range from 2.6% to (as large as) 14.5%. On the other hand,
reductions in per capita real income are smaller in tourism than in trade, and range form
$5 to (only) $25 on average. This is because the tourism sector only represents a small
share of overall spending and income in each country (given by small values of αTj and γ
T
j ).
Connected to this are smaller reductions in GWP, ranging from $7 billion to $38 billion
per year. Given the high energy intensity of air travel, the total tax revenue raised by the
carbon emissions pricing scheme in international air transport reaches $10 billion to $88
billion per year, while 26 Mt to 144 Mt of transport related CO2 are abated cost-effectively
each year (assuming zero growth in air transport output over time). The tax revenue and
abatement potential in the international air transport industry are therefore comparable in
levels to the tax revenue and abatement potential in the international maritime transport
industry. Similarities in these numbers are a direct result of the combination of differences
in scale and energy efficiency. While sea transport is a large scale industry, the release
of CO2 per unit of transport output (in tonne-km) is low (Table 6.1). In comparison to
maritime transport, (international) air transport is still a relatively small industry (Table
6.2), but with much a higher release of CO2 per unit of transport output (in passenger-km).
Finally, column 8 of Table 6.3 indicates that it costs between $265 and $291 in GWP to
reduce one tonne of CO2 in the international air transport industry. As in the case above,
this cost is decreasing with higher carbon prices. That is, the higher the carbon price, the
less the economic cost to reduce a further tonne of CO2 in the international air transport
industry.
The lower part of Table 6.3 combines the trade and tourism results so as to show the
demand implications along with the CO2 abatement potential if the carbon emissions
pricing scheme is jointly applied to both the international maritime and air transport
industry. In this case, per capita real income reduces by $20 to $83 and GWP reduces by
$31 billion to $131 billion per year, while the tax revenue reaches $23 billion to $166 billion
with a CO2 abatement potential of 77 Mt to 460 Mt per year. Putting these numbers into
context reveals an economic cost of $284 to $407 in GWP per tonne of CO2.
The results in Table 6.3 are dependent on the price elasticities of demand in each sector.
20It should be noted that these numbers do not represent relative changes in airfares. Rather, they are
reflective of how much the overall expenditure for tourism, inclusive of travel costs, increases.
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The results of running the CGE model with higher and lower elasticities than the ones
specified in Table 6.3 are shown in Tables C.1 and C.2 in Appendix C.3. The price in-
creases in both sectors due to a carbon tax in international transport are unaffected by
the value of the demand elasticity (column 2 of Tables C.1 and C.2). A higher demand
elasticity however results into smaller welfare impacts as demand is relatively more elastic.
In this case, a higher amount of foreign spending is substituted with domestic spending
(see Equation 6.6). The opposite is true for lower values of the demand elasticities where
a smaller amount of foreign spending is substituted with domestic spending. The value of
the demand elasticity therefore results into significant changes in domestic spending Xhjj
as indicated by the changes in relative domestic expenditures λ̂hjj in each sector (column
3 in Tables C.1 and C.2). Because real income is affected by both changes in income
and changes in foreign spending (Equation 6.23), the changes real income remain largely
unaffected by the changes in the demand elasticities. Slightly higher impacts due to lower
demand elasticities as well as slightly lower smaller impacts due to higher demand elasti-
cities become however visible at higher carbon prices. The calculation of the delta in GWP
takes the changes in real income as input and therefore mirrors these observations. The tax
revenue and CO2 abatement potential are solely related to the components of transport
supply and remain therefore unaffected by changes in the demand elasticities. As a result
of only marginal changes in GWP and no changes in CO2 abatement, the economic cost
in terms of GWP to reduce one tonne of CO2 in international transport is robust with
respect to changes in the demand elasticities as indicated by the results in column 8 of
Tables 6.3, C.1, and C.2.
Another key finding not yet described in detail is the declining trend of the economic cost
in GWP per tonne of CO2 with higher carbon prices which is apparent in all sectors, even
at higher or lower demand elasticities. In other words, the economic cost to reduce one
additional tonne of CO2 in international transport becomes smaller at higher carbon prices.
This declining trend is a result of the differences between the rate of GWP and the rate of
CO2 abatement (noting that both of them are non-linear trends however). The abatement
potential of both transport industries is higher at higher carbon prices as indicated by the
MAC curves in Figure C.1 and in Alvik et al. (2009) and IMO (2011a). The results in
Tables 6.3, C.1, and C.2 indicate that the CO2 abatement in both industries occurs faster
than changes in prices materialise into changes in GWP, which thus explains the declining
trend in economic cost. Once the maximum CO2 abatement potential is reached however,
the delta in CO2 would remain constant while the GWP would continue to decline. After
the maximum CO2 abatement potential has been reached therefore, the economic cost
to reduce one additional tonne of CO2 would start to increase again (not shown in the
results).
What carbon price should be adopted? A higher carbon price leads to higher reductions in
CO2 and a higher tax revenue on the one hand, but also to higher reductions in real income
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and GWP on the other. The economic cost per unit reduction in CO2 is decreasing with
higher carbon prices. At high carbon prices however, both industries could potentially
reach their maximum abatement potential. This limit may shift further upwards if R&D
spending in both industries increases as a result of the introduction of carbon emission
pricing schemes.
The carbon price of $150/tCO2 deserves particular mention. The results in Table 6.3
illustrate that at a carbon price of approximately $150/tCO2 applied to both the aviation
and the maritime transport industry would yield a tax revenue of approximately $100
billion per year. The international transport industries could therefore—within reasonable
limits (as illustrated by Figure 7.1)—become the primary source of global climate finance,
through mobilising 100$ billion per year, representing the agreed collective quantified goal
to assist developing country Parties under the Paris agreement with respect to mitigating
and adapting to climate change (UNFCCC, 2015; see Section 2.4). The carbon price
of approximately $150/tCO2 therefore indicates a benchmark for policy design if both
international transport industries are mandated to become the primary source of finance
for the global climate fund.
As the policy scenario investigated does not account for any rebate mechanism, the results
obtained from the CGE model can also be used to investigate if carbon emissions pricing
schemes in international transport would lead to any form of discrimination, most notably,
against developing economies. Using the changes in real income (in percent) as dependent
variable and three binary variables, one accounting for developing economies, one for SIDS,
and one for LLDCs, the probability of a systematic pattern of discrimination against these
three country groups can be evaluated in a logistic regression. Table 6.4 contains the
results.
A systematic pattern of discrimination against developing countries for the international
maritime, the international aviation, and the combined policy scheme cannot be identified.
The null hypothesis of a systematic pattern of discrimination against developing countries
is rejected at the 1% in all of these cases. If these schemes were discriminating, the coef-
ficient estimate of the corresponding binary variable would need to take a negative value,
thus indicating a systematic pattern of higher reductions in real income Ŵ < 1 for these
countries. Table 6.4 however shows that this is not the case. The empirical results also
support the results in Figures 6.2 and 6.3, where a common pattern of high versus low
transport costs across developed versus developing countries cannot be identified. Many
developing countries specialise in the manufacturing of goods that can be produced com-
petitively using lower wages. These goods have a relatively higher unit value than e.g.
goods in resources trade, and the share of transport costs in overall prices is therefore
lower. This in turn leads to relatively lower price increases and explains why developing
countries are less prone to large price shifts and hence welfare impacts. In international
tourism, the welfare impacts can either be relatively larger or smaller, given that tourism
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represents a major source of income for some of the developing countries (high γTj ), but not
for others (low γTj ). These differences do not lead to a pattern of systematic discrimination,
as illustrated by the results in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Tests for discrimination against economically disadvantaged countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable
Variable Ŵ Ij Ŵ
T
j Ŵj Ŵ
I
j Ŵ
T
j Ŵj
Developing country [binary] 0.09 0.51 0.26 0.10 0.11 0.10
(3.5) (12.8) (10.1) (4.2) (4.3) (5.9)
SIDS [binary] 0.27 -1.40 -0.62 0.27 -0.66 -0.15
(4.9) (-24.3) (-13.4) (4.4) (-21.1) (-5.5)
LLDCs [binary] 0.43 -0.02 0.26 0.42 -0.26 0.15
(14.2) (-0.3) (7.9) (15.1) (-8.2) (6.7)
GDP per capita [$/cap] - - - 1.0e-06 2.2e-06 1.7e-06
(2.8) (4.2) (5.8)
Carbon price [$/tCO2] - - - -1.6e-03 -1.5e-03 -1.6e-03
(-34.1) (-26.8) (-43.5)
Expenditure share αIj [-] - - - -1.55 -1.19 -1.36
(-21.4) (-18.4) (-29.6)
Income elasticity γIj [-] - - - 1.47 1.09 1.21
(19.4) (16.2) (23.3)
Expenditure share αTj [-] - - - -9.15 -24.12 -12.07
(-9) (-42.4) (-25.7)
Income elasticity γTj [-] - - - 3.85 -1.32 -1.51
(6.7) (-7.5) (-9.2)
χ
2 test H0 : βDevl. ≤ 0 0.0002 0 0 0 0 0
χ
2 test H0 : βSIDS ≤ 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
χ
2 test H0 : βLLDCs ≤ 0 0 0.6344 0 0 1 0
Notes: Each column represents a separate logistic regression using GLM (Papke and Wooldridge,
1996) and 3,444 computed observations at different levels of carbon prices. Z-statistics are reported
in parentheses. "Developing country", "SIDS", and "LLDCs" are binary variables, which take the
value of one if the country is a developing country or a SIDS, and zero otherwise.
The null hypothesis of a systematic pattern of discrimination against SIDS is rejected at the
1% level for the international maritime policy scheme. The opposite case is however true
for the international aviation, and the combined policy scheme, where the null hypothesis
is failed to be rejected at the 1% level. SIDS will therefore, on average, experience a higher
loss in real income than all other countries participating in the international aviation or
combined policy scheme, a pattern, which can be explained by the following two reasons.
First, SIDS are remote islands and the travel costs paid by tourists to get there are therefore
high. As a result, the overall prices paid by international inbound tourists in these countries
includes a high proportion of transport costs. A change in transport costs will therefore
lead to relatively higher impacts on prices and hence demand. Second, the economy of
SIDS is largely dependent on the tourism sector, which thus results into a high value of
the income elasticity γTj . In combination with a relatively low domestic spending in the
sector (low αIj ), the reductions in wages ŵ
T
j < 1 (as a result of less international inbound
tourists), lead to large reductions in real income Ŵj (see Equation 6.23).
The case for LLDC’s is less clear. The null hypothesis of a systematic pattern of dis-
crimination against LLDCs is rejected at the 1% level for the international maritime and
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combined policy scheme, but is failed to be rejected at the 1% level for the international
aviation policy scheme. The discrepancies in the results in column 3 and 6 are a result
of the underlying data limitations. For one third of the LLDCs analysed, no data on do-
mestic and outbound tourism expenditure could be obtained. The expenditure share for
these countries is therefore zero. Once these countries are excluded from the regression,
the null hypothesis of a systematic pattern of discrimination against LLDCs is failed to
be rejected at the 1% level for the international aviation policy scheme in column 3 as
well (not shown). The results in column 6 control for these data limitations by holding
the expenditure shares and income elasticities fixed, and are therefore the preferred estim-
ates. The systematic pattern of discrimination against LLDCs can be explained as follows.
LLDCs are geographically remote countries (given that they are land-locked), and there-
fore also face (similar to SIDS) higher transport costs. The calculated data supports this
claim: average travel costs relative to consumer prices fji/pji are systematically higher
than for all other countries in the dataset. Faye et al. (2004) argue in similar ways. Like
SIDS therefore, LLDCs will be exposed to higher welfare impacts due to relatively larger
price changes in tourism. In the combined policy scheme, no systematic pattern of dis-
crimination against LLDCs can be identified. This is because the industry sector is much
larger than the tourism sector in almost all of the LLDCs. The welfare changes due to
tourism therefore become insignificant relative to the welfare changes due to trade.
All other results in Table 6.4 are robust against the inclusion of additional explanatory
variables, such as GDP per capita, the carbon price as well as expenditure shares and
income elasticities. The coefficient estimates of GDP per capita and carbon price are small
in absolute value as a result of their relatively large scale if measured in $/capita and
$/tCO2. The coefficient estimates of the expenditure shares and income elasticities have
the expected sign. A country spending more on international trade and tourism will be
subject to price increases of a lager share of goods and activities and therefore experience a
higher welfare loss. Vice versa, countries with large domestic industry and tourism sectors
can compensate the welfare loss with a higher spending on domestic goods and services.
In the tourism sector however (column 6), the income elasticity obtains a negative value
as a result of the large asymmetries in terms of spending (αTj ) and income (γ
T
j ) in many
countries.
6.6 Summary
Carbon emissions pricing schemes in international transport trigger changes in consumer
prices worldwide, the extent of which is dependent on the level of transport costs relative to
consumer prices, and the shares of a country’s foreign spending and income in the industry
and tourism sectors. To quantify these price changes and the resulting implications in terms
of demand, this chapter developed a computational general equilibrium model of the world
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economy, consisting of the industry, tourism, and international transport sectors. Demand
is modelled using the gravity equations for international trade and tourism; transport
supply is modelled using a cost function of a representative transport firm, with a reduced-
form power function of endogenous technology uptake and operational improvements. Both
models are linked using equilibrium prices.
In equilibrium supply equals demand. Introducing a price shock to consumer prices in
trade and tourism as a result of a carbon tax in international transport introduces economic
imbalances in income and spending in each country. Using counterfactual exercises, the
changes in prices, spending, and income between the initial (without a carbon tax) and the
new equilibrium (with a carbon tax on international transport) can be made dependent on
only variable, the vector of wages in each country. A CGE model of the trade, tourism and
international transport sectors is then obtained by employing an optimization algorithm
to solve for the changes in wages in each sector and country. The CGE model is based on
2014 economic data from a range of different data sources, including input output tables
and transport costs data from the OECD, trade data from the UN Comtrade database,
trade BOP data, international tourism receipts and international inbound tourists data
from the World Bank, as well as domestic tourism receipts data from the WTTC. Demand
elasticities are taken from the literature (trade) and Chapter 5 (tourism).
In international trade, the data indicates that transport costs relative to the goods prices
are highest for resource exporting economies and lower for manufacturing exporting eco-
nomies, as a result of large differences in the unit value of the exported goods. Remoteness,
leading to higher transport costs, plays a subordinate role.
In international tourism, the data indicates that transport costs relative to the prices
paid by international inbound tourists in the destination country are highest for countries
where the cost of labour is low, and lowest for countries where the cost of labour is high,
as a result of large differences in wages. Remoteness plays a more significant role than in
international trade. SIDS and LLDCs are geographically remote countries, and average
travel costs relative to consumer prices are systematically higher than for all other countries
in the dataset.
The policy scenario considered uses a global bunker fuel levy as an economic tool to
reduce the emissions from the international maritime and air transport industries. As
an exogenously determined carbon price yields into "similar" aggregate predictions as
an endogenously determined carbon price with peak CO2 emissions in the model, the
computed results are also informative towards determining the demand impacts associated
with offsetting schemes or Emissions Trading Schemes (ETS) in international transport.
The CGE model, data and policy scenario is used to analyse changes in real income in each
country, using a balanced transition path of the world economy from an unconstrained to an
environmentally-constrained international transport industry at different levels of carbon
166
prices for each international transport sector individually and jointly.
In the range of carbon prices between $25/tCO2-$300/tCO2, consumer prices increase only
marginally in goods trade (0.3-1.2%), whereas in tourism (given that transport costs take
up a significant share of the overall prices paid by international outbound tourists) the
lump-sum price increases in activities can be significant (2-10%). The welfare impacts as a
result of these price changes consist of impacts on the demand as well as on the supply side.
On the demand side, the consumer price index increases, thus leading to a reduction in
real income. On the supply side, the impacts are determined by the differences in spending
and income in each sector. The demand elasticities in international trade and tourism take
a value of four to five. Given this relatively elastic demand on the one hand, and increases
in prices in each sector on the other, domestic relative to foreign spending increases by
0.5-2% in the industry sector and by 3-15% in the tourism sector. These increases lead to
a higher gross output and thus income in each sector. They however also lead to higher
prices in each sector, given that these goods and services are then produced and consumed
domestically. Whether or not these changes lead to welfare losses or gains is determined
by the differences in consumption and output. If output is higher than consumption in a
sector, consumers benefit from higher income. If output is smaller than consumption in a
sector, consumers loose from higher prices.
As the industry sector is a major source of income, and therefore much larger than the
tourism sector in many countries, the welfare impacts in terms of real income are much
larger in the industry than in the tourism sector, despite the fact that the average price
increases in tourism are larger than in trade. Average annual per capita real income reduces
by $15-$60 if the international maritime industry is subject to a global carbon tax. It
reduces (only) by $5-$25 if the international aviation industry is subject to a global carbon
tax. Similar observations can be made for the reductions in gross world product, dropping
by $25-$90 billion in trade and by $10-$40 billion in tourism, on a ’once only’ basis and
subject to the level of the carbon price. Given the higher energy intensity of air versus sea
transport, the tax revenues raised by the schemes in each sector are similar, reaching $15-
$80 billion in the international maritime and $10-$90 billion in the international aviation
industry annually, while 50-300 Mt and 25-150 Mt of transport related CO2 are abated
cost-effectively in each sector each year.
Dividing the amount of CO2 abated by the quantitative impacts in terms of GWP reveals
an economic cost of $300-$450 to reduce on tonne of CO2 in the international maritime
industry and an economic cost of $250-$300 to reduce on tonne of CO2 in the international
aviation industry. This cost reduces with higher carbon prices as the CO2 abatement
in both industries occurs faster than changes in prices materialise into changes in GWP.
At higher carbon prices, it therefore costs less to reduce one further tonne of CO2 in
international transport.
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A carbon price of $150/tCO2 applied to both the aviation and the maritime transport
industry would yield a tax revenue of $100 billion per year. This amount corresponds to
the latest agreed collective quantified goal of raising money for global climate finance.
Furthermore, the model results indicate that a carbon emissions pricing scheme in inter-
national transport would in general not lead to any systematic pattern of discrimination
against developing countries. Carbon emission pricing schemes in the international air
transport industry however would lead to a pattern of systematic of discrimination against
SIDS as well as LLDCs, indicating the need to exempting these countries from participa-
tion.
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Chapter 7
Discussion and future work
7.1 Discussion
Limitations of the study. This study is limited by the model restrictions imposed by
economic theory, and its model simplifications and data limitations.
Starting with the model restrictions imposed by economic theory, and as mentioned in
Chapter 3, gravity equations of international trade (and tourism) are considered as one
of the most empirically robust and theoretically sound findings in all of economics (Head
and Mayer, 2014, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2014). They however also impose strong
restrictions on the data. First, all variables need to enter in multiplicative form. Second,
the estimated coefficients are representative for all flows by country pair in the cross-
section. The log-linear form of the gravity equation restricts transport costs to be specified
as an ad valorem to the prices in the partner country (excluding travel costs). As shown in
Tables 4.1 and 5.2, the level of transport costs is also dependent on price levels. Assuming
transport costs proportional to prices is therefore not entirely accurate but imposed by
the multiplicative form of the gravity equation. This functional form also imposes the
restriction to specify the price elasticity of demand to be common to all country pairs.
Demand might however be more elastic for some country pairs, and be less elastic for others.
The elasticity estimates obtained from gravity equations are a representative average of
all these different elasticities by country pair. The predictions of the model can therefore
also only take average elasticities into account, and may be accurate for the majority of
country pairs in the dataset, but less accurate for relatively smaller flows (given the log
transformation of the variables). The predictions (in absolute levels) for smaller countries
(having smaller flows) need therefore be interpreted with respect to these limitations.
Model simplifications include the omission of fixed transport costs, the reduced-form de-
scription of technology uptake, and the omission of the relocation of production emissions.
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Starting with the omission of fixed transport costs, a number steps would be required
to implement a heterogeneous firm model instead of a homogeneous firm model in this
study. In international trade, fixed costs have been found to be quantitatively important
(Bernard, Jensen and Lawrence, 1995; Bernard and Jensen, 1999) and the gravity equation
should therefore take the form of the Melitz (2003) model with fixed exporting costs. In
international tourism however, the role of fixed costs on bilateral tourism spending needs
to be examined once data becomes available. As a result, fixed costs may, or may not
be quantitatively important in tourism, leading to either a heterogeneous or a homogen-
eous firm model. It should be noted that, as the model is specified sector by sector, the
combination of a heterogeneous firm model in trade with a homogeneous firm model in
tourism would in principle be possible. Second, to be able to predict changes in consumers
prices as a result of changes in fixed costs, data on fixed costs by country pair in trade
(and tourism) needs to be collected. Third, the cost function on the supply side would
need to take the form of a total cost function instead of a variable cost function. The
total cost function would consist of variable and fixed costs. The variable cost function
would need to take into account the costs, which are treated as fixed in the short-run,
whereas the fixed costs part would need to take into account the costs which are treated as
fixed in the long-run. Fourth, the change in fixed costs of an (average) transport firm as a
result of a change in the carbon costs needs to be examined. Given that the carbon costs
can be linked directly to the amount of fuel consumed via an emissions factor, they can
be classified as "pure" marginal costs. A carbon tax however triggers large investments
into technology and operational efficiency improvements that cause a change in fixed costs
through changes in capital costs. Fifth, the amount of fixed costs of a transport firm to be
passed on to the consumers in the form of price increases needs to be investigated. These
five steps illustrate the complexity and large data requirements involved. Once accom-
plished, a trade (and tourism) model with fixed costs would allow to additionally quantify
the dynamic welfare impacts on trade (and tourism) as a result of carbon emissions pricing
schemes in international transport. Such a model could reveal that the welfare impacts are
larger than the ones quantified in this study. This is because the dynamic welfare gains
tend be larger in a model with fixed exporting costs (Sampson, 2016).
The simplifications related to modelling technology uptake and the reductions in emis-
sions are described in Section 6.4 and Appendix C.2. A precise forecasting of technological
uptakes and efficiency improvements is however not required, provided that the resulting
cost reductions homogeneously apply to the entire transport fleet and therefore approxim-
ately uniformly to all country pairs. To remain competitive however, a transport firm may
choose to e.g. only equip the largest vehicles with fuel efficient technology that serve the
trade and tourism routes with the highest demand. Such individual operational strategies
would yield into different prices on competitive trade and tourism routes. As the welfare
impacts by country are calculated from all trade and tourism routes by country pair how-
ever, relatively large changes in prices on particular trade or tourism routes lead to only
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relatively small changes (if any) in the aggregated welfare impacts by country.
The same reasoning can be applied to justifying the assumption of constant markups.
Some trade and tourism routes may be subject to variable markups under carbon emission
pricing schemes. It is unlikely however that all trade and tourism routes are subject to
variable markups given the large number of existing shippers, ship charterers, and airlines,
characterising a competitive market. A model accounting for variable markups would
therefore very likely result into similar aggregated predictions on a country level.
Trade also generates an environmental impact through relocating emissions of production
i.e. the transfer of activities or production facilities to other market economies, with
different production technologies and hence different production emissions. Grubb et al.
(2015) show that the embedded carbon in goods imports can account for a significant share
of a country’s total CO2 emissions. A similar principle applies to tourism activities, where
some countries have a higher energy efficiency and sustainable tourism standards than
others. A shift in demand therefore also triggers changes in the release of CO2 emissions
related to tourism by country. Both these changes in emissions on the trade and tourism
side are not taken into account in this study.
Limitations of the study also exist with respect to the data. These include statistical
reporting errors of bilateral spending in international trade, the approximation of bilateral
spending in international tourism, and the approximation of gross output (overall and
by sectors) and transport costs by origin and destination country in case of missing data.
The detailed results of this study (obtained for each country individually) need therefore be
interpreted with respect to these data constraints. On an aggregate level however (incl. the
changes with respect to per capita average income and gross world output), the statistical
error remains within reasonable limits.
How realistic are the computed results? At carbon prices of 50, 150, and $300/tCO2
in international air and maritime transport, gross world product reduces by $55, $106, and
$131 billion (see Table 6.3). According to World Bank estimates, countries in the range
of these values in terms of their national GDP are Bulgaria, Ecuador, and Ukraine. If all
the demand impacts were borne by only one country, the implications would be large. If
these impacts are spread across all countries however, the implications are relatively small,
resulting into a per capita reduction in real income of $35, $67, and $83 respectively.
For another comparison, according to World Bank estimates, gross world product amoun-
ted to $78,658 billion in 2014. The above mentioned policy cases therefore correspond to
a 0.07%, 0.13%, and 0.17% reduction in gross world product. With annual growth rates
of gross world product of above 3% on average, the introduction of carbon emission pri-
cing schemes in the international air and maritime transport industry would therefore not
trigger a global economic crisis, even if a carbon price of $300/tCO2 would be introduced
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over a relatively short period of time. It should be noted that the reductions in GDP and
real income only occur once, in moving from the initial to the environmentally constrained
scenario. Once this transition has been accomplished, the world economy is a new equilib-
rium state and no further demand impacts are to be expected if the carbon price remains
unchanged.
For a third comparison, the increases in fuel costs due to a carbon price can be compared
against historically high and low fuel prices. Figure 7.1 shows historic jet fuel and Brent
oil spot prices (FOB) from the EIA (2017), which have been normalised to February 2017
prices. The drop in prices during the 2007-08 global financial crisis and the enforced
production of oil from OPEC countries starting in 2015 are clearly visible in the data.
From February 2017 onwards (indicated by a vertical line), the graph then shows the
increase in the fuel price index associated with the introduction of a carbon price (assuming
a $25/tCO2 increase per year). This increase resembles values of the one plus the CO2
tax equivalent of net fuel prices, given by χ = 1 +
ηfPCO2
Pfuel(oil)
≥ 1 in Equation 6.15. The
intersection of fuel prices with the second vertical line indicates the expected fuel price
increase, equivalent to a carbon price of $150/tCO2. Although a carbon price of $150/tCO2
may be associated with an aggressive policy, the historical data in Figure 7.1 illustrates
that the international transport industries both have seen hypothetical carbon prices of
(at least) $150/tCO2 in the past.
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Figure 7.1: Historic versus future, carbon price related, changes in fuel price indexes. Historic
data from EIA (2017). Future price changes calculated by assuming a gradual increase in carbon
prices.
For a fourth and final comparison, the counterfactual results obtained in this study can be
compared with results in the literature. Most commonly found in the literature are values
relating to the gains from trade. That is, the counterfactual exercises are calculated using
the hypothetical case of moving the economy to an autarky equilibrium. Mathematically,
this can be accomplished by assuming that foreign trade shocks become infinitely large
τ = +∞. In autarky, a country needs to produce all goods by itself, using labour, which
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is probably more expensive, and technology, which is probably less efficient (in the most
simplistic case). This leads to higher goods prices, and thus a decrease in real income
(leaving aside the changes in income on the supply side as a result of an increase in
production as per Equation 6.23). The gains from trade can then be calculated using
G = 1− Ŵ . Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) show that the welfare gains from trade
reach an average of 4.4% in most of the OECD countries, using the simple Armington
model as the theoretical baseline. As the price shocks investigated in this study using a
CGE model are smaller than the infinitely large price shocks in the autarky case, the gains
from trade associated with a reduction in transport costs in this study must be smaller
than the overall gains from trade (which are associated with the autarky case). Figure C.6
shows that gains from trade associated with the reduction in transport costs by amounts of
1/χ using a carbon price of $300/tCO2 can be as high as 1% for some countries, but with
a global average of 0.25% for most of the countries in the dataset. These results compare
well to the overall gains from trade, given the relatively smaller magnitude of exogenous
prices shocks investigated in this study.
Similar comparisons of the CGE model results can be made with the counterfactual results
in Chapters 4 and 5. The gains from tourism reach on average 1.6% (Table B.3). The
welfare impacts associated with slow steaming are on average -0.34%, not accounting for
sector-by-sector expenditure shares however in terms of αj (the welfare impacts are there-
fore larger). As slow steaming represents one of the key mitigation options under carbon
emission pricing schemes in international maritime transport (at least for containerised
trade and hence manufacturing imports), the price increases in terms of carbon costs and
time costs should ideally be jointly taken into account. In doing so, the predicted welfare
impacts in the industry sector in each country would become slightly larger.
Comprehensively taken into account, these four comparisons illustrate that the computed
results and assumptions on the demand as well as the supply side are within realistic limits.
The link of carbon emission pricing schemes in international transport with
tax revenue and welfare. The calculated tax revenues in Table 6.3 compare well to the
estimates in the study by the World Bank, the IMF, and the OECD (World Bank, 2011),
but generally obtain a relatively smaller value. The smaller values of this study are a result
of additionally taking technology uptakes into account. Without technology uptake, the
tax revenue would be higher as international transport emissions would be higher (subject
to the level of the carbon price).
It should be noted that, if the carbon tax from Equation 6.16 is "recycled within the
model" and thus assumed to take the form a rebated lump-sum to consumers as in e.g.
Shapiro (2016), a country’s real income will also be affected by the revenue the car-
bon price generates from all imports or tourist departures respectively, given by Yj =∑H
h=1
(
Y hj + PCO2η
h
y
∑I
i=1Q
hDha
)
, a = {ij, ji}. Subject to each country’s import and
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outbound tourism intensity, the revenues from the carbon emissions pricing schemes can
potentially outweigh any welfare losses. If this is the case for several countries, such a policy
scheme could eventually create imbalances in terms of welfare such that some countries will
benefit, while others will loose. Shapiro (2016) showed—by imposing a policy design with
lump-sum rebated environmental taxes in trade—that low-income countries are generally
disadvantaged as a result of relatively smaller total import values. From and economic
modelling point of view, the rebated lump-sum to consumer represents an interesting case
worthwhile to investigate. From the current political point of view however, a lump-sum
rebated environmental tax is not realistic, as it has neither been taken into consideration
at the ICAO nor at the IMO over the past several years in international negotiations. To
close the realised model of this study also in terms of the generated tax revenue, the model
would need to be embedded within a dynamic integrated model of climate change and the
economy, such as the DICE model described in Nordhaus (1994).
In this study, the predicted welfares changes across countries but relative to each other
remain identical at higher (or lower) carbon prices. This is because the cost increases to a
transport firm are treated homogeneously across all trade and tourism routes. Any patterns
of discrimination therefore also remain identical at higher (or lower) carbon prices. In
Chapter 5 the pattern of discrimination against SIDS is already apparent by rank-ordering
countries by the size of the gains from international tourism (Table B.3). These results are
obtained without the use of a CGE model. The ICAO also decided to exclude SIDS, as well
as LLDCs, from the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation
(CORSIA), though, the reason for excluding them has not been mentioned explicitly. In
international trade, it is widely believed that international maritime policies will lead
to a discrimination against developing countries (IMO, 2011b, ICS, 2017). This study
however shows, that this is not the case. Ultimately, what matters is the amount of
transport costs embedded in overall consumer prices (either in terms of purchases of goods
or tourism services and activities). The non-discriminating arguments can also be made
by only analysing the data as demonstrated in Figures 6.2, 6.3, 6.5, and 6.6 - without any
theoretical frameworks and complex modelling algorithms imposed on the data.
Exempting countries from carbon emission pricing schemes in international transport may
prohibit systematic patterns of discrimination in some cases (as e.g. shown for the inter-
national aviation policy case), but also trigger a potential for carbon leakage, especially if
the exempting rules apply to many of the larger countries participating in the scheme. For
example, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) could strategically buy from countries
which are exempt to lower their costs. A rise in net CO2 would then occur, if the supplier
country the OEM is buying from is less energy efficient than the country the OEM used to
buy from. In this case, carbon leakage would occur, if these strategic buying decisions by
the OEM are made with the intention to avoid carbon costs. The extent of which carbon
leakage may occur in exempting SIDS and LLDCs from international aviation policies is
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however limited for two reasons. First, the tourism sector of SIDS and LLDCs is small in
comparison to the tourism sector in large countries like the US. SIDS and LLDC’s would
therefore not be able to accommodate large shifts in tourism demand, which are triggered
by tourists from many countries with the goal to avoid carbon leakage. Second, the choices
of where to leak to are limited if only a few countries are exempt from the scheme. Grubb
(2014) notes that most of the studies undertaken suggest that the scale of potential carbon
leakage (due to national environmental policies) is small, certainly far less than the scale of
expected emissions savings, and actually also not the main concern of many governments.
Rather, many politicians are concerned they loose their competitive advantage in the in-
dustry or tourism sectors (or one particular sub-sector of it). Competitiveness is key to
ensuring economic growth and long-term investments. These concerns led quite often to
a special treatment of internationally competitive industries in environmental regulations
around the world (Grubb, 2014). Exempting certain industries form the participation in
emissions pricing schemes in international transport would be impracticable. International
transport policies may undeniably influence the competitiveness of some countries, for the
better or the worse. At the same time however, one could argue that many countries are
exposed to such market dynamics through the volatility in oil prices in any case. Changes
in oil and thus fuel prices also trigger changes in consumer prices. These changes are
exogenous too and take the form as carbon tax levied directly on the carbon content of
the fuel. Figure 7.1 demonstrates that these fluctuations can be substantial and be of
comparable size of carbon emission pricing schemes with a carbon price in the range of
$25/tCO2-$150/tCO2.
7.2 Future work
To account for endogenous adjustment mechanisms of the aviation and maritime transport
industries, the model in Chapter 6 could be extended by linking the trade model and
tourism model with partial equilibrium models of the air and marine transport system. This
integrated assessment model (IAM) would allow to study policy cases of the international
aviation and maritime industry in which e.g. variable markups, mode shifts from air to sea
transport, and the uptake of technology in each industry are taken into consideration. The
added value of such a modelling approach to the results presented in this thesis is however
most likely to be limited for two reasons. First, a more rigorous modelling approach on
the supply side does not overcome the modelling simplifications and data restrictions on
the demand side as described above. Statistical inaccuracies on the demand side may
therefore prevent the model to precisely capture small changes on the supply side. Second,
changes in real income are computed on a country level, thereby taking domestic and
bilateral expenditure shares into account (given by λjj , λij , and λji). Given that domestic
expenditure shares are much larger than bilateral expenditure shares, even relatively larger
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changes in prices one some trade and tourism routes may not result into sufficiently large
differences in real income on a country level. For the purpose of this study, a detailed
description of the international transport network and the underlying market dynamics is
therefore not necessary.
If the focus of the analysis lies on accurately predicting emissions reductions and the extent
of which mode shifts occur, the IAM model is the preferred model. It would consist of
the trade and tourism demand models (Equations 6.19 and 6.21), a mode choice model
(Equation 4.36), models of the global transport system (supply model, similar to Equation
6.20), a value-to-unit model, and a welfare model (similar to Equation 6.23) as shown by
the red boxes in Figure 7.2. The models of the global transport system consist of a cost
and a technology module, and may also include a network assignment module (not shown).
The welfare model includes a rebate module to allocate the distribution of carbon revenue
(if any) among countries. The choice and demand model could be specified and estimated
as nested models as in e.g. Jamin et al. (2004). The black boxes represent input/output
data.
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Figure 7.2: Structure of an IAM consisting of the trade, tourism and transport sectors.
The loop in blue colour represents the iteration over trade and tourism demand flows in
units of US dollars. The black arrows indicate calculations of and modifications to transport
supply. As transport costs are an input to the trade and tourism models, all black arrows
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are nested within the blue loop of trade and tourism demand. The grey arrows indicate the
exchange of information to conduct welfare calculations. These calculations can be carried
out independent of the iterative calculations in the blue loop, unless a boundary condition
is established that links welfare impacts with changes in the carbon price as indicated by
the line c.
The demand models are sector-specific but not sector and mode-specific. In international
trade, the gravity equation is specified for total goods trade which includes both, air and
ocean freight transport. To account for endogenous mode shifts due to changes in transport
costs however (e.g. from air to ocean freight), the model needs to disaggregate sector-
specific demand to sector and mode-specific demand, perform the relevant calculations at
this level, and then aggregate sector and mode-specific transport costs to sector-specific
transport costs. The model system in Figure 7.2 therefore also bears a resemblance of the
aggregate-disaggregate-aggregate (ADA) model in Ben-Akiva and De Jong (2013), where
disaggregation is performed over firms to includes logistic decisions at the firm level that
feed into a network assignment model.
The demand model is based on expenditures, income, and budgets shares in each country.
Given wages, the output of the demand models are bilateral trade and tourism demand in
units of US dollars (top right box in Figure 7.2). To link trade and tourism demand to
transport supply, a unit conversion needs to be performed. The value-to-unit model trans-
fers bilateral trade and tourism demand in US dollars into bilateral transport demand in
tonne-km and passenger-km (arrows 1 and 2 in Figure 7.2). As in OECD ITF (2015),
this model could represent a Poisson regression model that takes into account attributes
of product, time, distance, and any trade barriers (common language, contiguity, etc.).
Input to the transport choice model are origin-destination (OD) flows and transport costs.
The choice model then predicts how OD transport demand changes, relative to baseline
OD flows. Consistent projections of oil and carbon prices under a set of GHG stabilisation
scenarios serve, together with projections of trade and tourism demand, as inputs to the
models of the global transport system. Given demand, technology, and exogenous input
prices (carbon price, oil price, etc.), these models than calculate changes in transport costs.
As the choice model and the supply model depend on both, transport costs and transport
demand, the level of equilibrium transport costs needs to be determined iteratively (in-
dicated by the loop of 4, 5, 7, and 8). As the trade and tourism model are specified in
terms of aggregate demand (i.e. the demand over all transport modes in each sector),
mode-specific transport costs in each sector need to be aggregated to sector-specific trans-
port costs. The demand model takes transport costs, and trade and tourism flows (in the
form as budget shares) as inputs and calculates the changes in wages in each sector (the
general equilibrium trade and tourism impact, GETI). The vector of changes in wages
then predicts changes in bilateral trade and tourism flows, over which the model iterates
until the changes in wages are below a predefined threshold level and a new equilibrium
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state is found. The welfare model can then transfer the equilibrium changes in the price
index and income in each country, and the total of CO2 emissions reduced globally, into
a quantitative welfare measure. Conditional on the selected GHG stabilisation scenario
underlying the calculations, the IAM predicts the welfare impacts in each country, the tax
revenue, the energy consumed, the emissions emitted, and the technology utilized.
The carbon price can be treated as either exogenous or endogenous. The carbon price
would become endogenous if the annual release of CO2 emissions or welfare is treated as
fixed, as indicated by the lines a and b. The former case would represent a scenario of
carbon-neutral growth of the international transport industry, if a sustained growth can be
maintained in retrospect to increases in costs and their impact on demand. Furthermore,
the IAM could also be used to study the policy case of a combined regime, where the
aviation and maritime transport industry would be treated conjointly under the same
policy measure.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
The introduction of carbon emissions pricing schemes in the international aviation and
maritime industry will lead to an increase in the costs associated with the international
transport of goods and the international travel of tourists. Conditional on the amount of
CO2 a transport firm is capable to reduce cost-effectively through the uptake of technology
and operational improvements under a given a carbon price, these costs increases will be
passed down the supply chain to consumers in the form of price increases.
Affected by these price increases are the prices of goods imported from foreign countries
as well as the lump-sum prices paid for accommodation and travel services for tourism
activities in foreign countries. This is because in both cases, the overall prices paid by
consumers include the cost of transport. The magnitude of these price changes therefore
simply depends on the level of transport costs, relative to the level of these prices itself.
In resources trade, transport costs take a significantly higher share, relative to the goods
price due to relatively lower per-unit values (measured in $ per tonne) of the traded goods.
In manufacturing trade, the per-unit values are higher, and the level of transport costs re-
lative to the goods price is therefore lower. Resources trade will thus be subject to higher
price increases than manufacturing trade under a carbon emissions pricing scheme in inter-
national maritime transport. In tourism, countries with relatively low labour costs (most
of Africa and Latin America) will be affected more by price increases in international air
transport than countries with relatively high labour costs (e.g. the US, Australia, Western
Europe). If the costs associated with travelling to foreign countries are high relative to
the amount spent on accommodation and other services in the destination country, any
price increases in the international air transport will lead to significant increases in travel
budgets and therefore higher impacts in terms of tourism demand.
The extent of which these price changes materialise into changes of the consumer price
index in each country and sector depends on the ratio of domestic to foreign expenditure.
In the industry sector, this is the ratio of goods produced and consumed in the home
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country relative to the consumption of imported goods. In the tourism sector, this is
the ratio of domestic tourism expenditure relative to international (outbound) tourism
expenditure.
The extent of which the changes in the price index in each sector materialise into changes in
a country’s overall consumer price index depends on the output elasticity and expenditure
share in each sector. Trade is interlinked with the industry sector, representing the most
important and thus biggest sector in most of the countries. The output elasticity and
expenditure share in the industry sector are therefore high (approx. 0.43). In tourism, the
output elasticity and expenditure share are small (approx. 0.035), as the tourism sector
represents a relatively small sector for most of the countries which are industry-intensive.
Changes in the sectoral price index due to price changes in trade therefore materialise
into significantly higher changes in the overall consumer price index than changes in the
sectoral price index due to price changes in tourism.
At the same time, any changes in the consumer price index will cause a shift in demand.
The sensitivity of demand to price changes is measured by the price elasticity of demand in
each sector. The micro-theoretical foundation of trade and tourism demand take the form of
a gravity equation, which are empirically robust and theoretically sound. In this context,
the demand elasticities represent macro-level predictors of bilateral trade and tourism
flows. In the industry sector, the trade elasticity therefore measures the proportionate
change in the expenditure of imported goods relative to the expenditure of goods produced
at home. In the tourism sector, the (outbound) tourism (demand) elasticity measures
the proportionate change in the expenditure on tourism activities consumed elsewhere
(including any travel costs) relative to expenditure on tourism activities consumed at
home. The large literature on estimates of the trade elasticity suggests a value of five.
Results in this thesis suggest a value of the tourism elasticity of four.
Lastly, changes in demand cause a change in income in each sector. A change in income
can have an overall positive or negative impact on welfare. If the expenditure share is
larger than the income share (output elasticity) in a country, any increases in income (as
a result of a reduction in foreign expenditure) will lead to a welfare loss, as consumers are
affected more by higher prices than they can benefit from higher income. If the expenditure
share is smaller than the income share in a country, any increases in income will lead to a
welfare gain, as consumers are affected more by higher income as they are by higher prices.
As the expenditure share is approximately equivalent to the income share in most of the
countries (even by accounting for foreign income and spending), the impacts on welfare
through changes in income are relatively small in comparison to the welfare impacts through
changes in consumer prices.
In general equilibrium, total expenditure equals total income in each country. Equilibrium
changes in real income can therefore be determined in a CGE model consisting of the
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industry, tourism, and international transport sectors. In such a model, international
transport takes the form of extended supply.
If the carbon price takes the form of a global bunker fuel levy, the percent increase in fuel
costs amounts to the level of the carbon price, relative to the price of the petroleum-based
fuel. Faced with these costs increases, transport firms will invest into more fuel-efficient
and cost-effective technologies and operational measures to mitigate these extra costs.
Marginal abatement cost curves of the international air and maritime transport industry
indicate a substantial potential of emissions reductions at low marginal costs. Once these
abatement options are exhausted, the abatement costs increase rapidly, while leading to
smaller reductions in CO2. As the basket of mitigation measures available is not sufficient
to reduce the emissions to zero, even under extremely high carbon prices, a transport firm
will inevitably face an increase in fuel costs if faced with a carbon price. The extent to
which changes in fuel costs lead to changes in the firms total operating costs is determined
by the fuel cost share and the level of aggregate, cost-effective emission reductions available.
Under the assumption of constant markups, the resulting cost increases net of technology
paybacks to a transport firm are then passed on to consumers in the form of price increases.
In summary, the changes in the consumer price index in each country depend on four cost
shares, the value of the demand elasticity, and the level of endogenous technology uptake.
The four cost shares are (i) the level of the carbon price relative to the price of petroleum-
based fuels, (ii) the share of fuel costs in a transport firm’s total operating costs, (iii)
the share of transport costs in consumer prices, and (iv) the level of domestic to foreign
expenditure. As all these shares are relatively small, the changes in the consumer price
index and income in each country can be expected to remain relatively small.
Subject to the limitations imposed by the model and data, the resulting economic cost of
reducing one tonne of CO2 in both the air and maritime transport industries corresponds
to approximately $400 in global value added (GWP). This cost reduces with higher car-
bon prices as the CO2 abatement in both industries occurs faster than changes in prices
materialise into changes in GWP.
In international trade, at a carbon price of $150/tCO2, consumer prices increase by 1.0%,
domestic consumption increases by 1.8%, per capita real annual income decreases by $49
on average, and gross world product drops by $78 billion and on a ’once only’ basis, while
$53 billion of tax revenue is raised and 219 Mt of transported related CO2 is abated cost-
effectively each year. At this carbon price, the economic cost of reducing one tonne of CO2
in the international maritime industry corresponds to $360 in global value added.
In international tourism, at a carbon price of $150/tCO2, consumer prices increase by
6.9%, domestic consumption increases by 10.2%, per capita real annual income decreases
by $18 on average, and gross world product drops by $28 billion and on a ’once only’ basis,
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while $51 billion of tax revenue is raised and 100 Mt of transported related CO2 is abated
cost-effectively each year. At this carbon price, the economic cost of reducing one tonne
of CO2 in the international aviation industry corresponds to $280 in global value added.
In a combined policy scheme, where both the international maritime and aviation industry
are subject to a carbon tax, the overall demand impact in each country is the sum of the
demand impacts from both sectors.
While the price increases in trade are smaller, the impacts in terms of demand are larger
as a result of relatively higher consumption and expenditure shares. Tourism is subject to
larger price increases, with significant larger changes in domestic expenditures, while the
demand impacts are smaller as a result of relatively smaller consumption and expenditure
shares.
As the carbon revenue is not "recycled" within the system using a rebate mechanism, the
predicted changes in real income in each country can be used towards determining patterns
of discrimination against economically disadvantaged countries participating in the scheme.
In international trade, no systematic pattern of discrimination against developing countries,
SIDS, or LLDCs can be identified. In international tourism, no systematic pattern of
discrimination against developing countries can be identified. As many of the SIDS are
disproportionally dependent on international inbound tourism and as many of the LLDCs
are geographically remote countries however, they would be systematically disadvantaged
by a carbon emissions pricing scheme in the international aviation industry.
A carbon emissions pricing scheme in the international maritime industry would therefore
be non-discriminatory and comply with the UNFCCC CBDR/RC principle and GATT
de jure and de facto discriminatory regulations. In the international aviation industry,
to comply with the UNFCCC CBDR/RC principle, SIDS and LLDCs would need to be
exempt, as it is currently proposed by the ICAO for the CORSIA.
Carbon emissions pricing schemes in international transport could significantly contribute
to the target of raising $100 billion annually of global climate finance for developing coun-
tries under the UNFCCC umbrella in a post-Paris world. A carbon price of $150/tCO2 in
international transport could raise all of the $100 billion of global climate finance needed,
while 318 Mt of transport related CO2 could be abated cost-effectively each year. This
scheme would result into a nonrecurring drop in gross world product of 0.13% and, except
for SIDS, be non-discriminatory against developing countries.
Carbon emissions pricing schemes in international transport therefore pose a substantial
opportunity to raise money for global climate finance. In comparison to an ETS, they are
also administratively simple and ensure price stability. Given the tremendous challenges
ahead in limiting the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2◦C above
pre-industrial levels and the inherently larger damages in terms of GWP if left unchecked,
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the international transport industries could become a key enabler of global climate fin-
ance and open up ways to tackle the pressing issues lying ahead. A carbon emissions
pricing scheme in international transport could therefore become a real game changer in
international climate policy by strengthening the global response to the threat of climate
change.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 4
A.1 Data appendix
Mode-specific trade data from Eurostat. Eurostat publishes International Trade in
Goods Statistics (ITGS) through different datasets (Eurostat, 2014). ITGS is grouped into
extra-EU and intra-EU trade. Extra-EU trade includes international trade of EU member
states with non-EU member states. Intra-EU trade includes international trade between
EU member states only.
EU-extra trade is reported by mode of transport1 since the year 2000 with a statistical
threshold of 1,000AC and 1,000kg. For intra-EU trade, the collection of mode of transport
has been optional for Member States since 2001, and as a consequence, only some countries
provide these data wholly or partially. No trade data by mode of transport is therefore
made available by Eurostat for intra-EU trade.
The trade value corresponds to the statistical value that is declared on the customs declar-
ation form by businesses and private individuals involved in an international transaction
of goods. The statistical value is ’the amount that would be invoiced in the event of sale
or purchase at the national border of the reporting country’ (Eurostat, 2014). For exports,
this value is said to be a FOB (free on board) valuation, for imports a CIF (cost, insurance,
freight) valuation. For imports, the statistical value includes transport and insurances costs
incurred on the part of the journey located outside the territory of the importing country.
For exports, the statistical value includes transport and insurances costs on the part of
the journey located on the territory of the exporting country (Eurostat, 2014). Assum-
ing that “domestic” transport and insurance costs are small in comparison to the overall
goods value, the FOB trade value is usually also referred to as the production value at the
factory gate. Import values should therefore be higher than the mirror export values as
1Supplement 3 of the ComExt intra- and extra-European trade database in Eurostat (2015).
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they include trade costs. Statistical values do not include taxes in import or export (e.g.
customs and excise duties or VAT).
Bilateral trade quantities are reported in kilograms of the goods’ net mass (i.e. the mass
without packaging) and for certain goods, a supplementary quantity information is avail-
able (e.g. litres, number of pieces, carats, terajoules or square meters).
The standard product classification for the trade in goods by mode of transport by Euro-
stat is the ‘Nomenclature uniforme des marchandises pour les Statistiques de Transport,
Révisée’, abbreviated NST/R. I group the data by NST/R into the economic sectors of en-
ergy production, mining and quarrying, agriculture and forestry, and manufacturing. Each
economic sector is further divided into industries, which I specify according to the NACE
Statistical Classification of Economic Activities. No conversation tables exist between
NACE and NST/R trade, as the former refers to economic activities and the latter to
international trade. The conversation table I used for aggregation is shown in Appendix
D.
The country classification of extra-EU trade data follows the ‘Nomenclature of countries
and territories for the external trade statistics of the Community and statistics of trade
between Member States’ or in short ‘Geonomenclature’.
The mode of transport is defined as the active means of transport by which goods are
either presumed to leave (exports) or to have entered (imports) the statistical territory of
the Community. The active means of transport is the means of transport providing the
motive power. In the case of several means of transport, the active means of transport is
identified as the one providing the motive power for the whole combination (Pongas, 2006).
The modes of transport considered in extra-EU trade are: air, fixed installation (including
pipelines), inland waterways, post, rail, road, sea, self propulsion and unknown.
For some observations, the reported active means of transport is different from the expected
primary mode of transport. By primary mode of transport, I refer to the mode of transport
which is used to bridge the greatest distance between the origin and destination country.
The primary mode of transport is therefore the relevant mode of transport to calculate
bilateral transport costs.
The expected primary mode of transport can be verified by surveying the data for countries
sharing the same landmass (relevant for road rail and inland water transport, e.g. EU
imports from the US by road are implausible). My analysis suggests that a significant
number of trade flows by road, rail and inland water transport are incorrectly reported.
For these observations I manually adjust the mode of transport and assume sea transport
to be the default mode. I choose sea transport rather than air transport as it is unlikely
that goods, which arrive via air in a non-EU country, are loaded onto "slower" means of
transport (i.e. inland water, road, rail) for their international onward journey (thereby
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Figure A.2: Cumulative tonnage breakdown by mode of transport (active means of transport)
as a function of trip length for unadjusted EU imports between 2001-13. FM = fixed mechanism,
SelfPro = Self propulsion.
crossing the statistical territory of the EU). The final dataset does not contain any trade
by road or rail between countries further than 6,000km apart as shown in Figure A.1.
Figure A.2 shows the cumulative distribution function for different transport modes of
unadjusted extra-EU trade. Trade that moves via air (measured in tonnes) becomes signi-
ficant only at a distance of 6,000km. This might however primarily be due to the missing
flows of intra-EU trade. In comparison, trade by sea seems to be utilised irrespective of
how far or how close the importer might be (indicated by the almost constant slope). In-
tuitively, the majority of trade by road and rail moves only very short distance, i.e. less
than 3,000km. Trade by road, rail and inland water beyond 3,000km however may refer
to the (reported) active means of transport rather than the primary means of transport as
described above.
Table A.1 gives an overview of trade data by mode of transport and industry from Eurostat.
Energy commodities, such as crude petroleum, gaseous hydrocarbons and coal, represent
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60% and thus the primary share of commodities traded by weight followed by iron ore and
minor bulk2 with 11% (column 3). These commodities are transported on large vessels to
utilise economies of scale. In contrast, the highest share of commodities traded by value
is among manufactured goods3 (70%), including machinery and vehicles (16%), electronic
and electrical equipment (13%), and wearing apparel and leather (with 7% of total trade
by value, column 4). The transport of manufactured goods is accomplished by a range of
different transport modes (columns 5 to 10), with sea transport being the dominant mode
of transport by weight for all industries (column 5), followed by road (column 7) and rail
transport (column 6). A significant amount of oil and gas enters the EU also via pipelines
(column 9). Air transport remains insignificant (with a total share of 0.2% by weight)
except for wearing apparel and electronics. If measured by value however, air transport
obtains a 15% share among all other transport modes utilised (column 11). The high share
of non-ferrous ores and concentrates transported via air might be a result of rare earth
elements trade with relatively hight unit values. As expected, containerisation is significant
for fruits and vegetables and for all manufactured goods (column 12). Column 13 reports
the median and upper and lower quantile of the value-to-weight ratio in AC/kg which are
significantly higher for manufactured goods. It is also apparent that for goods with higher
unit values, the heterogeneity in value-to-weight increases. The commodities live animals,
gold, coins and medals stand out in terms of their value-to-weight ratio and air transport
share.
Maritime transport cost and trade data from the OECD. The OECD Maritime
Transport Cost database (OECD, 2007) contains trade values (CIF and FOB) as well as
transport costs of seaborne trade between 1991 and 2007. The data is available for 43
importing countries (including EU-15 countries as a custom union) from 218 countries of
origin at 6 digit commodity level of the Harmonized System and 4 transport modes. The
database is restricted to international trade by sea. The data was collected by the Trade
and Agriculture Directorate from the statistical authorities of the United States, Australia,
New Zealand and Latin America (foremost Argentina and Brazil however). Missing values
were estimated using shipping freight rates data from a range of different sources includ-
ing UNCTAD, Containerisation International, Drewry Shipping Consultants, International
Grains Council , and the Baltic Exchange (Korinek, 2011). The four transport modes refer
to clean/dry bulk carriers, dirty bulk carriers, tankers, and containers. Similar to above, I
group the data into the economic sectors and NACE industries. The conversation table I
used for aggregation is shown in Appendix D.
Table A.2 gives an overview of MTC trade data by mode of transport and industry. On
2As in UNCTAD (2014) I consider coal, iron ore and grain as major bulk but group other ores and
concentrates (incl. bauxite and aluminium), phosphates, sand, salt, chalk, pumice stones and natural
fertilisers into minor bulk.
3Due to the a large amount of crude petroleum imports by weight, the respective value in AC still remains
to be the largest observed although the value-to-weight ratio is lowest.
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average, the transport of manufactured goods accounts for 5% of the traded value. This
value translates into a 0.19$/kg freight rate in 2007. For comparison, Anderson and Win-
coop (2004) report 10.7% as their preferred estimate of the ad valorem tax equivalent of
bilateral transport costs. The discrepancy between both values is expected and depends
on the level of disaggregation as illustrated in Table A.2. For the 16 different subgroups of
seaborne manufacturing trade, I obtain average values between 4% and 11%.
For the total of manufacturing imports, the value to weight ratio ranges from 0.95 to
4.71$/kg, ad valorem transport costs range from 3 and 8%, and freight rates range from
0.12 to 0.31$/kg. For the non-manufacturing commodities iron ore, coal and minor bulk,
I obtain an ad valorem tax equivalent above 20%, although freight rates are as lows as
0.04-0.06$/kg. This is because of a relatively low unit value of these commodities ranging
between 0.14 and 0.44$/kg. Lastly, Table A.2 also indicates that transport in tankers is
cheapest, followed by bulk carriers and then container ships. Container freight rates are
higher, primarily because of higher average sea speeds (IMO, 2014) and thus fuel burn but
also because of higher average cargo handling and port costs.
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A.2 Estimation of transit time
Bilateral transit time is modelled as a function of average distance and average transport
speed. Because vehicles encounter different operational segments between the points of
origin and destination, the average transport speed over the entire journey is lower than the
vehicle’s optimum design speed. For example, trucks first need to leave the city on narrow
roads before going on a highway; after take-off, aircraft first need to go through different
climb segments before they reach the cruise altitude and hence cruise speed. Taking all
those effects together and dividing the time lost by the time which would be needed if
the entire distance had been travelled at maximum cruising speed provides a measure of
time inefficiencies with respect to average distances travelled. Holding the time lost by
inefficiencies constant, this ratio decreases with increasing distance as the inefficiencies
become less prominent in the overall journey time. The speed-distance relationship v(D)
is best described by a power function of the form v = β0D
β1 (Schäfer, 2015). This function
can be fitted using data on average cruising speeds and average trip distances and provides
the baseline for complementing the extra-EU trade data with average mode-specific transit
times.
To be able to additionally control for maximum cruising speeds—e.g. the drag divergence
Mach number for aircraft (a physical constraint) or speed limits on highways (a practical
constraint)—the shape of the fitted functional form has to be skewed to either the left
or the right hand side (along the x-axis), while the position along the y-axis has to be
corrected via an additional constant
v = β2 + β0 (D + β3)
−β1 . (A.1)
Assuming that the maximum transport speed is reached if distance D approaches infinity
lim
D→∞
v (D) = β2, ∀ β1 > 1 (A.2)
yields β2 = vmax. This curve is then further constrained to pass through the zero-point. It
follows that β2 = −β0 (β3)−β1 and hence β0 = −vmaxββ13 . Equation A.1 is thus specified
to account for inefficiencies that occur on shorter distances D by reducing the maximum
cruising speed by the amount β0 (D + β3)
−β1 . Substituting β2 and β0 in Equation A.1
yields
v = vmax
[
1−
(
β3
D + β3
)β1]
, (A.3)
which I estimate using nonlinear least squares.
For subsonic aircraft, the cruise speed is limited by the drag divergence Mach number,
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which converts to a maximum cruise speed of approxmiately 486kts4. Observations with a
speed value above the maximum are identified as outliers. Figure A.3 shows the data and
the fitted curve.
For container ships (only trade in manufacturing goods is considered), the curve is fitted
using data from IMO (2014), which has been extracted using a method developed by
Prakash (forthcoming). For ships, the theoretical maximum hull speed is a function of the
Froude number. I therefore estimate the average maximum hull speed by choosing a value
of vmax such that β1 ≈ 1. Figure A.4 shows the data and the fitted curve.
The transport between countries is assumed to be direct, i.e. without intermediate stops or
a diversion from the most optimum route. For sea transport, I use trade weighted bilateral
sea distances from Newton (2009). For air transport, I use great circle distances which I
calculate between economic centres5 with latitude and longitude coordinates data taken
from Mayer and Zignago (2011).
Bilateral mode specific international distances are then used to calculate average mode
specific air and sea speed before converting them into the average bilateral transit time by
transport mode between countries.
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Figure A.3: Air speed as a function of average trip distance of U.S. air freight carriers between
1990 and 2013 by airline and by quarter. Data taken from the U.S. Department of Transportation
(2014). Fitted functional form using avg. distance in [km] to obtain avg. speed in [kts]: vmax =
486kts, β1 = 1.03, and β3 = 417.35.
4Depending on the cost of fuel, the cruising speed is either at or slightly below the drag divergence Mach
number (Kroo and Shevell, 2001). Typical cruising Mach numbers of new generation passenger aircraft
(such as the Boeing B787 or the Airbus A350) are in the range of Mach 0.85. At a typical cruising altitude
of 35,000ft, this value converts to approxmiately 486kts.
5The main city represents the country’s economic centre (measured by population density), which is in
almost all cases also the capital of the respective country.
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Figure A.4: Sea speed as a function of average trip distance of container ships in 2013. Data
from IMO (2014), extracted using the method by Prakash (forthcoming) and aggregated by IMO
ship number. Fitted functional form using avg. distance in [km] to obtain avg. speed in [kts]:
vmax = 17.9kts, β1 = 1.00, and β3 = 871.84.
A.3 Additional figures
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Figure A.5: Growth in airborne vs. seaborne trade, measured in revenue tonne-kilometres (RTK).
The growth in world merchandise exports is shown for reference. Data from the World Bank (2017)
(air), UNCTAD (2014) (sea) and WTO (2014).
.
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Figure A.6: Differences in calculated welfare changes of policy A using options 1 and 2.
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Figure A.7: Differences in calculated welfare changes of policy B using options 1 and 2.
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Figure A.8: Sea vs. air distance of manufactured goods imported into the EU. Sea distances are
trade weighted by port of origin and destination and taken from Newton (2009); air distances are
calculated great-circle distances between countries’ economic centres.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 5
B.1 Mathematical appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1. Changes in the price index
The price index of consumers in the tourism sector Pj is given by the CES exact price index
in Equation 5.10. To quantify changes in Pj , the price parameter Φj ≡
∑I
i=1 Si(Aiaji)
θp−θji
can be combined with the CES exact price index given by Pj ≡ γΦ−1/θj to obtain
(
Pj
)−θ
=γ−θΦj = γ
−θ
I∑
i=1
Si(Aiaji)
θp−θji
Noting that γ is a constant and that Si, Ai and aji remain constant by R2, small changes
in the price index satisfy
d lnPj =
I∑
i=1
λjid ln pji
=
I∑
i=1
λji
(
d lnwi + d ln τji
)
. (B.1)
Recalling that gravity can be written as
Xji
Xj
= λji = P
θ
j SiA
θ
iw
−θ
i a
θ
jiτ
−θ
ji , with domestic
flows given by
Xjj
Xj
= λjj = P
θ
j SjA
θ
jw
−θ
j a
θ
jjτ
−θ
jj , the odds ratio can be specified as
λji
λjj
=
Si
Sj
(
Aiaji
Ajajj
)θ (wiτji
wjτjj
)−θ
,
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where the price index Pj cancels out. Taking the derivative of this expression reveals
d lnλji − d lnλjj = 
(
d lnwi + d ln τji − d lnwj
)
, (B.2)
where  ≡ −θ, τjj ≡ 1, and S, A, and a remain constant by R2. It should be noted
that the same expression could be obtained if the definition of the demand elasticity in
Equation 5.21 was used instead:  ≡ −θ = ∂ ln
(
Xji/Xjj
)
∂ ln pji
=
∂ ln
(
λji/λjj
)
∂ ln pji
.
Combining Equations B.1 and B.2 yields
d lnPj =
I∑
i=1
λji
(
d lnλji − d lnλjj

+ d lnwj
)
=
∑I
i=1 λji
(
d lnλji − d lnλjj
)

+
I∑
i=1
λjid lnwj
=
−d lnλjj

+ d lnwj .
Changes in the price index can then be obtained by integrating this expression between
the initial equilibrium at time t (before the price shock) and the new equilibrium at time
t+ 1 (after the price shock)
P̂j = ŵj
(
λ̂jj
)−1/
.
By equation 5.36, changes in real income are then given by
Ŵj =
(
ŵj
)γj (ŵj (λ̂jj)−1/)−αj
=
(
ŵj
)γj−αj (λ̂jj)αj/ . (B.3)
Step 2. Changes in income
Changes in income are determined from the market clearing condition and the changes
in expenditure. Using the budget shares λij given by Equation 5.19, and dividing them
by same equation that is written for the new equilibrium λ′ji =
SiA
θ
iw
′
i
−θ
aθjiτ
′
ji
−θ∑I
i=1 SiA
θ
iw
′
i
−θ
aθjiτ
′
ji
−θ
reveals
λ̂ji =
(
ŵiτ̂ji
)∑I
i
′
=1
λ′ji
(
ŵiτ̂ji
) .
From the market clearing condition in Equation 5.13, a country’s total income from the
tourism sector in the new equilibrium is given by Yi
′ =
∑I
j
′
=1
X ′ji =
∑n
j
′
=1
λ′jiX
′
j . Because
v̂v = v′ for any variable v, this expression can be rewritten as ŶiYi =
∑I
j
′
=1
λ̂jiλjiX̂jXj ,
which in combination with the expression for changes in the budget shares from above
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yields
Ŷi =
1
Yi
I∑
j
′
=1
λji
(
ŵiτ̂ji
)
∑n
i
′
=1
λ′ji
(
ŵ
′
i τ̂
′
ji
) X̂jXj .
Because income from tourism is given by Yi = wiLi and using labour as the numeraire it
follows that Ŷi = ŵi. In equal terms, using Equation 5.17, changes in total income are
given by
Ŷ Ej =
(
ŵj
)ηj = X̂Ej ,
illustrating that changes in the total expenditure in the tourism sector (X̂j) are not equi-
valent to the changes in income of tourism workers (ŵj). This is because overall spending
is determined by changes in both sectors: tourism and non-tourism.
One can link the overall changes in spending X̂Ej to the changes in spending in each sector
X̂j by assuming that the percentage change in overall spending equivalently applies to all
sectors of the economy
X̂Ej ≡ X̂j .
Under this assumption, a 1% reduction in overall spending would materialise into a 1%
reduction in spending in the tourism sector as well as into a 1% reduction in spending in
the non-tourism sector. This is therefore a reasonable approximation as in the aggregate,
the 1% reduction in overall spending is retained.
Using these two observations in the expression from above, small changes in income satisfy
ŵi =
1
Yi
I∑
j
′
=1
λji
(
ŵiτ̂ji
)
∑I
i
′
=1
λ′ji
(
ŵ
′
i τ̂
′
ji
) (ŵj)ηj Xj . (B.4)
Equation B.4 determines income in the tourism sector wiLi as functions of the model
parameters () and of the prices and expenditure across countries. An implicit solution of
Equation B.4 can be obtained by introducing foreign price shocks to any of the variables on
the right hand side, and then solving for the vector of wages iteratively using a dampening
factor (see e.g. Head and Mayer, 2014).
Step 3. Autarky
In autarky, all tourism activities are consumed domestically. The share of domestic tourism
expenditure in the counterfactual equilibrium is therefore equivalent to one (λ′jj = 1).
The change in relative domestic tourism expenditure between the initial and the new
equilibrium is then given by λ̂jj = 1/λjj . Applying these observations to Equation B.3,
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changes in real income associated with moving to autarky can be calculated using
ŴAj =
(
ŵ
A
j
)ηIj−αIj (
λjj
)−αj/ . (B.5)
The next step therefore requires to determine the changes in wages associated with moving
to autarky ŵAj . The key insight of the size of ŵ
A
j is given by the implicit solution of
Equation B.4 above. In order to demonstrate, I proceed in three steps.
First, with  < 0, for all i′ = 1, . . . , j′, . . . , n′ the denominator of Equation B.4 becomes
lim
τ
′→+∞
I∑
i
′
=1
λ′ji
(
ŵ
′
i τ̂
′
ji
)
= 0 + · · ·+ λ′jj
(
ŵ
′
j τ̂
′
jj
)
+ · · ·+ 0,
as τ ′jj = τjj by R2 and hence Equation B.4 provisionally reduces to
ŵ
A
i =
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ŵ
′
j τ̂
′
jj
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In the second step, the same methodology can be applied to the nominator of Equation
B.4, now using the entire summation over j′. With  < 0, for all j′ = 1, . . . , i′, . . . , n′ the
summation term of j′ becomes
lim
τ
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as τ ′ii = τii by R2 and hence
ŵ
A
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1
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(
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′
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)
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(
ŵ
I
j
′ τ̂ ′jj
) (ŵAj )γj Xj .
Third, because in autarky i = j, it must be that λ′ii
(
ŵiτ̂
′
ii
)
= λ′jj
(
ŵ
′
j τ̂
′
jj
)
, which thus
gives
ŵ
A
j =
Xj
Yj
(
ŵ
A
j
)γj ⇐⇒
ŵ
A
j =
(
Xj
Yj
)1/(1−γj)
. (B.6)
Equations B.5 and B.6 can then be combined to reveal the result of Proposition 1.
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B.2 Data appendix
Air travel itinerary data from Sabre. The global aviation Market Intelligence database
of Sabre (2016) contains passenger traffic and sales data from bookings made via the three
major global distribution systems Sabre, Amadeus and Travelport.
Origin and destination (O-D) passenger flows in the dataset refer to the total number of
passengers travelling between any two countries, irrespective of how they got there in the
first place (non-stop, connections, through flights, etc.). An individual passenger’s journey
is therefore reported as several O-D entries in the data. For example, a passenger travelling
from Vienna (VIE) to New York (JFK) would show up in the VIE-JFK-VIE (outbound)
as well as the JFK-VIE-JFK (inbound) itinerary. Using the filter option by point of origin
country however, one can filter for inbound travel only. The point of origin country refers
to the country where passengers started their journey. Using the example from above, the
outbound journey is thus characterised by the itinerary VIE-JFK-VIE with VIE selected
as the point of origin airport, whereas the inbound journey is characterised by the itinerary
JFK-VIE-JFK with JFK selected as the point of origin airport.
In international tourism, passengers returning to their country of origin are however not
classified as international tourists and need therefore be excluded from the total number
of international tourist arrivals. This can be achieved by filtering the data for O-D flows,
where the origin country is identical to the point of origin country. Inbound itineraries are
therefore excluded. Using Austria as the origin country and the point of origin country, and
the US as the destination country would include the number of passengers travelling from
VIE to JFK on the VIE-JFK-VIE itinerary. The same criteria apply to connecting flights.
For example, passengers travelling from Vienna to New York via London are included in
the VIE-LHR-JFK-LHR-VIE itinerary using Austria as the point of origin country, but
excluded from the LHR-JFK-LHR itinerary as the point of origin country should in this
case only be the UK or the US.
By applying these filter criteria, the air travel itinerary data becomes a dataset that is
representative for international tourism flows. Limitations however exist as the data does
not contain passenger movements across borders using surface transport modes (e.g. rail
and road). The total number of international tourist arrivals in the realised dataset is
therefore smaller than the actual number of international tourist arrivals in each country.
Table B.1 gives an overview.
The total number of international tourist arrivals for the top ten countries I obtain from
the air travel itinerary data compare well to the numbers in UNWTO, 2016, considering
that surface transport accounts for 46% (with road being 39%, rail 2% and water 5%) of
global tourism movements (UNWTO, 2016). Significantly smaller numbers are obtained
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for countries which are a popular destination for international tourism by road like France
and the US. With air travel being the primary modes of transport for visits to the UK, the
numbers should match more closely. Discrepancies however still exist due to differences in
the reporting method. For example, the UNWTO data counts international tourists from
numbers of overnight visitors. The data therefore indicates that there are a significant
number of day trips into the UK, which is the reason for obtaining a higher number of
international tourist arrivals using air travel itinerary data.
Table B.1: Top ten destination countries by international tourist arrivals (in millions)
Rank All tourism acc. to UNWTO Tourism via air transport
using data from Sabre
Country 2014 arrivals 2014 arrivals
1 France 83.7 22.9
2 USA 75.0 47.5
3 Spain 64.9 47.3
4 China 55.6 24.9
5 Italy 48.6 26.6
6 Turkey 39.8 19.6
7 Germany 33.0 26.5
8 United Kingdom 32.6 39.5
9 Mexico 29.3 12.4
10 Russian Federation 29.8 12.3
The Sabre data contains two types of airfares. The base airfare is the amount paid for
the ticket for a one way trip and exclusive of any taxes. The total airfare is the base
airfare plus taxes for a one way trip. Table B.2 gives an overview and shows that the
amount of taxes paid (calculated as the difference between the two) is substantial. As these
taxes are determined exogenously, they can be used as an instrument for the endogenously
determined airfares in IV regression statistics. The amount paid for travel relative to the
total amount paid for all tourism activities in the destination country (the ad valorem
measure) is discussed in the main text. Transport costs in international tourism refer to
the costs paid for return trips. O-D airfares (one way) need therefore be multiplied by two.
Table B.2: Unit and ad valorem air travel costs (return trips) in international tourism in 2014
Distance range Base airfare Total airfare
[1000km] airfare [2014$] ad valorem [%] airfare [2014$] ad valorem [%]
0-1.0 216 (170-273) 26 (16-37) 341 (268-424) 42 (27-58)
1.0-2.5 279 (221-425) 31 (21-47) 443 (371-608) 49 (33-71)
2.5-5.0 645 (462-841) 55 (35-87) 894 (676-1,157) 78 (51-124)
5.0-7.5 873 (695-1,129) 76 (47-103) 1,274 (1,059-1,529) 111 (68-149)
7.5-10.0 994 (821-1,228) 79 (56-105) 1,451 (1,241-1,707) 116 (84-150)
10.0-15.0 1,385 (1,110-1,832) 92 (64-116) 1,888 (1,563-2,399) 126 (88-161)
15.0-20.0 1,799 (1,587-2,054) 87 (54-118) 2,385 (2,131-2,725) 120 (72-157)
Total 772 (416-1,125) 61 (34-96) 1,137 (605-1,570) 88 (52-136)
Notes: Descriptive statistics of unit and ad valorem air travel costs of international tourism in 2014. Data
from Sabre (2016) and World Bank (2017). Base airfares are exclusive; total fares are inclusive of taxes,
surcharges and other fees. Reported is the median value with the 25% quartile and 75% quartile reported
in brackets. Ad valorem values are calculated by dividing airfares by the average price paid by tourists in
the destination country (see Equation 5.22).
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World Bank data. The World Bank (2017) provides tourism data by number of tourist
arrivals and departures and tourism receipts and expenditures. The data is collected from
the UNWTO and reported on an annual basis.
International inbound tourists refers to the total number of travellers entering a foreign
country for any period lass than 12 months and for any purpose other than a remunerated
activity. The data is collected from statistical authorities from border statistics (police,
immigration, and the like) or tourism statistics (tourism accommodation establishments)
and may also include same-day visitors, cruise passengers, and crew members.
International tourism receipts (in current U.S. dollars) refer to balance of payments (BOP)
expenditures by international inbound visitors (arrivals) and include payments for goods
and services and payments to national carriers for international transport, both from
overnight and same-day visitors. The BOP expenditures exclude expenditures from do-
mestic tourists. The amount spent on activities is identified with the travel item of the
BOP. The BOP estimates however also include expenditures associated with other types
of travellers (e.g. long-term students or patients, border and seasonal workers).
International outbound tourists refers to the total number of travellers exiting their country
of residence to any other country for any purpose other than a remunerated activity in the
country visited.
International tourism expenditures (in current U.S. dollars) refer to the BOP expenditures
of international outbound visitors in other countries from overnight and same-day visit-
ors and include, for most of the countries, payments to foreign carriers for international
transport.
WTTC data. Domestic tourism expenditure. The World Travel and Tourism Council
(2015) uses the Tourism Satellite Account (TSA) method to measure the direct economic
contribution of tourism consumption to a national economy (Frechtling, 2010). Data is
collected from reports from individual country statistic and tourism bodies and includes
spending for business and leisure trips. If these are not available, TSA data is used from the
UNWTO. If TSAs are not available, domestic tourism receipts are estimated as a function
of GDP and tourism expenditures.
Bilateral tourism variables.
Distance is the great circle distance in kilometres between the two major cities in each
country. The major city is defined as the city with the highest population density. In the
majority of cases, the major city is equivalent to the country’s official capital. Data source:
Mayer and Zignago (2011).
Direction of travel is an indicator variable if the preferred direction of travel is mainly
219
north to south as opposed to east-west, measured as the absolute difference in degrees of
latitude between the country centroids of the origin and destination country, relative to
the absolute difference in degrees of longitude between the country centroids. Latitude and
longitude data is taken from the Portland State University Economics Department (2016).
Internet users refers to the lower average number of people using the internet in the origin
and destination country as defined by Equation 5.32. An internet user is a person who
has used the internet from any location and within the last 12 months via a computer,
mobile phone, personal digital assistant, games machine, digital TV etc. Data source:
World Bank (2017).
Tourism visa is a binary variable that equals one if bilateral visa restrictions are in place,
and zero otherwise. Data source: Neumayer (2011)
Ski resort is a binary variable that equals one if both the origin and the destination country
have at least one major ski resort, and zero otherwise. According to Vanat (2016), the 68
countries with a ski resort, representing 100% of the total inbound market volume, are:
Austria, France, Italy, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Andorra, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Al-
bania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz-
stan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Ser-
bia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Argentina, Canada, Chile,
Mexico, United States, Australia, China, India, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, North
Korea, South Korea, Algeria, Israel, Lebanon, Lesotho, Morocco, and South Africa.
Near coast is a binary variable that equals one if 54.3% of both countries’ surface area is
within 100 km of ice-free coast, and zero otherwise. 54.3% is the mean value of all countries
in the data. Data source: Nunn and Puga (2012).
Common official language is a binary variable that equals one if both countries share the
same official language, the same national language, or a language spoken by at least 20%
of the population in either country, and zero otherwise. Data source: Mayer and Zignago
(2011).
Colonial ties is a binary variable that equals one if the origin country ever colonised the
destination country or vice versa after 1945, for a relatively long period of time and with
a substantial participation in the governance of the colonized country, and zero otherwise.
Data source: Mayer and Zignago (2011).
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B.3 Additional results
Table B.3: Gains from international tourism (full list).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Country Xj/Yj λjj αj γj Ŵj,w Ŵj,λjj Ŵj
[-] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
1 Maldives‡ 0.12 19 3.5 28.5 52.96 1.46 53.65
2 Fiji‡ 0.18 53 1.9 11.0 15.84 0.31 16.10
3 Croatia 0.23 69 2.7 11.5 13.67 0.25 13.89
4 Cambodia* 0.31 56 3.9 13.2 11.90 0.56 12.39
5 Montenegro 0.24 71 2.1 9.4 10.99 0.18 11.15
6 Belize‡ 0.27 58 2.7 10.2 10.26 0.37 10.59
7 Kuwait* 3.53 25 7.9 1.7 7.59 2.73 10.11
8 Bahamas‡ 0.32 65 3.3 11.0 9.37 0.36 9.69
9 Jordan* 0.30 32 2.0 7.2 6.58 0.56 7.10
10 Jamaica‡* 0.36 55 2.9 8.9 6.47 0.44 6.88
11 Malta 0.38 43 3.9 9.8 6.08 0.83 6.86
12 Panama* 0.34 55 2.7 7.9 5.91 0.40 6.28
13 Hong Kong* 0.58 33 7.2 12.6 3.31 2.01 5.25
14 Brunei Darussalam* 2.39 33 5.7 1.8 3.44 1.56 4.94
15 Cyprus 0.64 14 6.2 9.6 1.63 3.04 4.62
16 Mauritius‡* 0.47 53 3.9 8.8 4.02 0.62 4.61
17 Albania 0.92 13 8.4 10.2 0.16 4.15 4.30
18 Dominican Republic‡* 0.36 73 2.0 5.8 4.06 0.16 4.21
19 Georgia 0.44 49 2.7 6.8 3.52 0.49 3.99
20 Greece 0.48 72 3.6 7.7 3.18 0.30 3.47
21 Thailand* 0.43 65 2.7 6.1 3.01 0.29 3.29
22 Qatar* 1.18 14 5.9 3.8 0.36 2.89 3.23
23 Armenia 1.09 11 6.1 6.2 -0.01 3.24 3.23
24 Zimbabwe* 2.42 0 1.3 0.6 0.63 2.15 2.76
25 Bulgaria 0.47 45 2.3 5.0 2.13 0.46 2.58
26 Morocco* 0.48 64 2.5 5.5 2.30 0.29 2.58
27 Costa Rica* 0.51 73 3.2 6.4 2.26 0.26 2.52
28 Portugal 0.52 60 3.2 6.2 2.03 0.42 2.44
29 Saudi Arabia* 1.76 32 3.9 2.0 1.09 1.12 2.20
30 Tunisia* 0.54 71 2.9 5.7 1.79 0.25 2.03
31 St. Vincent & Gren.‡ 0.32 66 0.7 2.4 1.88 0.08 1.96
32 Estonia 0.68 28 3.7 5.4 0.70 1.17 1.86
33 Norway 1.62 39 4.2 2.4 0.85 0.97 1.82
34 Iceland 0.79 38 6.2 7.5 0.32 1.50 1.81
35 Singapore‡* 1.18 28 4.8 3.7 0.20 1.54 1.74
36 Puerto Rico‡ 0.64 74 5.0 7.8 1.37 0.38 1.74
37 Luxembourg 0.69 20 3.4 4.3 0.34 1.36 1.70
38 Kenya* 0.61 92 3.4 6.4 1.55 0.07 1.62
39 Azerbaijan 1.11 31 5.2 4.1 0.12 1.49 1.60
40 El Salvador* 0.56 78 2.4 4.7 1.41 0.15 1.56
41 Belgium 1.47 25 3.3 2.2 0.41 1.13 1.53
42 Turkey* 0.51 84 2.0 4.0 1.38 0.09 1.47
43 Yemen* 0.60 90 3.0 5.6 1.38 0.08 1.46
44 Tanzania* 0.70 39 3.3 5.1 0.68 0.77 1.45
45 Kyrgyz Republic 1.16 24 4.0 4.2 -0.03 1.44 1.41
46 Lesotho* 1.77 52 3.9 2.5 0.78 0.63 1.41
47 Slovenia 0.59 55 2.7 4.5 0.97 0.41 1.37
48 United Arab Emirates* 1.17 30 4.2 3.6 0.10 1.24 1.34
49 Nigeria* 1.62 59 4.1 2.6 0.78 0.55 1.32
50 Ukraine 1.63 34 2.8 1.7 0.52 0.74 1.26
51 Botswana* 0.55 68 2.2 3.9 1.03 0.21 1.24
Continued on next page
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Table B.3 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Country Xj/Yj λjj αj γj Ŵj,w Ŵj,λjj Ŵj
[-] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
52 Laos* 0.76 42 3.7 5.2 0.44 0.80 1.24
53 Russian Federation 1.64 40 2.8 1.7 0.59 0.65 1.23
54 Mongolia 1.58 28 2.5 1.6 0.40 0.78 1.18
55 Togo* 0.47 61 1.1 2.4 1.04 0.13 1.18
56 Myanmar* 0.41 89 0.9 2.2 1.13 0.03 1.16
57 Hungary 0.59 61 2.4 3.9 0.83 0.30 1.13
58 Spain 0.65 79 3.6 5.4 0.87 0.21 1.07
59 Bahrain* 0.61 47 2.6 3.7 0.58 0.49 1.06
60 Vanuatu‡* 0.18 25 0.1 0.7 1.01 0.05 1.06
61 Moldova 1.26 28 3.0 2.8 0.05 0.94 0.99
62 Ireland 0.65 32 1.9 2.6 0.34 0.53 0.86
63 Philippines* 1.21 62 5.7 4.8 0.17 0.68 0.85
64 Uganda* 0.63 50 1.7 2.8 0.55 0.29 0.84
65 Oman* 1.03 37 3.2 2.6 0.02 0.81 0.83
66 Bolivia* 1.13 52 4.4 3.9 0.07 0.72 0.79
67 Denmark 1.18 42 3.2 2.6 0.10 0.69 0.79
68 Malaysia* 0.73 55 3.1 4.0 0.32 0.46 0.78
69 Austria 0.77 67 4.3 5.5 0.33 0.42 0.75
70 Iraq* 1.28 49 2.9 2.1 0.22 0.52 0.75
71 Gambia* 0.58 42 1.1 2.0 0.48 0.25 0.73
72 Vietnam* 0.68 74 2.7 3.9 0.48 0.21 0.69
73 Uruguay* 0.91 42 2.9 3.3 0.03 0.64 0.67
74 New Zealand 0.79 75 4.8 6.0 0.30 0.35 0.65
75 Sri Lanka* 0.74 51 2.2 3.0 0.27 0.37 0.63
76 Serbia 1.00 33 2.3 2.4 0.00 0.62 0.62
77 Germany 1.14 74 6.4 5.4 0.14 0.47 0.61
78 Switzerland 0.96 47 3.2 3.1 0.00 0.61 0.61
79 Netherlands 1.11 44 2.7 2.3 0.04 0.55 0.59
80 Sweden 1.12 58 3.9 3.4 0.06 0.52 0.58
81 Latvia 0.84 47 2.5 3.0 0.10 0.47 0.56
82 Canada 1.26 59 3.1 2.4 0.15 0.41 0.56
83 Nepal* 1.13 53 3.5 3.7 -0.02 0.56 0.54
84 Nicaragua* 0.92 62 3.9 4.7 0.07 0.47 0.54
85 United Kingdom 1.07 72 6.1 5.7 0.02 0.49 0.52
86 Namibia* 0.76 87 3.2 4.6 0.40 0.11 0.51
87 Lithuania 0.86 47 2.4 2.8 0.06 0.45 0.51
88 Egypt* 0.79 79 3.5 4.7 0.29 0.20 0.49
89 Cameroon* 1.12 57 3.2 3.0 0.03 0.46 0.49
90 Macedonia 0.76 49 1.6 2.3 0.19 0.29 0.48
91 Czech Republic 0.79 43 1.7 2.1 0.10 0.35 0.45
92 Poland 0.81 33 1.3 1.6 0.06 0.36 0.43
93 Ghana* 0.96 53 2.5 2.8 0.01 0.40 0.41
94 Slovak Republic 1.00 48 2.2 2.2 0.00 0.41 0.41
95 Finland 1.15 58 2.6 2.2 0.05 0.35 0.40
96 Honduras* 0.94 74 4.4 5.1 0.05 0.34 0.39
97 Guyana‡* 0.99 63 3.3 3.8 0.01 0.37 0.38
98 Suriname‡ 0.92 38 1.5 1.7 0.02 0.35 0.37
99 France 0.96 67 3.6 3.8 0.01 0.36 0.37
100 China* 1.22 67 2.6 2.1 0.10 0.26 0.37
101 Guatemala* 0.86 69 2.9 3.5 0.10 0.26 0.36
102 South Africa 0.81 64 2.1 2.7 0.12 0.24 0.36
103 Paraguay* 1.14 60 2.4 2.1 0.04 0.30 0.34
104 Sao Tome and Principe‡* 0.41 27 0.2 0.5 0.27 0.07 0.34
105 Belarus 1.02 66 3.1 3.1 0.00 0.33 0.33
106 Burundi* 1.41 68 1.9 1.4 0.15 0.18 0.33
107 Iran* 1.26 65 2.1 1.7 0.10 0.23 0.33
Continued on next page
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Table B.3 – continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Country Xj/Yj λjj αj γj Ŵj,w Ŵj,λjj Ŵj
[-] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
108 Benin* 0.68 74 1.1 1.7 0.25 0.08 0.33
109 Senegal* 0.85 75 2.8 3.5 0.13 0.19 0.32
110 Australia 0.98 70 3.4 3.5 0.00 0.31 0.31
111 Venezuela* 1.10 89 7.7 6.8 0.09 0.22 0.31
112 Brazil* 1.22 76 2.9 2.4 0.10 0.20 0.30
113 Zambia* 0.78 60 1.5 1.9 0.10 0.19 0.29
114 Burkina Faso* 0.98 48 1.6 1.7 0.00 0.29 0.29
115 Argentina* 1.05 83 5.8 5.5 0.02 0.27 0.29
116 Korea, Rep.* 1.05 63 2.4 2.2 0.01 0.27 0.28
117 Colombia* 1.02 60 2.0 2.0 0.00 0.26 0.26
118 Peru* 0.87 82 3.5 4.1 0.08 0.17 0.25
119 Italy 0.88 77 3.3 3.6 0.05 0.21 0.25
120 Ecuador* 0.83 54 1.3 1.6 0.05 0.19 0.25
121 Romania 1.07 55 1.5 1.4 0.01 0.23 0.24
122 Mozambique* 1.12 66 2.5 2.6 -0.02 0.25 0.23
123 Kazakhstan 1.08 67 1.8 1.5 0.02 0.18 0.20
124 Malawi* 1.18 77 2.4 2.2 0.03 0.16 0.19
125 United States 0.91 85 3.6 4.0 0.04 0.14 0.19
126 Sudan* 0.83 84 2.1 2.6 0.09 0.09 0.19
127 Mexico* 0.97 90 6.3 6.5 0.01 0.16 0.17
128 Indonesia* 0.97 78 2.6 2.7 0.00 0.16 0.16
129 Chile* 0.97 83 3.3 3.4 0.00 0.15 0.15
130 Pakistan* 1.11 83 2.9 2.7 0.02 0.14 0.15
131 India* 0.97 84 2.6 2.7 0.00 0.11 0.12
132 Bangladesh* 1.08 91 2.8 2.7 0.01 0.06 0.07
133 Japan 1.04 87 1.9 1.9 0.00 0.07 0.07
134 Algeria* 1.04 92 2.3 2.3 0.00 0.05 0.05
135 Sierra Leone* 0.92 82 0.4 0.5 0.00 0.02 0.03
Notes: Small island developing states indicated by a ‡. Developing countries indicated by a ∗.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 6
C.1 Mathematical appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
From the definition of the budget shares in 6.8 and expenditure functions in 6.3, the budget
shares can be written for the initial equilibrium state as
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In the new equilibrium, these budget shares take the form
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Dividing λ′a by λa and using Definition 1
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ŵ
h
i τ̂
h
a
)h
∑I
i=1 λ
h
a
(
ŵ
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Market clearing (using 6.7) in the new equilibrium implies Y hi
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well as Y hi
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respectively. Changes in income can therefore be written as
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The next step requires to link changes in sector h to changes of the entire economy in each
country. From Equation 6.9, a country’s change in total income from all sectors is given
by
Yi = wiLi ≡ Li
H∏
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,
where the second equality derives from the fact that labour L remains constant by Defini-
tion 1. If only one sector changes at a time, this equality simplifies to Ŷi =
(
ŵ
h
i
)γhi
.
Using Equation 6.11, a country’s change in total income can be linked to its change in
total expenditure using
Xi = wiLi(1 + dn)⇐⇒ X̂i = ŵi.
Because market clearing implies Yi = wiLi (Equation 6.9) it follows that Ŷi = ŵi. Com-
bining this observation with the previous one results into X̂i = ŵi = Ŷi.
Assuming that a change in a country’s overall income equivalently applies to all sectors
X̂hi ≡ X̂i and therefore X̂hi = Ŷi =
(
ŵ
h
i
)γhi
, the expression for the changes in budget
shares of sector h can be rewritten as a general equilibrium model that iterates over the
vector of wages w ≡
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}
in sector h
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which is Equation 6.19 in Section 6.2. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Transferring the transport cost function Cτ = ζ(y,ϑ,P, F, ξ(t)) in 6.12 into a logarithmic
form and taking the total differential of the log of variable costs with respect to factor
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input prices P ≡ {Pk} yields
d lnCτ
d ln Pk
=
∂ lnCτ
∂ ln y
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+
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d lnF
d ln Pk
+
∂ lnCτ
∂ ln ξ(t)
d ln ξ(t)
d ln Pk
.
The partial derivatives in this expression represent the cost elasticities with respect to
output (εy ≡ ∂ lnCτ/∂ ln y), any quality differentials (εqϑ ≡ ∂ lnCτ/∂ lnϑq), fixed inputs
(εF ≡ ∂ lnCτ/∂ lnF ), technology (∂ lnCτ/∂ ln ξ(t)), and input prices ∂ lnCτ/∂ ln pi. In
addition, the cost elasticity with respect to prices is representative for the cost share of the
respective variable factor input (indexed with an i).
The expression above can be investigated for any changes in input prices
P = [Pfuel,Plabour,Pmaterial, . . . ,Pk]. By Definition 1 however, only changes in the fuel price
index are of primary interest for the general equilibrium model used in this study. With
Pk = Pfuel, the fuel cost share of the variable cost function is given by λfuel ≡ ∂ lnCτ/∂ ln pi.
Because a transport firm is assumed to operate under CRS (see main text), average costs
equal marginal costs, the cost elasticity with respect to output can be set to one (εy = 1),
and the output variable y be taken to the left hand side of the cost function to obtain
Equation 6.13 in the main text.
As pure technical change causes a neutral shift of the entire production function, the
general index of pure technical technical change ξ(t) can be expressed as a time-dependent
constant. As a result, the elasticity of cost with respect to pure technical change must be
equal to one ∂ lnC/∂ ln ξ(t) = 1.
Combining these observations in the expression from above
d lnCτ
d ln Pfuel
=
d ln y
d ln Pfuel
+
∑
q
εqϑ
d lnϑq
d ln Pfuel
+ λfuel + εF
d lnF
d ln Pfuel
+
d ln ξ(t)
d ln Pfuel
and rearranging yields
d ln
(
Cτ
y
)
= λfueld ln Pfuel +
∑
q
εqϑd lnϑq + εFd lnF + d ln ξ(t).
Integrating this expression between a point in time t and t + 1, which correspond to a
situation before and after a carbon tax on international transport has been introduced and
noting that, by Definition 1, this transition corresponds to any changes in costs, output
related quality differentials and technology that do not affect output ŷ = 1 as well as fixed
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costs1 F̂ = 1 results into
ln
(
C ′τ
y′
)
− ln
(
Cτ
y
)
=λfuel(ln P
′
fuel − ln Pfuel) +
∑
q
εqϑ(lnϑ
′
q − lnϑq)+
εF (lnF
′ − lnF ) + ln ξ(t+ 1)− ln ξ(t)⇐⇒
Ĉτ
ŷ
=(P̂fuel)
λfuel(F̂ )εF
ξ(t+ 1)
ξ(t)
∏
q
(ϑ̂q)
ε
q
ϑ ⇐⇒
Ĉτ =(P̂fuel)
λfuel ξ˙
∏
q
(ϑ̂q)
ε
q
ϑ ,
where the left hand side has been transformed to only account for changes in transport
costs as transport output y remains constant by Definition 1. From this expression, which
is Equation 6.20 in the main text, ξ(t) can now be recovered as a general index of pure
technical technical change at time t, while ξ˙ ≡ ξ(t + 1)/ξ(t) measures the rate of pure
technical change2. Within the stated time period, technological progress thus occurred if
ξ˙ < 1, whereas ξ˙ > 1 indicates technological regress. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Equation 6.1 can be used to link changes in freight rates and airfares f̂ha to changes in
iceberg transport costs τ̂ha using τa = 1+fa/wi ≥ 1, where a = {ij, ji}. As the formulation
of iceberg transport costs includes a normalisation using wages, which change in moving
from the initial to the new equilibrium, it is necessary to also keep track of the changes in
wages in this derivation.
Under constant markups, changes in prices charged by a transport firm are given by f̂ha =
Ĉhτ . Changes in freight rates and airfares in the new equilibrium can thus be written as
fha
′
= fha Ĉ
h
τ . Dropping the index h to ease notation, changes in iceberg freight rates and
airfares can then be calculated using
τ̂a =
1 +
f ′a
w
′
i
1 +
fa
wi
=
w
′
i + faĈτ
w
′
i
wi + fa
wi
=
wi
(
w
′
i + faĈτ
)
w
′
i
(
wi + fa︸ ︷︷ ︸
pa
)
=
wi
w
′
ipa
(
w
′
i + faĈτ
)
=
wi
pa
+
wi
w
′
i
fa
pa
Ĉτ
=
1
τa
+
1
ŵi
fa
pa
Ĉτ , a = {ij, ji} .
1Faced with a permanent change in fuel cost, a transport firm will consider to invest into more fuel-
efficient technology over time. These changes are captured by ξ˙. High capital investments costs and the
related difficulties to adjust to new cost-optimal minima over a relatively short period of time could also
involve a in fixed costs F . These changes are not taken into account.
2See e.g. Lundmark and Söderholm, 2004 for a similar specification of the rate of pure technical change.
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In addition, one can show that
1
τa
=
1
1 +
fa
wi
=
1
1 +
fa
pa − fa
=
1
pa
pa − fa
=
pa − fa
pa
= 1− fa
pa
, a = {ij, ji} .
Combining both expressions and multiplying both sides with ŵi yields
ŵiτ̂a = ŵi
(
1− fa
pa
)
+ Ĉτ
(
fa
pa
)
, a = {ij, ji} ,
which is Equation 6.21 in the main text. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Starting from the price index
P hj =
(
I∑
i=1
(
w
h
i τ
h
a
)h
Si
)1/h
⇐⇒
(
P hj
)h
=
I∑
i=1
(
w
h
i τ
h
a
)h
Si, a = {ij, ji}
it follows that small changes in the price index satisfy
hd lnP hj =
I∑
i=1
λha
h
(
d lnwhi + d ln τ
h
a
)
⇐⇒
d lnP hj =
I∑
i=1
λha
(
d lnwhi + d ln τ
h
a
)
, a = {ij, ji} .
From the gravity equations given by Equation 6.3, the budget shares λha can be rewritten
as
Xha /X
h
j = λ
h
a =
(
w
h
i τ
h
a
)h (
P hj
)−h
Si, a = {ij, ji} ,
and also be stated for domestic flows in the form of (noting that τhjj = 1)
Xhjj/X
h
j = λ
h
jj =
(
w
h
j
)h (
P hj
)−h
Sj .
Relative spending is therefore given by
λha/λ
h
jj =
(
w
h
i τ
h
a /w
h
j
)h
Si/Sj , a = {ij, ji} .
Taking logs of this expression gives
d lnλha − d lnλhjj = h
(
d lnwhi + d ln τ
h
a − d lnwhj
)
Si/Sj ⇐⇒
228
d lnλha − d lnλhjj
h
+ d lnwhj = d lnw
h
i + d ln τ
h
a , a = {ij, ji} ,
because d lnSi = 0 and d lnSj = 0.
Combining these results with the expression for the changes in the price index, it can be
shown that
d lnP hj =
I∑
i=1
λha
(
d lnλha − d lnλhjj
h
+ d lnwhj
)
d lnP hj =
∑I
i=1 λ
h
a
(
d lnλha − d lnλhjj
)
h
+
I∑
i=1
λhad lnw
h
j , a = {ij, ji} .
Because
∑I
i=1 λ
h
a = 1 by definition 6.8 and therefore
∑I
i=1 d lnλ
h
a = 0 it follows that
d lnP hj =
−d lnλhjj
h
+ d lnwhj ,
which is Equation 6.2 in the main text. 
C.2 Data appendix
Using a similar specification as in Simonovska and Waugh (2014) (online appendix), gross
industry output and gross output values for the countries not included in the OECD Input
Output tables are approximated using the ratio of value added to gross output. The
specification used for the industry sector is
ln
(
GDPI
Y I
)
= β0 + βGDPCGDP + βPOPCPOP +
i,a∑
k=1
(
βkLC
k
l + β
k
GDPC
k
GDP
)
+ ε,
and for the total economy
ln
(
GDP
Y
)
= β0 + βGDPCGDP + βPOPCPOP +
i,a,s∑
k=1
(
βkLC
k
l + β
k
GDPC
k
GDP
)
+ ε,
where βx is 1× 3 vector of coefficients corresponding to Cx. Cx denotes an N × 3 matrix
of variables containing
[
ln(x), (ln(x))2, (ln(x))3
]
for the sub-sample of N countries for
which data is available. POP refers to total population and L to the labour force in each
sector in each country using data from the World Bank. The World Bank uses the sector
disaggregation of industry (i), agriculture (a), and services (s), where industry corresponds
to ISIC divisions 10-45 and agriculture to ISIC divisions 1-5. Jointly, the World Bank
sectors i and a therefore represent the industry sector I as defined in Chapter 6, whereas,
229
all three World Bank sectors (i, a and s) represent the entire economy. The labour force
in each sector is calculated by multiplying labour share data in each sector (i, a and s)
with total labour force data from the World Bank.
Calculated and estimated 2011 gross output and gross industry output values are then
transferred to 2014 values using 2011-14 growth rates in industry GDP and total GDP and
corrected for inflation with data from the World Bank.
Rate of CO2 reduction. The rate of CO2 reduction is approximated using marginal
abatement cost curve data from Schäfer et al. (2015) for aviation and from Alvik et al.
(2009) for maritime transport. In both cases, a constant value is added to the marginal
abatement costs such that negative values do not occur and emission reductions are nor-
malised to represent % emission reductions of the entire fleet. Using this data, a power
function, constrained to pass through the zero-point, in the form of
φh(PCO2) = % CO2 reduction = 1−
(
β2
carbon price + β2
)β1
(C.1)
is fitted, using nonlinear least squares. Figure C.1 shows the data, the estimated coeffi-
cients, and the fitted curve. To establish MAC curves, the cost-effective mitigation options
are assumed to be implemented first. The rate of CO2 reduction in Figure C.1 therefore
declines with higher carbon prices, as the basket of cost-effective mitigation options is
gradually exhausted, leaving mitigation options that are more expensive to implement.
The maritime transport industry has—in comparison to the air transport industry—a sig-
nificantly larger number of mitigation options with significantly higher CO2 abatement
potential available. The potential for emission reductions is therefore lower in the aviation
than in the maritime transport industry, as indicated by the data in Figure C.1.
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Figure C.1: Approximated rate of CO2 reduction in the aviation and maritime transport industry.
Data from Schäfer et al. (2015) and Alvik et al. (2009). Aviation: β1 = 0.32, and β2 = 121.
Maritime transport: β1 = 1.18, and β2 = 301.
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C.3 Additional results and figures
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Figure C.2: Dynamic price changes in trade. The figure displays the changes in prices pIji (of
all country pairs in the dataset) between the initial and new equilibrium as a result of changes in
wages ŵ I in international trade using a carbon price of $50/tCO2.
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Figure C.3: Dynamic price changes in tourism. As in Figure C.2 but for tourism, using a carbon
price of $50/tCO2.
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Figure C.4: Reductions in real income Ŵj − 1 by country due to a carbon price of $300/tCO2 in
international sea transport.
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Figure C.5: Reductions in real income Ŵj − 1 by country due to a carbon price of $300/tCO2 in
international air transport.
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Figure C.6: Reductions in real income Ŵj − 1 by country due to a carbon price of $300/tCO2 in
international air and sea transport.
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Figure C.7: Reductions in real income Ŵj − 1 of trade against tourism due to a carbon price of
$300/tCO2 in international air and sea transport.
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Figure C.8: Changes in income
(
ŵ
h
j
)(γhj −αhj )
over changes in the price index
(
λ̂hjj
)αhj /h
in the
industry sector due to a carbon price of $300/tCO2 in international sea transport.
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Figure C.9: Changes in income
(
ŵ
h
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)(γhj −αhj )
over changes in the price index
(
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)αhj /h
in the
tourism sector due to a carbon price of $300/tCO2 in international air transport.
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Table C.1: Sensitivity analysis of results in Table 6.3 using lower demand elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Carbon Av. Av. Av. delta Delta Tax Delta Economic
price p̂Iij λ̂
I
jj RI GWP rev. CO2 cost
$/tCO2 % % $/cap. $bn $bn MtCO2 $GWP/tCO2
International trade in a CO2-constrained world
25 .3 .3 -15 -24 13 -52 464
50 .5 .6 -26 -42 24 -96 440
75 .7 .8 -35 -56 33 -133 418
100 .9 .9 -41 -66 41 -166 398
125 1 1 -46 -74 48 -194 379
150 1 1.1 -50 -79 53 -219 363
175 1.1 1.1 -52 -84 58 -241 347
200 1.1 1.2 -54 -87 63 -260 333
225 1.2 1.2 -56 -89 67 -278 320
250 1.2 1.2 -57 -90 70 -294 308
275 1.2 1.3 -57 -91 73 -308 297
300 1.2 1.3 -59 -94 78 -316 298
International tourism in a CO2-constrained world
25 1.7 1.3 -5 -8 10 -26 295
50 3.1 2.3 -9 -14 20 -46 295
75 4.3 3.2 -12 -18 28 -63 293
100 5.3 3.9 -15 -22 36 -77 292
125 6.1 4.5 -17 -26 44 -89 291
150 6.9 5.1 -19 -29 51 -100 289
175 7.5 5.6 -20 -31 58 -109 288
200 8.1 6 -22 -34 64 -117 286
225 8.6 6.3 -23 -36 70 -125 285
250 9.1 6.7 -24 -37 76 -132 283
275 9.5 7 -25 -39 82 -138 282
300 9.9 7.3 -26 -40 88 -144 280
International trade and tourism in a CO2-constrained world
25 - - -20 -32 23 -77 409
50 - - -35 -56 44 -142 393
75 - - -47 -74 61 -196 378
100 - - -56 -88 77 -242 364
125 - - -63 -99 91 -283 351
150 - - -68 -108 104 -318 340
175 - - -73 -115 116 -350 329
200 - - -76 -120 127 -378 318
225 - - -79 -124 137 -403 309
250 - - -81 -128 147 -426 300
275 - - -82 -130 156 -446 292
300 - - -85 -134 166 -460 292
Notes: The base year for calculations is 2014 using data and input parameters as
specified in Table 6.1 and I = −3 and T = −2.
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Table C.2: Sensitivity analysis of results in Table 6.3 using higher demand elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Carbon Av. Av. Av. delta Delta Tax Delta Economic
price p̂Iij λ̂
I
jj RI GWP rev. CO2 cost
$/tCO2 % % $/cap. $bn $bn MtCO2 $GWP/tCO2
International trade in a CO2-constrained world
25 .3 .8 -15 -24 13 -52 463
50 .5 1.3 -26 -42 24 -96 435
75 .7 1.8 -34 -55 33 -133 411
100 .9 2.1 -40 -65 41 -166 390
125 1 2.3 -45 -72 48 -194 371
150 1 2.5 -48 -77 53 -219 354
175 1.1 2.7 -51 -81 58 -241 338
200 1.1 2.8 -53 -84 63 -260 324
225 1.2 2.8 -54 -87 67 -278 311
250 1.2 2.9 -55 -88 70 -294 299
275 1.2 2.9 -56 -89 73 -308 288
300 1.2 3 -57 -91 78 -316 289
International tourism in a CO2-constrained world
25 1.7 3.9 -5 -7 10 -26 288
50 3.1 7 -8 -13 20 -46 282
75 4.3 9.6 -11 -17 28 -63 278
100 5.3 11.8 -14 -21 36 -77 274
125 6.1 13.7 -16 -24 44 -89 270
150 6.9 15.3 -17 -27 51 -100 267
175 7.5 16.7 -19 -29 58 -109 264
200 8.1 17.9 -20 -31 64 -117 261
225 8.6 19 -21 -32 70 -125 258
250 9.1 20 -22 -34 76 -132 256
275 9.5 20.9 -23 -35 82 -138 254
300 9.9 21.7 -24 -36 88 -144 251
International trade and tourism in a CO2-constrained world
25 - - -20 -31 23 -77 405
50 - - -34 -55 44 -142 386
75 - - -46 -72 61 -196 369
100 - - -54 -86 77 -242 353
125 - - -61 -96 91 -283 339
150 - - -66 -104 104 -318 327
175 - - -70 -110 116 -350 315
200 - - -73 -115 127 -378 305
225 - - -75 -119 137 -403 295
250 - - -77 -122 147 -426 286
275 - - -78 -124 156 -446 278
300 - - -81 -128 166 -460 277
Notes: The base year for calculations is 2014 using data and input parameters as
specified in Table 6.1 and I = −7 and T = −6.
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Appendix D
Correspondence tables
D.1 Aggregation of extra-EU data into industries
# Industry NST/R three digit code and description
Energy
1 Crude petroleum 310 Crude petroleum
2 Gaseous hydrocarbons 330 Gaseous hydrocarbons, liquid or compressed
3 Coal, lignite and peat 211 Coal
213 Coal briquettes
221 Lignite
223 Lignite briquettes
224 Peat
Mining and quarrying
4 Iron ore 410 Iron ore and concentrates; except roasted iron pyrites
5 Minor bulk 452 Copper ore and concentrates; copper matte
453 Bauxite and concentrates
455 Manganese ore and concentrates
459 Other non-ferrous ores and concentrates
611 Sand for industrial use
612 Ordinary sand and gravel
613 Pumice stone, including pumiceous sand and gravel
621 Salt, crude or refined
622 Unroasted iron pyrites
623 Sulphur
634 Chalk
639 Other crude minerals
711 Sodium nitrate, natural
712 Phosphates, crude, natural
713 Potassium salts, crude, natural
719 Other natural fertilizers
820 Aluminium oxide and hydroxide
Agriculture and forestry
6 Grain 11 Wheat, spelt and meslin
12 Barley
13 Rye
14 Oats
15 Maize
16 Rice
Continued on next page
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Table D.1 – continued from previous page
# Industry NST/R three digit code and description
19 Other cereals n.e.s.
7 Fruits and vegetables 20 Potatoes
31 Citrus fruit
35 Other fruit and nuts, fresh
39 Other vegetables, fresh or frozen
60 Sugar beets
8 Wood and cork 51 Paper pulp wood
52 Pit props
55 Other wood in the round
56 Railway or tramway sleepers of wood and other wood
roughly squared, half squared, or sawn
57 Fuel wood, wood charcoal, wood waste, cork unworked,
waste cork
Manufacturing
9 Manufacture of food
products
141 Meat, fresh, chilled or frozen
147 Meat, dried, salted, smoked; prepared or preserved meat
142 Fish, crustaceans and molluscs, fresh, frozen, dried,
salted or smoked
148 Fish, crustaceans and molluscs, prepared or preserved
164 Fruit, frozen, dried, dehydrated; prepared and preserved
fruit
165 Dried vegetables
166 Prepared and preserved vegetables
182 Animal and vegetable fats and oils, and products de-
rived therefrom
145 Margarine, lard and edible fats
144 Butter, cheese, other dairy produce
161 Flour, cereal meal and groats
895 Starches and gluten
163 Other cereal preparations
112 Refined sugar
136 Glucose, dextrose; other sugars; sugar confectionery;
honey
132 Cocoa and chocolate
133 Tea, mat+, spices
131 Coffee
139 Food preparations n.e.s.
10 Manufacture of beverages 121 Wine of fresh grapes, grape must
122 Beer made from malt
125 Other alcoholic beverages
128 Non-alcoholic beverages
11 Manufacture of tobacco
products
135 Manufactured tobacco
12 Manufacture of textiles 962 Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles and related
products
13 Manufacture of wearing
apparel and leather
961 Leather, manufactures of leather, of raw hide and skins
963 Travel goods, clothing, knitted and crocheted goods,
footwear
14 Manufacture of wood and
of products of wood and
cork
976 Wood and cork manufactures, excluding furniture
15 Manufacture of paper and
paper products
972 Paper and paperboard, unworked
973 Paper and paperboard manufactures
974 Paper matter
841 Paper pulp
16 Manufacture of coke and
refined petroleum products
231 Coke and semi-coke of coal
233 Coke and semi-coke of lignite
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321 Motor spirit
323 Kerosene, jet fuel and white spirit
325 Distillate fuels
327 Residual fuel oils
341 Lubricating oils and greases
343 Petroleum bitumen and bituminous mixtures
349 Other non-fuel petroleum derivatives
17 Manufacture of chemicals
and chemical products
811 Sulphuric acid; oleum
812 Caustic soda and soda lye
813 Sodium carbonate (soda ash)
814 Calcium carbide
819 Other basic chemicals
721 Basic slag (thomas slag)
722 Other phosphatic fertilizers
723 Potassic fertilizers
724 Nitrogenous fertilizers
729 Composite and other manufactured fertilizers
896 Other chemical products and preparations
892 Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials
894 Manufactured explosives, fireworks and other pyrotech-
nic articles, sporting ammunition
43 Man-made fibres
18 Manufacture of basic
pharmaceutical products
and pharmaceutical
preparations
893 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products; perfumery and
cleansing preparations
19 Manufacture of rubber and
plastic products
971 Semi-finished products and manufactured articles of
rubber
891 Plastic materials, unworked
20 Manufacture of other
non-metallic mineral
products
951 Glass
952 Glassware, pottery and other manufactures of minerals
692 Bricks, roofing tiles and other ceramic building materi-
als, refractory building materials
614 Clay and clay earth
631 Crushed or broken stone; pebbles, macadam, tarred
macadam
641 Cement
642 Lime
650 Plasters
691 Pumice stone agglomerates; concrete, cement and sim-
ilar building materials
21 Manufacture of basic
metals and fabricated
metal products
512 Pig iron, spiegeleisen and carburized ferro-manganese
513 Ferro-alloys other than carburized ferro-manganese
(non-ecsc)
515 Crude steel
522 Semi-finished rolled steel products (blooms, billets,
slabs, sheet bars, coils)
523 Other semi-finished steel products (non-ecsc)
532 Hot-rolled or -shaped steel
533 Cold-rolled or -shaped or forged steel (non-ecsc)
535 Wire rod
536 Steel iron and steel wire (non-ecsc)
542 Sheets and plates of steel for re-rolling; universal plates
543 Other steel plates and sheets (non-ecsc)
545 Steel hoop and strip, tinplate
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546 Other steel hoop and strip (non-ecsc)
551 Tubes, pipes and fittings
552 Iron and steel castings and forgings
561 Copper and copper alloys, unwrought
562 Aluminium and aluminium alloys, unwrought
563 Lead and lead alloys, unwrought
564 Zinc and zinc alloys, unwrought
565 Other non-ferrous metals and alloys thereof, unwrought
568 Finished and semi-finished products of non-ferrous
metals (except manufactures)
941 Finished structural parts and structures
949 Other manufactures of metal
22 Manufacture of electronic
and eletrical equipment
931 Electrical machinery, apparatus, appliances and en-
gines; parts thereof
23 Manufacture of machinery,
vehicles and other
transport equipment
920 Tractors; agricultural machinery and equipment,
whether or not assembled; parts thereof
939 Non-electrical machinery, apparatus, appliances and en-
gines; parts thereof
910 Transport equipment, whether or not assembled, parts
thereof
24 Manufacture of furniture 975 Furniture, new
Other
25 Live animals 1 Live animals
26 Gold, coins, medals 994 Gold, coins, medals
D.2 Aggregation of OECD-MTC data into industries
# Industry HS2 HS6 HS2/HS6 description
Energy
1 Crude petroleum 2709 Crude oil from petroleum and bituminous minerals
2 Gaseous hydrocarbons 2705 Coal gas, water gas, prdcr gas etc
2711 Petroleum gases & other gaseous hydrocarbons
3 Coal, lignite and peat 2701 Coal, briquettes, ovoids etc
2702 Lignite, agglomerated or not, excluding jet
2703 Peat (including peat litter), incl agglomrtd
2704 Coke etc of coal, lignite or peat, retort carbon
4402 Wood charcoal, whether or not agglomerated
Mining and quarrying
4 Iron ore 2601 Iron ores & concentrates, including roast pyrites
5 Minor bulk 25 Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering materi-
als, lime and cement
2602 Manganese ores & concentrates inc mangnfrs iron
ores
2603 Copper ores and concentrates
2604 Nickel ores and concentrates
2605 Cobalt ores and concentrates
2606 Aluminum ores and concentrates
2607 Lead ores and concentrates
2608 Zinc ores and concentrates
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2609 Tin ores and concentrates
2610 Chromium ores and concentrates
2611 Tungsten ores and concentrates
2612 Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates
2613 Molybdenum ores and concentrates
2614 Titanium ores and concentrates
2615 Niobium, tantalum, vanadium & zirconium ore &
conc
2616 Precious metal ores and concentrates
Agriculture and forestry
7 Grain 10 Cereals
8 Fruits and vegetables 7 Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers
8 Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or melons
6 Wood and cork 4401 Fuel wood in logs etc, wood in chips, etc
4403 Wood in the rough, stripped or not of sapwood etc
4501 Natural cork, raw or simply prep, waste cork etc
4502 Natural cork deback/rgh sqd in
blocks/sheets/strips
Manufacturing
9 Manufacture of food
products
2 Meat and edible meat offal
3 Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic
invertebrates
4 Dairy produce; birds’ eggs; natural honey etc
5 Products of animal origin, not elsewhere specified
or included
9 Coffee, tea, mate and spices
11 Products of the milling industry; malt; starches;
inulin; wheat gluten
13 Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps and ex-
tracts
14 Vegetable plaiting materials/products not else-
where included
15 Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage
products etc
16 Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, mol-
luscs etc
17 Sugars and sugar confectionery
18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations
19 Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk;
pastrycooks’ products
20 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other
parts of plants
21 Miscellaneous edible preparations
35 Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; glues;
enzymes
10 Manufacture of
beverages
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar
11 Manufacture of tobacco
products
24 Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes
12 Manufacture of textiles 50 Silk
51 Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn
and woven fabric
52 Cotton
53 Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and
woven fabrics of paper yarn
56 Wadding, felt and nonwovens; special yarns etc
57 Carpets and other textile floor coverings
58 Special woven fabrics; tufted textile fabrics etc
59 Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile
fabrics etc
60 Knitted or crocheted fabrics
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63 Other made up textile articles; sets; worn clothing
and worn textile articles
13 Manufacture of wearing
apparel and leather
41 Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and
leather
42 Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel
goods, handbags etc
43 Furskins and artificial fur; manufactures thereof
61 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted
or crocheted
62 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not
knitted or crocheted
64 Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles
65 Headgear and parts thereof
14 Manufacture of wood
and of products of wood
and cork
4404 Hoopwood, split poles, pickets and stakes etc
4405 Wood wool (excelsior), wood flour
4406 Railway or tramway sleepers (cross-ties) of wood
4407 Wood sawn or chipped length, sliced etc, ovmm
thick
4408 Veneer sheets etc, not over mm thick
4409 Wood, continuously shaped (tongued, grooved etc)
4410 Particle board & similar board of wood etc
4411 Fiberboard of wood or other ligneous materials
4412 Plywood, veneered panels & similar laminated
wood
4413 Densified wood blocks/plates/strips/profile shapes
4414 Wooden frames paintings, photographs, mirrors,
etc
4415 Packing cases etc of wood, pallets etc of wood
4416 Casks, barrels, vats, etc and parts, of wood
4417 Tools, tool & broom bodies etc shoe last/trees
wood
4418 Builders’ joinery and carpentry of wood
4419 Tableware and kitchenware, of wood
4420 Wood marquetry etc, jewel case etc & wood furn
nesoi
4421 Articles of wood, nesoi
4503 Articles of natural cork
4504 Agglomerated cork and articles thereof
15 Manufacture of paper
and paper products
47 Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulosic material;
recovered paper
48 Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of
paper or of paperboard
49 Printed books, newspapers, pictures etc
16 Manufacture of coke and
refined petroleum
products
2706 Mineral tars, including reconstituted tars
2707 Oils etc from high temp coal tar, sim aromatic etc
2708 Pitch & pitch coke from coal tar or other min tars
2710 Oil (not crude) from petrol & bitum mineral
2712 Petroleum jelly, mineral waxes & similar products
2713 Petroleum coke, petroleum bitumen & other
residues
2714 Bitumen & asphalt, natural, shale & tar sands etc
2715 Bit mixture from nat asph, nat bit, pet bit, min
tar or pt
17 Manufacture of
chemicals and chemical
products
28 Inorganic chemicals; organic or inorganic com-
pounds
29 Organic chemicals
31 Fertilisers
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32 Tanning or dyeing extracts; tannins and their de-
rivatives
33 Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or
toilet preparations
34 Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing pre-
parations, etc
36 Explosives; pyrotechnic products etc
38 Miscellaneous chemical products
54 Man-made filaments
55 Man-made staple fibres
18 Manufacture of basic
pharmaceutical products
and pharmaceutical
preparations
30 Pharmaceutical products
19 Manufacture of rubber
and plastic products
39 Plastics and articles thereof
40 Rubber and articles thereof
20 Manufacture of other
non-metallic mineral
products
68 Articles of stone, plaster, cement, asbestos, mica or
similar materials
69 Ceramic products
70 Glass and glassware
21 Manufacture of basic
metals and fabricated
metal products
72 Iron and steel
73 Articles of iron or steel
74 Copper and articles thereof
75 Nickel and articles thereof
76 Aluminium and articles thereof
78 Lead and articles thereof
79 Zinc and articles thereof
80 Tin and articles thereof
81 Other base metals; cermets; articles thereof
82 Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of
base metal
83 Miscellaneous articles of base metal
22 Manufacture of
electronic and eletrical
equipment
85 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts
thereof
23 Manufacture of
machinery, vehicles and
other transport
equipment
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechan-
ical appliances; parts thereof
86 Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and
parts
87 Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-
stock, and parts thereof
88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof
89 Ships, boats and floating structures
24 Manufacture of furniture 94 Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports,
cushions and similar
Other
25 Live animals 1 Live animals
26 Gold, coins, medals 71 Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-
precious stones, precious metals
91 Clocks and watches and parts thereof
92 Musical instruments; parts and accessories of such
articles
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